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ABSTRACT 
Who Influences Your Outcomes? The Effect of Culture and Ethnic Origin, Neighborhood and 
Peers on Personal Income: A Spatial Econometric Analysis of New York City 
by 
Anna Arakelyan 
Advisor: Wim Vijverberg 
Being a “social animal”, each person is inherently embedded into a complex structure of social 
relations. He has role models to aspire to, conformity rules to follow, and expectations to meet. This 
paper explores the different social influences each person experiences in life. Specifically, I consider 
how a person’s ethnic community, age reference group, occupational and industry group peers, and 
residential area neighbors affect his total income. I introduce a novel model of multiple social 
networks and discuss various identification implications. I apply the model empirically to New York 
City, which naturally is a very favorable environment to test for multiple social effects. The study 
uses generous person-level American Community Survey data that cover rich geographic, ethnic, 
demographic, and employment characteristics. The sample consists of five pooled cross-sections, 
resulting in about 270,000 observations. I analyze a model with spatial lags in dependent variable 
SARAR(1,0), a model with spatial lags in disturbance term SARAR(0,1), and a model with spatial 
lags in both dependent variable and error SARAR(1,1). I address self-selection into groups by 
correcting the empirical model for neighborhood choice and occupation choice. The main finding of 
the dissertation is that a person’s income is affected by his occupational group within his 
neighborhood, by people of the same occupation and industry, by people of the same age group, and 
by his ethnic group within his neighborhood. Additionally, people that work in the same industry 
and the same neighborhood have their unobserved characteristics correlated. 
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I. Introduction 
What determines personal outcomes of people and which factors explain impressive 
differences in personal achievements? The roots of diversity in educational, professional, spiritual, 
humanistic, entrepreneurial, and health-related positions of people present a broad area of research in 
social sciences. What part of personality and outcomes is a product of permanent traits imprinted in 
DNA, and what part is due to changeable traits? Particularly, what is the role of environment, and 
how does it affect a person’s mindset?  
At birth, each person is endowed with exogenous cultural and ethnic context, family and 
resources, and various professional opportunities. These endowments may determine the expected 
life path for a person. As the person grows up, he may change and control to some degree a part of 
his environmental factors; nevertheless many of them may still have a substantial effect on him. One 
way to break down the vague term “environment” is to consider the social interactions framework 
for each person. This study addresses the various social interactions each person is involved in. 
Specifically, my research question is how social interactions affect personal income. 
Each person has a unique network of social connections and social roles. Each social group 
sets its own standards of what is approved and acceptable, and what is inappropriate in terms of 
actions, behavior, and even beliefs. Thus, each social group creates expected behavior, and deviating 
from it may result in anything from disrespect to exclusion and deprivation from the group’s gains 
and benefits. Various groups may carry formal or informal rules that may even be completely 
opposite to each other. For example, in poor neighborhoods the “streets” may be considered the best 
school, while in wealthy neighborhoods formal education gets the most respect. Each individual may 
be influenced by the social medium not only due to the need to conform, but also due to a genuine 
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need for inspiration and role models. And his connections are the natural source for such role 
models. Each individual has someone to look up to, and that is a selective set of people. 
The diverse social groups that may affect the individual’s outcomes are his family, his 
friends, his school and college peers, his colleagues, members of the same clubs, fellow countrymen, 
people of the same occupation, people working in the same industry, people of the same 
socioeconomic status, people from his house, block, street, or neighborhood, people speaking the 
same language, people of the same religion, people of the same age, and, finally, people of the same 
interests or values. This unique cocktail of social interactions influences the individual’s mindset and 
self-image, the sense of identity which then translates to personal outcomes. Which of these social 
mediums have the most prominent effect on the person’s achievements? The goal of the study is to 
answer this question and to measure the relative magnitude of these social effects. 
There are various indicators of personal outcomes: certain objective or subjective measures 
of well-being, personal fulfillment, happiness, or health; some hard measures of accomplishment 
such as experience, certificates, intellectual tests; monetary measures such as income or wealth. The 
outcome variable of my choice is personal income, which is easy to measure and interpret, is widely 
available in the empirical data sets, and has been investigated extensively in the economic literature. 
Therefore, the study’s results can be compared to the earlier findings. Personal income is not claimed 
to be the ideal or the best measure of personal outcomes. In future work, the presented model may be 
applied to happiness or to other measures of attainment or satisfaction.  
The principal distinction and novelty of my approach to social interactions analysis is that 
multiple social mediums are incorporated into one model and estimated simultaneously. Such a 
framework allows separating the different channels of effects and influences. In a sense, I model 
interactions as an integration of multiple social networks. 
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The specific choice of social groups concepts that will enter the model is inextricably linked 
to the empirical context. In this study, I employ the unique urban setting of New York City where 
variations in personal characteristics and personal achievements are substantial, and where the space 
for social interactions is impressive as well. Using rich micro-level Census data, I estimate the effect 
of a person’s ethnic origin group, his residential area neighbors, his adjacent areas neighbors, his 
occupational group peers, his industry group peers, and people of his age group, on his income. 
Econometrically, social interactions may enter the model as spatial lags in the dependent 
variable, as spatial lags in independent variables covering personal demographic and other 
characteristics, as spatial lags in the error representing individual unobservable factors, as a group-
specific unobservable term, or as group-observable characteristics.1 The justification of the particular 
choice for just one group effect is a complex problem in itself. The task gets significantly more 
complicated when multiple group structures are combined in one model. The scope of possible 
models is very broad, and each of them may lead to potential estimation issues. The strategy of 
building the best model capturing the data generating process acquires an essential importance in 
such a compound setting. This study does not intend to fully encompass the multitude of these 
models; rather it sets a starting point for such investigations and attempts to articulate the main 
challenges and theoretical and empirical issues induced by combining multiple group effects. This 
paper originates a large area for future thought and findings. 
The start to empirical testing is laid by considering multiple group effects as spatial lags in 
the dependent variable, spatial lags in error, and the combination of the two. The results show highly 
statistically significant group effects in the majority of specifications. The employment-related peer 
groups consistently show higher impact on income than ancestry groups, age groups, and 
                                                           
1 Blume et al (2011) describe five ways social interactions may enter the model in an example of the effect of 
growing up in a poor neighborhood on the probability of graduating from high school.  
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neighborhood groups, though all of the group effects are salient. A crucial issue with an analysis of 
social networks is their possible endogeneity. If people self-select into social groups rather than have 
group membership predetermined to them, the estimation results can be biased. I address this 
endogeneity by modeling the choice of neighborhood space and the choice of occupation; then I run 
the estimation for the corrected social network structures. I find that after self-selection correction, 
the employment-related peer groups still show the largest effect. The extension of these models and 
the resolution of the related theoretical and econometric issues are some of the directions for future 
research.2 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section II describes different points 
of view regarding the income equation and social interactions in the literature; Section III elaborates 
deeply on sources, destinations, means, and other aspects of social interactions; Section IV states the 
formal theoretical framework; Section V introduces the data and empirical context; Section VI 
discusses the econometric model and relevant identification issues; Section VII presents the initial 
estimation results; Section VIII describes self-selection correction procedure; Section IX 
demonstrates the self-selection corrected estimation results; and Section X presents the conclusion. 
 
 
 
II. Literature Overview 
 
Explaining Income 
The classical model that explains individual income lies within the human capital theory 
framework. The original Mincer (1974) equation is based on the idea that personal income is the 
                                                           
2 Some of the questions will be addressed in the next chapters of my dissertation. 
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return to human capital, and that it increases as the stock of human capital grows. Human capital can 
be obtained with education or experience or some other kind of intellectual or physical skill or 
knowledge accumulation. Later versions of the Mincer equation were complemented with some 
personal characteristics that may affect the human capital growth process (Becker, 1975). The model 
evolved further with the discussion of behavioral traits that are rewarded in the labor markets 
(Willis, 1986; Bowles et al, 2001). One fundamental determinant of human capital growth gained 
increased attention - personal ability. It is mostly unobserved and may be correlated with many 
regressors; thus the failure to include measures of ability in the model raised identification issues. 
Early research paid attention to ability effects as well (Roy, 1951; Griliches and Mason, 1972).  
A number of studies integrated the personality notion to the economic behavior and labor 
market outcomes. Davis (2003) explores a variety of concepts of the individual in economics. 
Heckman et al (2006) highlight the effect of both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities in explaining 
individual outcomes. Cognitive abilities may be measured with IQ-tests and standardized 
mathematics and reading scores, while non-cognitive abilities may be proxied with a self-esteem 
score and a locus of control score. Borghans et al (2008) do another comprehensive analysis of 
personality traits effects. The study relates personality psychology to economic outcomes and 
describes various measures of these traits spanning from Goldberg’s “Big Five” to notions of 
temperament. In particular, this study includes social vitality, social dominance, emotional stability, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness as potential predictors for individual outcomes. Almlund et al 
(2011) list personality traits as determinants of income as well, while stressing their possible 
instability.3 Extreme points of view attribute all behavior to the person-situation pairs and do not 
accept the hypothesis of permanent personality traits.  
                                                           
3 This instability is named in the psychological literature “situational specificity”. 
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While personality and identity theories address the individual traits, many of them 
incorporate social interactions as a part of construction of self-perception. This applies, for example, 
to self-verification theory in psychology (Swann and Read, 1981), and to identity theory in 
economics. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) develop a framework where an individual identifies himself 
with some social category and has beliefs about the expected behavior of that social category’s 
members, and where his payoff depends on whether he complies with these expectations, as well as 
whether other members of that social group “behave” as expected. Brekke et al (2003) consider a 
similar model, where individual’s self-image is determined by whether he complies with the 
generally accepted social morals. 
Since one can single out some internally personal traits and socially acquired traits, 
inevitably the question arises: how to separate them. Generally speaking, this question traces back to 
the “nature vs nurture” controversy. To what degree are personal behavior and outcomes, including 
economic ones, due to inherited personal characteristics, and to what degree are they due to 
environmental factors? Behavioral geneticists conclude that no less than 50% on average of 
behavioral and intellectual outcomes is due to biological factors (Plomin et al, 2013). Economic 
studies on the duality of biological and environmental factors come to the same conclusion: 
biological parents matter a great deal in the prediction of socioeconomic status of an individual 
(Sacerdote, 2002; Bjorklund et al, 2007; Plug and Vijverberg, 2003) To assess the “nurture” effect, 
many studies consider adoptive parents and adopted children’s outcomes. A well-known study by 
Harris (1998), supported and criticized by different branches of psychological thought, establishes 
low or no effect of parents rearing styles on the child personality and attributes the environmental 
part of personal development to peer group effects and social interactions. At the same time, 
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economic studies find the income of adoptive parents has a significant effect on adopted children’s 
outcomes (Plug and Vijverberg, 2005). 
Many empirical studies evaluating the Mincer equation get a low (20%) coefficient of 
determination. What constitutes the remaining variation? One can expect that at least a part of the 
residual variation in outcomes can be explained by all kinds of social factors, such as culture, 
ethnicity, community, residential neighborhood, social networks, peer group effects, etc. 
Personal values and beliefs, whether purely socially acquired or partially innate, play an 
important role in determining the individual’s outcomes. Bourdieu (1986) discerned cultural capital 
as one of the forms of human capital. Klamer (2003) reasoned that personal values affect most of the 
decisions people make. However, it is nearly impossible to disentangle economic motives from the 
effect of culture, values, and social systems. The embeddedness perspective on economic 
performance demonstrates that economic goals and activities are ingrained into structures of social 
relations (Granovetter, 1985 and 1992; Krippner and Alvarez, 2007). Particularly, examples of 
specific markets show that social structures shape prices (Uzzi and Lancaster 2004). The more 
general view on embeddedness describes social networks, institutional processes, and economic 
processes as an integrated system (Oliver, 1991; Fourcade, 2007; Beckert, 2010). 
Thus, methodological individualism was expanded to incorporate social interactions and 
environment effects in a large body of theoretical and empirical economic literature.  
 
Points of View on Social Interactions 
The points of view on the analysis of social interactions vary among social science 
disciplines. Sociology models them through theoretical and empirical correlations in behaviors. 
Generally speaking, sociology explores inequalities due to class, community, culture, status, gender 
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roles, influences, etc. Social psychology models them through theories on the nature of group effects 
and studies them through experiments.4 Theories of self-verification, social comparison, social 
learning, social exchange, social penetration and identity as a social function are in the range of 
possible explanation of the nature of social interactions. Social psychology insights demonstrate that 
even random assignment to groups causes impressive within-group and between-group effects. 
Developmental psychology explores how children learn from observing and interacting; see for 
example Bandura et al, 1966; Berndt, 1979; Grusec, 1992; Wertsch and Tulviste, 1992. 
Alternatively, economic theory mostly uses the conventional utility function, where 
attributes, choices, or actions of others influence the payoff for an individual who solves a personal 
optimization problem. The concept of a utility function is highly controversial in the economic 
literature. According to behavioral economists, rational choice does not exist, and the notion of a 
selfish optimizing agent is not realistic (Sen, 1977; Mullainathan and Thaler, 2001). In accordance 
with neuroscientific findings (Pinker, 1999), a special branch of neuroeconomics argues that 
individual decision-making is far from being a fully conscious process. Many choices are highly 
influenced by emotions, habits, and the very structure of neural pathways (Camerer et al, 2004; 
Camerer et al, 2005). 
At the junction of economics and sociology, the specific field of economic sociology 
combines the features of both sciences (Smelser and Swedberg, 2005): the agent is influenced by 
other actors and is a part of groups; the rationality of the agent is not assumed, rather it is a variable; 
model constraints are not only economic resources but also the social structure; and the range of 
analytical methods is wider than merely mathematical models.  
                                                           
4 For a large, but not exhaustive list of social psychology experiments, see https://explorable.com/social-
psychology-experiments. 
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The most commonly used theoretical model where individual choices depend on choices or 
outcomes of others is essentially a game and can be well modeled with the game theory toolkit. 
Game-theoretic models are specifically configured, and the solutions – unique or multiple – may 
depend on the completeness of information. See Jackson (2005) for a vast survey of studies on game 
theory applications of social interactions models.  
Another framework for social interactions research is social network theory. When the 
connections between agents are not described simply by nonoverlapping groups, the specific 
structure of relationships determines unique interesting payoffs to each person in a network. In the 
visual model of the network, agents are presented as nodes; social relations are presented as 
connections between the nodes; and the centrality degree determines the number of connections an 
agent has. The studies reveal that not only the number of connections but also the quality of them has 
an important impact on individual outcomes (Granovetter, 2005; Jackson and Rogers, 2007). For 
example, it proves much better to have connections with at least one agent from various groups not 
related to each other. See Knoke (2014) for a survey of social network studies. 
A particularly important aspect of the social network applications is the possible endogenous 
structure of networks. Blume et al (2011) explore models accounting for unknown network structure. 
Some problems of sampled networks are discussed by Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) and by 
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013). A number of studies considers tendogenous social networks 
from the point of view of game theory (Hiller, 2013; Hojman and Szeidl, 2013; Badev, 2013). These 
studies consider social games where agents choose both their partners and their actions. Rogowski 
and Sinclair (2012) apply endogenous network structure to analysis of legislative behavior.  
Self-selection into groups is an important case of endogenous social networks. Similarly to 
the game theory approach described above, Weinberg (2007) develops a framework where people 
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have social groups, but choose to actively interact with a subset of their group, thus, forming a 
desired set of contextual effects. Some empirical studies explicitly correct for group choice, 
particularly for residential neighborhood choice (Benabou, 1993; Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996; 
Hoff and Sen, 2005). Evans et al (1992) employ the instrumental variables approach to address self-
selection. Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) use quasi-experimental design to account for self-selection. 
Generally, the Heckman type approach applied to group choice has proved reasonable to correct for 
the selectivity. Brock and Durlauf (2001) model the choice between two groups; and Ioannides and 
Zabel (2008) extend the model to account for the choice between arbitrary finite number of groups. 
The number of connections and their configuration constitute what is called social capital. 
Bourdieu (1986) included social capital in the human capital term. Coleman (1988) explored how the 
social capital is created. Glaeser et al (2002) offered another study on how social capital is built. For 
a survey on empirical social capital research, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2003). 
In order to fully describe the social interaction effects, it is important to note that it is a two-
way process. On the one hand, society affects individuals, on the other hand, individuals affect 
society. Individuals’ reactions create certain group compositions. Some studies focus on the 
equilibrium group allocations. Such aggregate group configurations effects are named “social 
multiplier” (Glaeser et al, 2003). 
Finally, recent literature on social effects constitutes a large body of studies. An extensive 
overview of theoretical literature is given in Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Durlauf and Ioannides 
(2010). For a comprehensive survey of empirical studies, see Durlauf (2004). 
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III. Modeling Social Interactions 
 
Sources of Social Effects 
Different kinds of social interactions get attention in the economic research. The following 
sources of social effects arouse the strongest interest. 
First is family effects. As noted earlier, intergenerational transmission of traits and status 
plays an important role and the genetic effect is very strong, as confirmed by empirical research. 
Besides, parents’ choices determine the child’s available resources: parents in most cases choose the 
school, the residential neighborhood, and at least partially control the economic well-being of the 
family. Additionally, as the neuroscientific view on child’s brain formation states, the individual 
development as a creation of neurons and pathways between them proceeds much faster and is much 
stronger in childhood. And one can see that at this time of child’s life, he is almost always 
surrounded by his immediate relatives, so if there are any social spillovers, parents are one of the 
important sources.  
Second is culture and ethnicity, as supported by a lot of aggregate-level cross-cultural 
analysis. The channels through which traits of cultural beliefs and informal rules affect well-being of 
whole nations have always been of great interest in economic theory and beyond. For example, 
social psychologist Geert Hofstede (1991) identified six dimensions of society’s values: power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation, and indulgence. 
From an economic point of view, cultural constructs are admitted to affect the economic 
performance of communities. One example is religion – it is shown to shape personal traits, and 
they, in turn, create economic outcomes (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Lehrer, 2004). And the same 
informal rules and beliefs are saved when the ethnic communities migrate to other countries. This 
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way, ethnic diasporas have distinct socioeconomic statuses (Borjas, 1995). Language, among other 
features, can be a decent predictor of earnings (Chiswick and Miller, 1995). 
The third source of interactions is the residential neighborhood. The infrastructure, the 
demographic composition, the lifestyle, the dominant level of wealth and social status, the speed of 
activities, and so on, may have impressive social spillovers on an individual’s outcomes. A vast 
neighborhood effects literature supports the hypothesis that people who share the same 
neighborhood with an individual affect his outcomes (Ioannides, 2002; Oreopoulos, 2003).  
An extension of the neighborhood effects concept can be found in urban economics. In 
addition to the neighborhood the individual is allocated in, the adjacent neighborhoods may have an 
effect, as well, although expectedly lower. The Tobler’s first law of geography states that 
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things”. 
Following this logic, spatial analysis with weights depending on distance between neighborhoods is 
a reasonable approach to the interactions investigation. Urban structure of interactions is shown to 
result in segregation (Schelling, 1971), and, in general, to influence economic performance (Storper 
and Venables, 2004). 
The fourth kind of social interactions is peer group effects. This is a broad notion that may 
span from as narrow as school class and work colleagues group, to wider group definitions such as 
occupation or industry, or to more sophisticated networks with specific structures. There is a wide 
range of tools to analyze such effects, including addressing both within-group and between-group 
effects. An extensive number of studies focuses on these general kinds of social interactions 
(Manski, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Durlauf and Ioannides, 2010). 
All the four kinds of effects described above are sometimes studied separately, and 
sometimes interchangeably, for one can notice the general resemblance of such interactions. They 
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differ in the space definition, but may be pooled into one general analysis using the notion of “social 
space”5 (Durlauf, 2004), because geographic proximity can be treated as one of the special cases of 
“social proximity”. 
One problem with any classification of interactions is the difficulty of disentangling various 
sources of effects. For example, in an urban context, children are affected by their family and 
relatives’ community, which combines ethnic, religious, language effects, and is also a part of their 
residential neighborhood, and also carries the between-group comparison effects, and can be well-
correlated with possible school peer groups. Thereby, proper definition of neighborhood boundaries 
is an important task. Durlauf (2004) notes that many social interactions studies do not pay 
appropriate attention to it. 
The principal idea of my research is to combine various sources of social effects in one 
model. Such a model is not limited by any of the single group definitions listed above, but extends 
them to include multiple other sources of effects. This approach helps to capture a fuller picture of 
different influences on personal outcomes. This is an attempt to single out each separate channel of 
social influence for better inference and prediction.  
As general as it is, the model has to include a set of specific effects, and the choice of the 
sources of effects is not a straightforward task. Traditional understanding of social networks uses a 
set of links between people that personally know each other well, to the point that they can exchange 
information. More general networks theory may split connections into strong and weak ties. The 
present study uses different network determination which can be the closest in definition to “the 
reference group” term from sociology. For the agent of interest, he does not have to be personally 
acquainted with all the people affecting him; rather he generally reacts to their typical or averaged 
                                                           
5 The term “social space” was introduced by Akerlof (s1997) in the paper “Social Distance and Social 
Decisions”.  
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traits or behaviors. At the same time, he may or may not be in particular groups that affect each of 
them. Such broad definitions of groups may span to, say, all people in one’s age group in the city, 
which can be overgeneralizing. Therefore, it makes sense to reduce the groups in a reasonable way 
to include, for example, people of the agent’s age group within the agent’s residential neighborhood 
and the neighborhood of his workplace. Another strategy is to include in the model both the effect of 
the closer and farther circles – agent’s age group within and beyond his neighborhood. On the other 
hand, it is also important not to overly limit the groups. One problem with social network 
applications that use sample data arises from observing only a part of the network captured by the 
sample. In other words, some part of the effects may be lost in sample data. Since the goal is to 
capture an average characteristic or behavior within the reference group, it is important to keep the 
groups populated enough to preserve that average tendency within the confines of the sample.  
The reasonable set of social spaces may include geographically defined reference groups, 
such as people in the agent’s neighborhood and in adjacent neighborhoods; culturally defined 
groups, such as people of the agent’s ethnic origin or diaspora; employment-related groups, such as 
people of the same occupation or people employed in the same industry; and, finally, certain general 
social resemblance groups, such as people of the same age group.  
Another interesting question arises with the structuring of the social spaces included in the 
model. One way to set boundaries is to split all the agents into nonoverlapping groups; this approach 
makes sense for geographic areas with clear boundaries. Other structures may have groups overlap 
slightly, for example for ethnic origin, if a person is a mix of two or more origins he identifies 
himself with, he then might be a member of more than one ethnic community. Finally, structures like 
age group are widely overlapping if, for example, one includes a range of age above and below the 
agent’s age. A special kind of overlapping group structure is a spatial map of the city or country. The 
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reference group of interest can be comprised of people living in the adjacent areas. Alternatively, 
each area may have an effect inversely proportional to the distance from the agent’s location. 
The next question concerns the number of social spaces and group effects included in a 
model. The preferred set of group effects will be sufficiently comprehensive to include the most 
important sources of effects. At the same time, following the parsimony principle, the desirable 
model should be simple and clear. Besides, keeping the model from being overwhelmed with group 
factors helps to avoid multicollinearity and imprecision of estimates. 
In this study, I do not adopt the traditional visions of social network with purely exogenous 
or endogenous weights given to connections. I consider a mix of the two, so the model combines 
properties of both extreme cases. The reference groups are predetermined, while their relative 
influences are to be estimated. Thus, the resulting social structure is a linear combination of several 
reference groups of different nature and different strength of effect. 
 
Caveats 
Several important complications come with the novel model of multiple social networks. 
The first issue is the possible heterogeneity of effects. Different people may be affected more or less 
by different sources of social effects. There is a multiplicity of possible scenarios. Representatives of 
some very religious ethnic communities may be significantly affected by these communities and to a 
lesser extent by other social groups. Younger people may care a lot about their age reference groups, 
and much less about other peer groups. Experienced professionals may choose not to associate 
themselves with people of their age group at all, but may be highly influenced by people of the same 
occupation regardless of their age. The social effects may change with certain individual 
characteristics. For example, with the growth of intellectual level, or with experience, or with the 
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change of marital status, certain effects may get substantially stronger or weaker. The social effects 
may change with certain features of the groups themselves. Such factors as the size of the group, or 
some qualitative composition of it may determine the strength of the effect. Besides, the interactions 
may well be nonlinear. For example, for some person his ethnic community may have a strong effect 
if the group is small, and weak effect if the group is large, and again strong effect, if the group is 
very large, because it becomes the dominant cultural group. If the model does not contain cross-
products representing the implied interactions, it may fail to account for some important 
heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the effects estimated by the general model will represent certain 
average tendencies.  
The second issue is linked to the presumed exogeneity of each of the social network 
structures. The primary concern is whether the whole group is given to an individual, or is chosen 
consciously. Certainly, a person does not select his family, ethnicity, and country of birth. Neither 
has he control over his age. Thus, the associated cultural and age reference groups can be plausibly 
assumed exogenous. The situation is not that straightforward with residential neighborhoods and 
employment-based groups.  
Consider first the neighborhood. A number of studies consider the family and residential 
neighborhood effects on the child’s development and outcomes. There is no doubt that the 
neighborhood a child grows in is predetermined to him. The neighborhood is shown to have an 
impressive effect on child’s outcomes to the point where a poor neighborhood can be called a 
poverty trap (Duncan et al, 1994; Durlauf, 1996). Moreover, as empirical studies suggest, the 
socioeconomic status of community is self-enhanced, and overcoming poverty presents a formidable 
challenge for a growing person (Durlauf et al, 2017). My study, however, considers adults and their 
residential location can be changed more than once or remain the same as in their childhood. While 
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for adults the house location is not likely to be uncontrollable, the true degree of the power over it is 
closely tied to the population of interest. In developing countries, buying a new house may be very 
difficult due to financial constraints, so only the well-off people can afford it. A reasonable objection 
may state that renting a living space is available to a large part of the population. The problem, 
however, is that in a highly unequal and segregated urban environment, the rent payments are also 
highly segregated, so that the affordable apartments or houses will be located in particular kinds of 
neighborhoods, and there will not be much of a choice for a person, given that he has some expected 
standards of living and is limited financially. Thus, the residential neighborhood may be exogenous 
to some degree. The situation may be completely different in developed countries, where many 
people can afford if not to buy, then at least to rent a house in any place with some reasonable 
limitations. In that case, the people in his own neighborhood and adjacent neighborhoods are, in a 
sense, selected, and the model of group effects must correct for the selected sample in one way or 
another. 
Consider now the occupational and industry groups. Intergenerational transmission of values 
and preferences may result in children following the same or similar career tracks as their parents 
and larger family. In some cultural communities, children are inheriting the family business or 
professions without any personal considerations, because that is the standard formal or informal 
practice. If that is the case, employment-related reference groups are truly exogenously given to a 
person. Further, some countries or regions have predetermined sectoral composition structures, and 
the choice for a person is rather narrow. Additionally, the membership in a particular racial or ethnic 
minority may predetermine the set of available occupational positions or industries. On the other 
hand, in developed countries, many people may realize an “American dream”: enter any desired 
profession and achieve various career successes. The chance of advancement may still be highly 
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correlated with childhood conditions and financial safety of the family, but the limitations are not 
binding.  
A quite different moment is the selectivity within the considered reference group. Each 
person may look up more to some members of the group and less to other ones. The role models are 
likely to be selective and appreciated for some personal reasons. In that case, exogeneity of the 
group effect also gets questioned. In Section VIII I elaborate on my selection correction strategy and 
discuss the implementation details. 
The third issue is the various possible associations between included social networks. Age 
group peers are plausibly independent from other groups, but the other considered networks may be 
difficult to untangle. Occupational choices may be very tightly linked to ethnic community. One 
reason for that is uneven labor market information flows within and between cultural groups. 
Evidence of interdependencies in occupation and ethnicity is the highly diverse ethnic compositions 
across industries and occupations. Another relationship may exist between the neighborhood a 
person lives in and job opportunities due to distinct sectoral specialization in distinct parts of the 
town. A separate issue is that the neighborhood reflects the socioeconomic status of the residents, so 
that poor and low-skilled workers reside in poor neighborhoods and naturally have access only to 
certain low-paid jobs, while more educated and qualified workers reside in favorable neighborhoods 
and have greater employment opportunities. Thus, neighborhood and occupational reference groups 
reflect the same story and should not be added in the model independently. Since different social 
spaces can be correlated, it is important to include all of them in the model to separate various 
channels of influences. This presents no econometric issues as long as the spatial weighting matrices 
for different spaces are not identical. 
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Finally, the overlay of a number of social networks inevitably presumes that certain people 
may be tied together through several reference groups. If two people share more than one social 
group, then they naturally have more influence on each other. This is another reason to include in the 
model different social effects simultaneously. According to the method of instrumental variables, 
each endogenous effect is explained separately by exogenous characteristics of an underlying group; 
so that social effects for various channels are separated. 
The validity of the expressed concerns of heterogeneity, endogeneity and interdependence of 
social effects is subject to the unique empirical context used in the analysis. As mentioned earlier, 
rich and poor countries may have quite different frameworks of social effects. 
The empirical part of this study explores the New York City population. Within the urban 
environment with rich ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic variations, one can reveal different kinds 
of social effects. While the fulfillment of the homogeneity, exogeneity and independence is not 
always achieved, the presented models are unique and yield valuable results as they may capture 
interesting and unexpected social effects patterns. 
 
Pathways of Social Effects 
In various studies in economic literature and far beyond, social interactions are shown to 
influence an individual’s health, behavior, attitudes, language, education, as well as his income. 
From the economic perspective, such multiplicity of directional effects complicates the estimation of 
social effects on income. The listed characteristics are usually assumed to be exogenous predictors of 
income. The task becomes more complicated when social interactions go both directly and 
indirectly. In this paper, I assume that all included 𝑋 characteristics are exogenous to income and, 
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instead, adopt a very flexible functional form that allows for social effects through observable and 
unobservable, endogenous and exogenous group factors.   
In this study, the focus is on total personal income as a dependent variable. I purposely do not 
limit income sources to wage and salary income, or asset income, or any other kind of income, but 
unite all the various sources of income. This way, the results are not tied to membership in the labor 
force, or formal employment, and do not depend on labor market conditions. Clearly, social 
interactions exist for people of diverse life activities, professional ambitions, and leisure preferences. 
For some groups, a temporary or freelance job is respectable. For other groups, the best standard 
might be to run the family business or farm. Some other groups of people value education and 
knowledge accumulation itself, and not relative to potential income flows in the future. In some 
groups, the generally accepted way of living is altruistic and compassionate, where the goal is to 
serve to other people. In some groups, the ascetic and nonmaterial way of living is the best practice, 
while in other groups the achievement of affluence is the main criterion of the success and respect. 
Having people project quite different attitudes about income, I find it reasonable to include in the 
analysis all the sources of income combined. Additionally, it proves useful to consider both absolute 
and relative measures of income, therefore, I use income and natural logarithm of income as key 
dependent variables. 
 
Means of social interactions 
People connect with each other for many reasons: achievement of common goals and pursuit 
of common interests, enforcement of power, ensuring the safety, communication, self-respect and 
reference, obtainment of certain status, information exchange, resources exchange, labor connections 
exchange, recreation and new acquaintances, and perhaps yet other reasons. 
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The social interactions appear to manifest themselves in certain kinds of agents’ 
interdependencies (Durlauf, 2004). First is the interdependencies in preferences. This may be due to 
purely psychological factors, such as an intrinsic desire to behave like certain others. Other agents 
can be the role models, and the agent selectively learns from those whom he wants to resemble or 
those arousing most of his sympathy. Some studies suggest that individuals tend to connect with 
similar others, the ones with the closest attributes. Even weak preferences for selective communities 
and neighboring may cause a complete segregation, at least in a spatial sense (Schelling, 1971). 
Another view considers imitative behavior more as conformity and concerns for social reputation. 
For example, according to Benabou and Tirole (2006), and Sobel (2005), social norms such as 
altruism are embedded into the decision-making process.6 Grilo et al (2001) elaborate on the idea of 
social pressure for certain behaviors even more by adding to the model the agent’s need for 
exclusivity, so that the agent may gain from deliberately deviating from the group. Grilo et al call 
these two motives conformity and vanity. A similar concept in consumer theory is called snob 
behavior. 
Second is the interdependencies in constraints. The costs of some behaviors depend on 
whether other individuals do the same. Manski (1993) describes two mechanisms of 
interdependencies in constraints: the market mechanisms (through the adjustments of prices) and the 
congestion mechanisms (through sharing some common resource). An example of interdependencies 
in constraints is the network effects for new technologies: people are more inclined to use some 
service such as telecommunications, or internet products, or mobile applications if more of their 
                                                           
6 Similarly with this view, neuroscience literature offers an insight on the chemical need for belonging. 
Breuning (2015) suggests that, just as mammals or simpler animals, people unconsciously seek the social 
approval, for the individual survival depends on the membership in the group. The social approval is awarded 
by the release of oxytocin, which signalizes “happiness”, whereas the social disapproval causes droop in 
oxytocin and a spike in cortisol, a stress chemical. 
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acquaintances use the same product. Another example is the use of the same area infrastructure by 
people living in the same neighborhood. 
Third is the interdependencies in information transmission. Uncertainty is one reason of 
inefficient choices of individuals, and in such context the access to some private information may 
play a crucial role in improving the outcomes. Granovetter’s (1973) study on labor market 
connections is an impressive demonstration of the importance of access to information. Besides, for 
any contexts with expectations on variables instead of perfectly observable values, the access to 
particular information allows to correct the expectations. The informational flows unique to certain 
cultural communities may be the crucial determinants of the individuals’ outcomes. 
In this paper, I model the social interactions through interdependencies in both preferences 
and constraints, while assuming complete information for all agents. Further extension of the model 
may relax this assumption. 
 
Method: Utility Function 
The present paper employs a mathematical model of choice with social interactions in the 
tradition of classical utility optimization. From the vantage point of utility function, there can be 
interactions at the level of payoff and interactions at the level of strategies (Cooper and John, 1988). 
The former refers to other agents’ payoff effect on the payoff of the individual; the latter refers to 
other agents’ choices effect on the payoff of the individual. Manski (1993) identifies these two kinds 
of effects in econometric models and names them endogenous effects and contextual effects, 
respectively. This finding is accompanied by the attached identification problem, “the reflection 
problem”, which lies in the practical difficulty of disentangling these two kinds of effects. In 
addition to endogenous effects represented by spatial lags in the dependent variable and contextual 
23 
 
effects represented by spatial lags in independent variables or by some group-level observable 
characteristics, the model may allow for unobservable (fixed or random) group effects, and for 
spatial correlation in unobservable disturbance terms.  
The theoretical model I use allows for all these effects, while the empirical analysis makes 
certain limiting assumptions. The use of all the ways social effects can enter the model is beyond the 
scope of this paper, and the strategy is to consider the essential model of spatial lags in the dependent 
variable, the model of spatial correlation in error terms, and the model that combines the two. The 
proper development of this model may further complicate and generalize the model by relaxing 
limiting assumptions on some of the effects described above.  
This study utilizes the following theoretical framework: on the one hand each individual 
experiences a utility level that depends on his income and the set of social factors; on the other hand 
each individual suffers costs associated with achieving his income that depends on the income level 
and the set of social factors. Thus, social effects enter the model in both the utility function and in 
the constraints. Finally, the individual maximizes his net utility function which is a difference of his 
utility and his costs. 
Consider first the utility function. It must account for differing attitudes people have towards 
income. Even though the wealth-seeking approach is applicable to many people for whom high 
income can be a kind of consumption good in itself, personal perceptions of happiness are not based 
solely on material wealth for every agent. I regard personal preferences as a function of values of 
some goods consumed, where these consumption goods are used in a very broad definition. They 
certainly include the conventional economic goods such as food and clothing, housing, and 
healthcare. But more importantly, they include intangible notions of leisure, spiritual peace, romantic 
relationships, family creation, self-respect, social respect, friendships, professional success, 
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realization of abilities, altruism and service, fame, etc. In a broad sense, various levels of income 
yield different levels of consumption of these goods. Social effects may play an important role in this 
translation of income level to a certain utility level. 
Consider now the cost function. Achieving and sustaining certain income level inevitably 
requires carrying costs. Each of the described “consumption goods” has its own price, where the 
notion of price is broad as well and may mean certain time or income losses, or opportunity costs.  
And the prices of certain activities may be well affected by the transaction costs determined by 
social groups. Thus social effects influence the translation of income level to a certain costs level. 
When modeling the social effects, if there is some specific generally accepted notion of 
success, say, wealth, one way to envision the preferences is to expect increasing utility return on 
relative income, so that the people richer than average gain respect and power. An alternative way to 
model interactive preferences is through negative return on both positive and negative deviations 
from the average level. The following theoretical model employs the second view, where the 
ordinary members of the group achieve the highest utility, such that being on the left or right end of 
the distribution is not favorable.  
 
 
 
IV. Theoretical Model Setup 
For the setup of the model, I adopt the generally used linear-in-means model framework7 and 
extend it to include multiple social effects. 
 
                                                           
7 See Blume et al (2011) for description of various social interaction models and a detailed description of 
linear-in-means model. 
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Group Definitions 
There are 𝑁 individuals and 𝐿 spaces in which they unite into groups. Each space 𝑙 =
1,2, … , 𝐿 is structured in its own unique way defined by the matrix 𝑊𝑙 of dimensions 𝑁 × 𝑁. For 
example, 𝑙 = 1 may represent common ancestry space, 𝑙 = 2 same age group space, etc. 
For each individual 𝑖, the social group 𝑔𝑙𝑖 in a space 𝑙 that affects him is determined by the 𝑖-
th row of 𝑊𝑙. For example, for a person 𝑖 𝑔1𝑖  represents a group of people of his ancestry, 
𝑔2𝑖  represents a group of people of the same age group, etc. 
The matrix element 𝑤𝑙,𝑖𝑗 > 0 for individuals 𝑗 that are members of group 𝑔𝑙𝑖, 𝑤𝑙,𝑖𝑗 = 0 for 
individuals 𝑗 that are not members of group 𝑔𝑙𝑖, and 𝑤𝑙,𝑖𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖. The nonzero weights 𝑤𝑙,𝑖𝑗  can be 
assumed to be equal; in that case, each member of group 𝑔𝑙𝑖 has the same relative weight in the 
group effect.  
Due to stationarity considerations, each matrix 𝑊𝑙 is row-standardized. In this way, the 
operator 𝑊𝑙 when applied to a vector, generates a vector of individual-exclusive group means based 
on the presumed social structure of the space 𝑙. For example, 𝑦 is the 𝑁 × 1 vector of total personal 
income, and 𝑊𝑙𝑦 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of group mean incomes. It follows that each individual is subject 
to 𝐿 group effects from groups 𝑔1𝑖 , 𝑔2𝑖 , … , 𝑔𝐿𝑖.  
 In order to identify the causal effects of social groups on income, the groups must be 
assumed predetermined to individuals: 
Assumption A.1: Each 𝑊𝑙 is exogenous to each individual 𝑖.           (1) 
 
The process that generates the network structures is assumed unrelated to the process that 
determines the dependent variable income. Thus, network structures help determine 𝑦 but are not 
determined by 𝑦; there is no feedback effect. 
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Net Utility Function 
Each individual enjoys a utility level 𝑈𝑖 that depends on his income level 𝑦𝑖 and a set of 
social factors Θ𝑖: 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈(𝑦𝑖 , Θ𝑖). Each individual bears a costs level 𝐶𝑖 that depends on his income 
level 𝑦𝑖 and a set of social factors Θ𝑖: 𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑖 , Θ𝑖). 
Below is the optimization problem solved by each individual 𝑖: 
max
𝑦𝑖
(𝑈(𝑦𝑖 , Θ𝑖) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑖 , Θ𝑖))                            (2) 
Each person chooses the income level that maximizes the difference between his utility 𝑈𝑖 
and his costs 𝐶𝑖. The social factors space Θ𝑖 consists of the following characteristics: 
Θ𝑖 = {𝑋𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖𝑔1𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖𝑔2𝑖 , … , ?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝐿𝑖 , 𝑍𝑔1𝑖 , 𝑍𝑔2𝑖 , … , 𝑍𝑔𝐿𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖 , 𝜇𝑔1𝑖 , 𝜇𝑔2𝑖 , … , 𝜇𝑔𝐿𝑖},                (3) 
where 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of observable individual characteristics of 𝑖;  
?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖  ∀𝑙 is average income in a group 𝑔𝑙𝑖 excluding individual 𝑖: 
 ?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖 =
1
𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖−1
∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗∈𝑔𝑙𝑖,𝑗≠𝑖 , where 𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖 is the size of 𝑔𝑙𝑖;  
also, ?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖   is an 𝑖-th element of the vector 𝑊𝑙𝑦; 
𝑍𝑔𝑙𝑖  ∀𝑙 is a vector of group observable characteristics of 𝑔𝑙𝑖
8; 
𝜀𝑖 is a random individual unobservable term of 𝑖;  
𝜇𝑔𝑙𝑖  ∀𝑙 is a random group unobservable term of 𝑔𝑙𝑖. 
 
The optimal level of income maximizes net utility function 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑈(𝑦𝑖 , Θ𝑖) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑖 , Θ𝑖) for 
every individual 𝑖: 
                                                           
8 As a special case, it can be a set of average attributes of its members 𝑍𝑔𝑙𝑖 = {?̅?1𝑔𝑙𝑖 , ?̅?2𝑔𝑙𝑖 , … , ?̅?𝑝𝑔𝑙𝑖}, where 
𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑝 is some subset of 𝑋. 
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𝑦𝑖 = argmax
𝑦
𝑉(𝑦, Θ𝑖).                 (4) 
Under certain conditions the solution will be a linear function of factors Θ𝑖; otherwise, the 
linear equation form can be a first-order approximation of the more complex process. 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜓(𝑋𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖𝑔1𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖𝑔2𝑖 , … , ?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝐿𝑖 , 𝑍𝑔1𝑖 , 𝑍𝑔2𝑖 , … , 𝑍𝑔𝐿𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖 , 𝜇𝑔1𝑖 , 𝜇𝑔2𝑖 , … , 𝜇𝑔𝐿𝑖).                      (5) 
Below is an example of the indirect utility functional form that yields a linear solution. I 
follow the model described in Blume et al (2011), assuming complete information and multiple 
group effects. The utility function is quadratic and is a sum of private benefit and social benefit. 
Individual’s utility linearly decreases with the quadratic deviation from group average income.  
𝑉𝑖(𝑦𝑖 , Θ𝑖) = 𝜑𝑖𝑦𝑖 −
𝑦𝑖
2
2
− ∑
𝜎𝑙
2
(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖)
2𝐿
𝑙=1 ,                   (6) 
where the individual marginal benefit 𝜑𝑖 can be decomposed as  
𝜑𝑖 = 𝜒 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝜅 + ∑ 𝑍𝑔𝑙𝑖
′ 𝛾𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1 + 𝜉𝑖 + ∑ 𝑓𝑔𝑙𝑖
𝐿
𝑙=1 .                      (7) 
In this expression, 𝜉𝑖 and 𝑓𝑔𝑙𝑖 are individual 𝑖 specific and group 𝑔𝑙𝑖 specific random terms, 𝜒 is a 
constant term, and  𝜅, 𝛾1, 𝛾2, … , 𝛾𝐿 are parameter vectors. 
The solution for 𝑦𝑖 is derived as follows. The first order condition is  
𝜑𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 − ∑ 𝜎𝑙(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖)𝑙 = 0.                   (8) 
Solving for 𝑦𝑖, this yields: 
𝑦𝑖 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜑𝑖 +
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
∑ 𝜎𝑙?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑙 ,                   (9) 
or, substituting for 𝜑𝑖: 
𝑦𝑖 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜒 +
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝑋𝑖
′𝜅 +
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
∑ 𝑍𝑔𝑙𝑖
′ 𝛾𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1 +
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜉𝑖 +
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
∑ 𝑓𝑔𝑙𝑖
𝐿
𝑙=1 +
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
∑ 𝜎𝑙?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑙  
                     (10) 
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Setting 𝛼 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜒,  𝛽 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜅, 𝛿𝑙 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝛾𝑙  ∀𝑙, 𝜀𝑖 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜉𝑖 ,  𝜇𝑔𝑙 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝑓𝑔𝑙𝑖  ∀𝑙, and 
𝜆𝑙 =
1
1+∑ 𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜎𝑙, the solution is equivalent to the linear equation 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 + ∑ 𝑍𝑔𝑙𝑖
′ 𝛿𝑙𝑙 + ∑ 𝜆𝑙?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖 + ∑ 𝜇𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑙 .          (11) 
Equation (11) is the structural equation. Actually, equation (11) is one equation of a system of 𝑁 
equations that determines the outcome 𝑦𝑖  for 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁 individuals simultaneously. The 
equilibrium solution for all the individuals may be derived in the reduced-form equation as follows. 
Equation (11) is rewritten in matrix form as    
𝑦 = 𝛼𝜄 + 𝑋𝛽 + ∑ 𝑍𝑙𝛿𝑙𝑙 + ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀 + ∑ 𝜇𝑙𝑙 ,               (12) 
where 𝜄 is a 𝑁 × 1 matrix of ones, matrix 𝑋 stacks rows 𝑋𝑖, matrices 𝑍𝑙 stack rows 𝑍𝑔𝑙𝑖  ∀𝑙, and 𝜇𝑙 
stacks the 𝑁 values of 𝜇𝑔𝑙𝑖. 
Collecting terms with 𝑦 yields: 
(𝐼 − ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑙 )𝑦 = 𝛼𝜄 + 𝑋𝛽 + ∑ 𝑍𝑙𝛿𝑙𝑙 + 𝜀 + ∑ 𝜇𝑙𝑙 ,                      (13) 
where 𝐼 is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 identity matrix. This leads to an explicit functional form for 𝑦: 
𝑦 = 𝛼𝑆𝜄 + 𝑆𝑋𝛽 + 𝑆 ∑ 𝑍𝑙𝛿𝑙𝑙 + 𝑆𝜀 + 𝑆 ∑ 𝜇𝑙𝑙 ,             (14) 
where 𝑆 = (𝐼 − ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑙 )
−1.                                     (15) 
Thus, equation (14) represents the equilibrium solution after accounting for all social interaction 
effects.9  
 Each 𝜆𝑙 represents the coefficient of spatial autocorrelation. It is a parameter that measures 
the strength of linear relationship between the outcome variable 𝑦 and the spatial lags 𝑊𝑙𝑦. The 
meaning of the parameter vectors 𝛽 and 𝛿𝑙 in the model of social interactions is different from 
meaning of parameters in a conventional OLS model. From equation (14), one can see that  𝛽 and 𝛿𝑙 
                                                           
9 Blume et al (2011) prove that this is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete 
information. I extrapolate the conclusions to the case of complete information. 
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are not partial derivatives of 𝑦 with respect to 𝑋 and 𝑍𝑙, thus 𝛽 and 𝛿𝑙 cannot be interpreted as 
marginal effects. Moreover, for each explanatory variable there are 𝑁 × 𝑁 effects, since each of the 
𝑁 observations of a variable from the set 𝑋 or 𝑍𝑙 has an effect on each of the 𝑁 observations of the 
outcome variable 𝑦. Such a matrix of marginal effects for an explanatory variable 𝑣𝑎𝑟 from the set  
𝑋 or 𝑍𝑙 would be  
𝐷𝑣𝑎𝑟 = (
𝜕𝑦1
𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑟1
…
𝜕𝑦1
𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑁
… … …
𝜕𝑦𝑁
𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑟1
…
𝜕𝑦𝑁
𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑁
).              (16) 
Deriving 𝐷𝑣𝑎𝑟 from (14), one gets 𝑆𝛽𝑣𝑎𝑟𝐼 if  𝑣𝑎𝑟 is one of the 𝑋 variables, and 𝑆𝛿𝑙,𝑣𝑎𝑟𝐼 if 𝑣𝑎𝑟 is one 
of the 𝑍𝑙 variables. For example, if 𝑣𝑎𝑟 is a 𝑘-th 𝑋 variable, then 
𝐷𝑥𝑘 = (
𝜕𝑦1
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
…
𝜕𝑦1
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘
… … …
𝜕𝑦𝑁
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
…
𝜕𝑦𝑁
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘
) = 𝑆 ∙ (
𝛽𝑘 0 … 0
0 𝛽𝑘 … 0
… … … …
0 0 … 𝛽𝑘
) = (𝐼 − ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑙 )
−1 ∙ (
𝛽𝑘 0 … 0
0 𝛽𝑘 … 0
… … … …
0 0 … 𝛽𝑘
).           
      (17) 
The resulting matrix of marginal effects will have the effects of 𝑥𝑖𝑘 on 𝑦𝑖 on diagonal (direct 
effects), and the effects of 𝑥𝑖𝑘 on the rest of the 𝑦 observations off diagonal (indirect effects).
10 Thus, 
𝛽 and 𝛿𝑙 are important parameters of the social interactions model, but are not explicitly 
interpretable. Nevertheless, it is useful to check that the values of estimated 𝛽 and 𝛿𝑙 coefficients are 
in a reasonable range, so that the estimation results are meaningful. 
 Equation (11) is the baseline econometric model to be used for empirical testing. In the 
following chapters I make certain restrictive assumptions on parameters of equation (11). 
 
 
                                                           
10 Detailed derivation and interpretation of direct and indirect spatial effects can be found in LeSage and Pace 
(2009) and in Elhorst (2014). 
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V. Data: Application to New York City 
For the empirical analysis of the model of multiple social effects I examine the population of 
New York City. The data I use come from Census. I use American Community Survey Public Use 
Microdata Samples (PUMS) for years 2010-2014. It represents five pooled 1% population size cross-
sections, so the resulting data set covers 5% of the New York City population. The income and 
social interactions analysis must be applied to a relatively homogenous sample, so it is reasonable to 
exclude children and seniors. After removing individuals under 16 years and above 80 years old, I 
get a generous sample of 270,402 observations. Furthermore, I use this entire sample, including 
individuals with zero or negative total personal income.  
New York City today is a unique place. With a population of over 8 million, it has over 250 
neighborhoods and is inhabited by communities representing almost every possible culture in the 
world. Being a kind of patchwork cloth, New York City is a miniature model of the whole world. 
New York City naturally appears to be a very favorable case study for multiple social interactions 
analysis, for various reasons. 
First, the variation in socioeconomic status of residents is impressive. According to the 
Census data, household income inequality in New York State as measured by the Gini coefficient is 
the second highest of all US States (the state with the highest inequality is the District of Columbia). 
The Gini coefficient for New York State was 0.499 in 2010.11 The Gini coefficient for the New York 
City sample employed in this study is even higher at 0.561. Clearly, large income variations are to be 
explained, and there is a hope that social effects may partially help that. 
 
 
                                                           
11 For the full ranking and more urgent data, see American Fact Finder at http://factfinder.census.gov. 
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Table 1. Income Variables: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note: The values are measured in U.S. Dollars annually. 
 
 
The ACS data contain detailed information on various income sources. Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics on income variables. For all lines of Table 1, excluding “total personal income”, 
N represents the number of people that have positive income from each source; mean and standard 
deviation are reported for these subsamples. The total personal income statistics covers the whole 
data set, including negative, zero, and positive values. Different sources contribute to the key 
dependent variable – total personal income. Thus, it is not tied to one particular source such as wage 
or asset income. 
Second, New York City is known to be a “melting pot”, a place where very different cultural 
communities coexist, have certain interrelationships, and influence each other. The United States 
always eclectically grew from immigrants. Over the past 400 years, people from all parts of the 
world and of very different cultures moved to the US. And New York City attracted the most of 
them. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents statistics for the 10 cities with the largest population from 
the middle of 19th century to the current decade. Without exception, New York City has led in the 
N Mean St.Dev.
Total personal income 270402 38085.42 65341.51
Wage and salary Income 160402 51260.41 68997.28
Interest, dividend and net rental income 28129 16355.60 45787.30
Self-employment income 14782 33272.22 62966.76
Social security income 12237 7758.45 3938.70
Supplementary security income 38716 12198.33 6902.73
Public assistance income 7005 3305.52 3724.60
Retirement income 17581 22138.28 25083.25
All other income 12857 11639.35 14614.84
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absolute number of the foreign-born population until today.  It has significant ethnic enclaves of 
African American, Caribbean, Asian, European, Latin American, and Middle Eastern communities. 
See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for a map of predominant ethnicities by Census tract. 
The sample data that I use have very fine levels of ancestries reported. Table A.2 in the 
Appendix shows the ancestries frequency distribution in the data. The residents identify themselves 
with as many as over 200 ethnic groups which secures sufficient cultural variability and is 
particularly useful for my model framework. Close inspection reveals that the raw codes do contain 
certain flaws. The survey asks people to report their ancestry identification, and while some people 
report country affiliation, others identify very narrow (“Flemish”) or more general (“Scandinavian”) 
or very general (“white”, “black”) groups. A number of respondents reports race, and even uses 
different words (“Black”, “African-American”, “Afro”, “Afroamerican”, “Negro”); certain other 
groups report slang terms (“Chicano”) and even languages (“Arabic”). Sometimes categories are 
difficult to clearly separate (“British”, “English”; “Scotch Irish”, “Irish Scotch”). These features of 
the ancestry self-identification may cause certain issues. If members of a given group that goes by 
different names are not pooled together, the model may fail to capture the important relationships 
within this group. For example, it is highly likely that groups identified as “Black” and “African 
American” interact socially, perhaps to the point of being undistinguishable. An econometric model 
of social interactions should draw out evidence in social interactions from the data. But this is 
conditional on the accurate identification of social groups in the data. Therefore, a possible 
robustness check would be to make certain sensible adjustments in the raw codes and examine the 
resulting estimates for noticeable changes. In this work, I leave the groups intact and let the word 
used to identify their ancestry to be the criterion of social proximity, for the self-identification of 
particular group with a specific name may represent particular common characteristics. 
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Third, New York City has a very diverse set of residential neighborhoods. They vary in 
population composition, infrastructure, socioeconomic status, speed of activities, housing 
characteristics, and so on. Employing these differences is important for the neighborhood effects 
analysis. Additionally, the locational configuration of the areas may be used for spatial econometric 
analysis.  
The Public Use sample data has one limitation relative to confidential data: the geographic 
information about neighborhoods, tracts, zip codes, streets, and blocks is absent despite the fact that 
it was collected. The lowest level of locational data present is the PUMA level (Public Use 
Microdata Area). PUMAs are areas with at least 100,000 population and are aggregates of Census 
tracts. In New York City, PUMAs are very close in boundaries to community districts. From this 
point on, I will use these terms interchangeably and will use the term “neighborhood” to mean a 
PUMA or a community district. The map of 55 PUMAs and districts can be found in Figure A.2 in 
the Appendix. 
The described limitation affects the application of spatial econometrics tools. While spatial 
analysis remains useful, the inhabitants of a given district are treated as belonging to the same 
location – the neighborhood centroid point; and neither it is possible to differentiate the people from 
adjacent districts. So, keeping other variables constant, all the people from a given district have the 
same relationship to all the people in the adjacent districts. This drawback is alleviated by the 
presence of many other definitions of groups, so a unique network structure is created. However, the 
use of lower level geographic data might bring additional insights about social interactions and is a 
desirable future direction of this research.  
34 
 
The spatial patterns in the income distribution across the PUMAs can be seen in Figure 1. 
Clearly, the average income gradually changes from one neighborhood to the next, and lower level 
of geographic zones may reveal more details on these changes. 
Table A.3 in the Appendix reports the absolute and relative frequency distribution of sample 
observations among the 55 neighborhoods. Nearly 5000 observations per district on average is a 
sufficiently large subsample to reveal important effects. 
 
 
Table 2. Personal Characteristics Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 270402 43.790 17.199 16 80
Male 270402 0.466 0.499 0 1
Black 270402 0.256 0.436 0 1
Asian 270402 0.158 0.365 0 1
Hispanic 270402 0.237 0.425 0 1
Education, years 270402 13.038 3.839 0 22
Degree in humanities 270402 0.079 0.270 0 1
Degree in social sciences 270402 0.060 0.237 0 1
Degree in natural sciences 270402 0.022 0.147 0 1
Degree in formal sciences 270402 0.017 0.127 0 1
Degree in medical sciences 270402 0.021 0.145 0 1
Degree in business 270402 0.062 0.241 0 1
Served in military 270402 0.034 0.181 0 1
Has private health insurance 270402 0.582 0.493 0 1
Has public health insurance 270402 0.363 0.481 0 1
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Figure 1. Average Income in New York City PUMAs: Spatial Patterns 
 
Note: The map is made based on the sample data used. The legend refers to average total personal income in each 
PUMA, U.S. Dollars annually. 
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Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the set of the exogenous individual characteristics 
variables. The final set of 𝑋 variables contains all these variables and age squared. I have chosen the 
most important demographic, education, and health characteristics as determinants of income. The 
average age of people in my sample is 43.79 years; people of ages 16-24 constitute 16% of the 
sample, ages 25-64 are 70% of the sample, and 14% of the sample are people of 65 years and older. 
Age enters the model in a linear and a quadratic form. About 47% of the sample are men. Black and 
Asian, are the race variables, the omitted category is “other race”, which has White race as the 
predominant one. One can see a large diversity of races in the sample. Hispanic ethnicity is 
represented by another dummy variable. For education, I add a quantitative variable that measures 
the number of formal years of education, as well as variables on degrees completed. The ACS 
sample records first and possible second post-high school degrees. I combine this information to 
produce dummy variables on the presence of degree in particular areas – humanities, social sciences, 
natural sciences, formal sciences, medical sciences, business, and other areas (omitted category). 
Thus, the degree factors may overlap since some people may have two or more degrees. 
Furthermore, I have a dummy variable indicating military service. Finally, I include the indicators of 
private and public health insurance, and omit “other or no insurance” category. 
Using the New York City context, I created 17 different social group structures, each 
determined by unique weights matrix 𝑊𝑙. In a wide sense, these matrices represent 4 large 
categories. The first is geography: I use within neighborhood groups and adjacent neighborhoods 
spatial groups. The second is employment: I use occupation groups, industry groups, and consider 
employment peers inside the residency neighborhood and outside it. The third is age: I exploit a 
range of 5 years below and above the individual’s age to comprise the reference group, and further 
limit it to within and beyond the neighborhood. Finally, the fourth is ancestry: I consider general 
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ancestry groups, within and beyond district people. Additionally, I use ancestry peers who are US 
citizens and who are not citizens separately. 
Table 3 provides detailed information about the 17 social network structures created. 
“Islands” refer to individuals without social neighbors. In other words, their row of the 𝑊𝑙 matrix 
contains all zeroes. For these cases, the spatial lags (𝑊𝑙𝑦 )𝑖 will be equal to zero, and such 
individuals will not experience the particular social effect.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
3
8 
Table 3. Summary of Spatial Weighting Matrices  
 
Notation Description Structure Total groups Islands Actual groups
PUM within my puma people Nonoverlapping Groups 55 0 55
SP adjacent pumas people Overlapping Groups 55 0 55
ANC my ancestry people Nonoverlapping Groups 229 3 226
ANC_CIT my ancestry people that are citizens Nonoverlapping Groups 229 3 226
ANC_NCIT my ancestry people that are noncitizens Nonoverlapping Groups 198 0 198
ANC_WI my ancestry inside (within) my puma Nonoverlapping Groups 6485 553 5932
ANC_BE my ancestry outside (beyond) my puma Nonoverlapping Groups 7181 1237 5944
OCC my occupation people Nonoverlapping Groups 484 5 479
IND my industry people Nonoverlapping Groups 266 4 262
OCCIND my occupation and industry people Nonoverlapping Groups 14009 5665 8344
OCC_WI my occupation inside my puma Nonoverlapping Groups 14628 923 13705
OCC_BE my occupation outside my puma Nonoverlapping Groups 17261 3740 13521
IND_WI my industry inside my puma Nonoverlapping Groups 9405 630 8775
IND_BE my industry outside my puma Nonoverlapping Groups 10448 1791 8657
AGE my age group (+-5 yrs inclusively) Overlapping Groups 65 0 65
AGE_WI my age group inside my puma Overlapping Groups 3575 0 3575
AGE_BE my age group outside my puma Overlapping Groups 3575 0 3575
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VI. Econometric Model and Identification Issues 
 
Model Specifications 
All the empirical analysis specifications in this paper rely on the fundamental model 
presented in equation (12). Further I make the following assumptions: 
Assumption A.2: 𝛿𝑙 = 0 ∀𝑙 .                (18) 
 
In this study, I do not explicitly include 𝑧𝑙  contextual effects in the model. Nevertheless, 
some of these exogenous group characteristics participate in the estimation as instruments for 
endogenous effects. 
Assumption A.3: 𝜇𝑙 = 0 for all 𝑙 except the occupational groups.         (19) 
 
 Following the principle of parsimony, I aim to keep the model simple and interpretable. I add 
in the model the fixed effects only for the social space that clearly affects the income distribution. 
Income, as well as multiple number of work characteristics and conditions, vary in different 
occupations. Occupational fixed effects separately may explain a substantial part of income 
differences. A model that does not account for unobservable occupational effects is likely to yield 
biased estimates of social effects. Thus, the model that includes occupational dummies helps to 
single out pure social effects of all the presented social spaces. Further, I use the notation 𝜇𝑜 to 
indicate the occupational dummy variables. 
Equation (12) does not put restrictive assumptions on the disturbance term 𝜀. Allowing for 
the multiple spatial correlations in it is equivalent to 
𝜀 = ∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑊𝑙𝜀𝑙 + 𝜐 with 𝜐 being i.i.d.                 (20) 
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The spatial autocorrelation coefficients 𝜌𝑙 measure the strength of association between the 
individual unobservable features of people.  
Applying the assumptions A.2 and A.3, the baseline equation (12) reduces to 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑦𝑙 + 𝜇𝑜 + 𝜀, 
𝜀 = ∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑊𝑙𝜀𝑙 + 𝜐.                  (21) 
System (21) is a model of a general type SARAR(1,1) – a Spatial Autoregressive model of 
order 1 with an Autoregressive process in its error of order 1. My version of SARAR(1,1) includes 
multiple definitions of spatial lags in dependent variable 𝑦, various versions of spatial lag in 
disturbance term 𝜀, and occupation fixed effects. 
Further restrictive assumptions allow to estimate simpler versions of SARAR(1,1). In this 
study, I consider three specifications. 
 
Specification A: SARAR(1,0) 
Assuming no spatial lags in 𝜀, the model focuses only on endogenous spatial lags: 
𝜌𝑙 = 0 ∀𝑙.                     (22) 
Using Elhorst’s (2014) terminology, the resulting specification is a Spatial Autoregressive 
model SAR: 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑦𝑙 + 𝜇𝑜 + 𝜀, 
𝜀 is i.i.d.                   (23) 
 
Specification B: SARAR(0,1)  
The next model targets the spatial patterns in disturbance: 
𝜆𝑙 = 0 ∀𝑙.                     (24) 
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Elhorst’s (2014) calls the derived specification a Spatial Error Model SEM.   
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜇𝑜 + 𝜀, 
𝜀 = ∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑊𝑙𝜀𝑙 + 𝜐.                    (25) 
 
Specification C: SARAR(1,1) 
Finally, the last model combines spatial lags in 𝑦 and in 𝜀. The obtained specification is 
called a Spatial Autocorrelation model SAC by Elhorst (2014), and it is simply system (21). 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑦𝑙 + 𝜇𝑜 + 𝜀, 
𝜀 = ∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑊𝑙𝜀𝑙 + 𝜐.            
 
Estimation Methods 
For estimation of model A which focuses on spatial lags in dependent variable, I use the 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. Naturally good instruments for 𝑊𝑙𝑦 are the respective 
exogenous 𝑊𝑙𝑋 for 𝑙 = 1,2, … , 𝐿. Average group behavior is plausibly a function of average group 
members attributes. According to the generalized method of moments (GMM), the expression 
𝑊𝑙𝑦 = 𝑊𝑙(𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀) suggests that higher powers of 𝑊𝑙 applied to 𝑋 as well as 
various cross-product operators 𝑊𝑙𝑊𝑘 applied to 𝑋 are exogenous predictors of each 𝑊𝑙𝑦 in the 
equation (23). One issue with some cross-product instruments is that they can show no variation. 
Overall, 𝑊𝑙𝑋 solely turn out to be pretty strong instruments for 𝑊𝑙𝑦. 
One feature of this IV estimation procedure is the presence of multiple endogenous factors 
𝑊𝑙𝑦. Each particular set of 𝑊𝑙𝑋 must do the best job in explaining a specific 𝑊𝑙𝑦. Thus, one 
approach is to instrument each 𝑊𝑙𝑦 separately, which is a kind of simultaneous equations system. 
Another approach is to pool all the instruments 𝑊𝑙𝑋 together and jointly explain all 𝑊𝑙𝑦. The choice 
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of the approach that better explains each 𝑊𝑙𝑦 is important. On the other hand, it is crucial not to lose 
in the efficiency of estimates. I exploit the second approach and use all the exogenous factors to 
explain each endogenous 𝑊𝑙𝑦.  
Another issue is the quality of instruments as characterized by the fulfillment of instrument 
exclusion restriction. If any of the 𝑊𝑙𝑋 factors are the parts of second stage regression, the 
assumption A.2 might not hold. In that case, it proves useful to perform overidentification tests and 
move the invalid instruments to the main equation. 
To estimate models B and C, I use Kelejian and Prucha’s (2010) Generalized Spatial Two 
Stage Least Squares GS2SLS method. The procedure is developed for the case of one spatial lag in 
𝑦, or in 𝜀, or in both. The further development of multiple social networks model requires extending 
the GS2SLS procedure to include multiple lags with endogenous coefficients. While for the lags in 𝑦 
the straightforward solution is to add multiple factors and instrument them, estimation of multiple 
lags in 𝜀 cannot be done directly and requires a development of theoretical extension that is beyond 
the scope of this study. Therefore, the necessary sacrifice is to estimate only one spatial lag in 𝜀 at a 
time: 
𝜀 = 𝜌𝑀𝜀 + 𝜐.                     (26) 
The chosen weighting matrix 𝑀 for one lag in error can be one of the of 𝑊𝑙, or some linear 
combination of them, or an entirely different spatial weighting matrix. The initial idea of multiple 
effects modeled the coefficients in that linear combination to be determined empirically. However, if 
the choice of exogenous weights is inevitable, several strategies can be used. For example, assign 
equal weights to each social neighbor, or assign equal weights to all group averages, or estimate the 
weights by means of running auxiliary regression of the model (20) residuals on 𝑊𝑙𝑦. In this 
dissertation, I simply apply each 𝑊𝑙 as the possible spatial lag in error. 
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Another problem with the estimation of models B and C is their computational feasibility. 
The calculation of 270,000×270,000 variance-covariance matrix is practically infeasible, and the 
statistical packages developed for the spatial error models are working on strictly limited sample 
sizes. Certain analytical methods can help calculating the coefficients estimates for a model with 
more than one lag in error, however the calculation of standard errors requires operations on the full 
variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, to test these specifications I take a random subsample of 
about 11,000 observations.12 The PUMA-stratified subsample has on average 200 cases per district 
and that should provide sufficient variation for consistent results. The subsample shows results on 
OLS regressions without social effects that are very similar to the ones provided by the large sample. 
Thus one can accept the subsample as representative. 
Since the dependent variable income represents annual dollar quantities, heteroskedasticity in 
𝜀 is very likely. To address this issue I compute the White-corrected robust standard errors for all the 
models. Besides, I run the alternative specifications with the dependent variable logarithm of 
income. That assesses relative income patterns and alleviates the heteroscedasticity. 
An essential identification concern is the necessity of certain stationarity conditions to hold. 
The identification of models A, B, and C requires (𝐼 − ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑙 ) and (𝐼 − ∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑙 )   matrices to be 
nonsingular. The existing theory considers one spatial lag 𝜆𝑊 or 𝜌𝑊 and the necessary restrictions 
are slightly different for symmetric and non-symmetric matrices 𝑊 before normalization. For 
general case of non-symmetric matrix W, LeSage and Pace (2009) show that this condition is 
satisfied if 𝜆 and 𝜌 are restrictred to the interval (
1
𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛
, 1), where 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the most negative purely 
real characteristic root of 𝑊 after 𝑊 is row-normalized. For the case of symmetric normalized 
                                                           
12 The choice of subsample size of 11,000 is explained by the largest matrix size that spatial econometrics 
package SPMAT in Stata SE can analyze. 
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matrix W, Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) restrict 𝜆 and 𝜌 to the interval (−1,1). Generally, the 
requirement is for the row and column sums of 𝑊 before normalization to be bounded in absolute 
value as the sample size goes to infinity. Elhorst (2014) shows that not all 𝑊 matrices used in the 
spatial econometric analysis literature satisfy the stationarity condition. 
In my study, the presence of multiple lags, defined by symmetric and non-symmetric weights 
matrices, must make the restriction condition more complex. The spectral radius of ∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑙  and 
∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑊𝑙𝑙  must be less than 1. That may require each separate 𝜆𝑙 and 𝜌𝑙 to be in (−1,1) and the sums 
∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑙  and ∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑙  to be bounded in some way too. This question requires further attention and formal 
analysis; for now I row-normalize each 𝑊𝑙 matrix and explore the estimated ?̂?𝑙 and ?̂?. 
 
Further Considerations 
Four other aspects of model specification deserve attention. First is the choice of the specific 
functional form assumptions on the baseline econometric model (12). The five ways social networks 
of each kind 𝑙 can enter the model are 𝑍𝑙, 𝜇𝑙, 𝑊𝑙𝑦, 𝑊𝑙𝑋, and 𝑊𝑙𝜀. The restrictions A.2 and A.3 might 
be unrealistic, for some social interactions can go through group unobservable effects and contextual 
effects.  
Consider the group unobservable factors 𝜇𝑙 other than occupational groups. For example, the 
change in a person’s income 𝑦𝑖 can be explained by the growth of the industry he works in, and the 
group mean income ?̅?−𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑖 would change for that same reason. In that case, the person’s income is 
not simply a reaction on industry peers in terms of effort or work conditions; rather, it is a reaction to 
the industry group change 𝜇𝑔𝑙𝑖. In such case, the omission of the random effect or fixed effect of the 
group may cause biases for the estimated coefficients, and particularly for social effect variables 
representing that same group. The problem, however, is that 𝜇𝑙 itself may be endogenous and may 
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itself require instrumental variables for identification. Regarding the estimation methods, Lee, Liu 
and Lin (2010) provide the approach to estimate the model with spatial lags and unobserved group 
effects. 
Another omitted factor is the vector of exogenous group characteristics 𝑧𝑙 that may or may 
not be equal to average personal attributes 𝑊𝑙𝑋. The inclusion of these exogenous effects is 
inevitably linked to the “reflection problem”. Originally described by Manski (1993), the reflection 
problem stems from failing to identify the parameters of structural equation (12) from the parameters 
of the reduced-from equation (14).13 Blume et al (2011) argue that both endogenous and contextual 
effects must enter the model and the critical task is to estimate their separate effects. The omission of 
these exogenous effects may cause inconsistent estimates. A careful choice of 𝑍𝑙, the extended 
specifications testing, and the strategies to tackle the reflection problem are among the directions for 
future development of the model of multiple social networks. 
The crucial question is which of the five ways group effects must enter the model for each of 
the social networks 𝑙. How to make an optimal, not overwhelmed resulting model of multiple social 
effects is one of the directions for the further thought. In this study I gradually build up a model from 
simple to more general as I relax assumptions of functional form of the population model. I keep in 
the model the social effects that demonstrate the most strength from the point of view of statistical 
                                                           
13 In the simplest model of only one social effect 𝐿 = 1 and assuming that each individual is small enough to 
affect group mean ?̅?−𝑖𝑔 = ?̅?𝑔 , equation (11) reduces to 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑔 + 𝜆?̅?𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖. Then the moment 
condition for ?̅?𝑔 is ?̅?𝑔 =
𝛼+𝛽?̅?𝑔+𝛿𝑧𝑔
1−𝜆
. Thus, the endogenous ?̅?𝑔 is the linear function of both ?̅?𝑔 and 𝑧𝑔. In that 
case, assuming A.2, the identification of the structural group coefficients fails. In my model, however 
mean ?̅?−𝑖𝑔 ≠ ?̅?𝑔, and that provides the source for indentification, although not addressing properly the 
reflection problem may cause biased estimates for endogenous effects. The main solution to reflection 
problem is to carefully choose strong instruments so that ?̅?𝑔 and 𝑧𝑔 together explain more variation in ?̅?𝑔 than 
𝑧𝑔 alone. Other solutions are to substitute ?̅?𝑔 with a nonlinear term of function 𝜔(𝑦𝑔), such as median 
income, or polynomial function, and etc; to use hierarchical models (see Blume and Durlauf (2005)), and to 
use dynamic linear model for panel data or pooled cross-sections. 
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significance and stability to variations in the model form, and that are rigorously theoretically 
justified. 
A second issue is the likely endogeneity of the network structures 𝑊𝑙. Specifically, in the 
context of the New York City, the exogeneity assumption A.1 for neighborhood and occupational 
group contradicts casual empiricism. People do have considerable power in making their residential 
neighborhood choice and occupational choice. So, their social neighbors are not randomly given. 
Thus, leaving this issue unaddressed in the empirical testing will result in inconsistent estimates due 
to correlation of particular 𝑊𝑙 with 𝜀. The problem of endogeneity of some 𝑊𝑙 is among the most 
serious issues to be solved further in my dissertation.  
Two approaches may be exploited to correct for the self-selection. The first approach follows 
the traditional Heckman (1979) idea that sample selection can be treated as an omitted variable bias. 
The technique to resolve the endogenous group membership is to consider two equation jointly: the 
equation of group assignment and the outcome equation conditional upon a group assignment. Each 
person chooses the group (neighborhood or occupation), taking into account his own characteristics 
and characteristics of all the groups. Next, a term proportional to a probability of choosing the group 
is added to the outcome equation.14 The second approach is to correct the 𝑊𝑙 matrices themselves, 
where the weights 𝑤𝑙,𝑖𝑗 will represent the probabilities that the person 𝑗 is in the same group with the 
person 𝑖. The latter probabilities can be predicted after multinomial logit estimation of group choice.  
Certain other considerations may help reduce the selection bias. For example, in the case of 
the neighborhood choice, migration characteristics may be crucial. If the person does not move from 
his house for a rather long time, the changes in the neighborhood characteristics and neighbors’ 
                                                           
14 Formalized estimation procedure of multinomial logit selectivity correction are described by Lee (1983), 
Dubin and McFadden (1984), and Bourguignon et al (2001). 
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characteristics are in a way forced upon him, so can be treated as exogenous. This way, excluding 
from the analysis those who changed his place of living recently, may be a fruitful idea. The criteria 
of the “long time” are vague, however. On the other hand, people could make forward-looking 
choices in the past, so that their neighborhood choice is correlated with a portion of their current 
unobservables. In that case, the exogeneity of the choice depends on the degree of predictability of 
the current unobservable features. Besides, a person may choose to stay long in that group because 
he has persistently higher utility from staying than from switching. In regards to occupational choice, 
the changes cannot be made that easily. Adjustment costs may be high: retraining or a new education 
is necessary for a drastic switch. Therefore, starting from some point in career, a person may be very 
close to have occupational group exogenously given. Following that logic, excluding people in their 
early careers may help to lower the selection bias.  
In my study, I first consider empirical models that are based on actual social groups, and then 
I consider the sample selection corrected models. I employ the Alternative Specific Conditional 
Logit ASCL method to estimate the models of neighborhood and occupation choice. Further I 
correct the spatial weighting matrices 𝑊𝑙 and elaborate on the implications of the correction. 
The third issue is that the baseline model does not account for heterogeneous effects. As 
described previously, the social effect may be different for different kinds of people, and it may vary 
with different kinds of groups. A possible solution is to add to the model some cross-products of 
group effects with individual characteristics and group characteristics. For example, interaction of 
person’s age with the occupational group effect proves to be highly significant. The ancestry effect 
interaction with the decade of migrating to US is strong as well. If certain interactions belong to the 
true process, not including them is a flaw of the current model. Further investigation of various 
reasonable interactions are another direction for the development of this study. 
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Finally, the fourth issue is the possible associations between distinct social spaces. Some 
social spaces create widely overlapping groups. For example, membership in specific ethnic group 
may be highly correlated with living in certain neighborhoods and working in certain industries in 
specific positions. Such correlations between the same rows 𝑖 of different 𝑊𝑙 matrices do not create 
severe estimation problems, as the consequences of multicollinearity (precision loss) are reduced 
through the use of a very large sample. However, even with a large sample size, correlations between 
social spaces may make it more difficult to interpret estimated social interactions: for example, a 
neighborhood interaction may reflect interaction within ethnic groups or vice versa. Therefore, it is 
important to include in the model multiple social interactions at the same time, which is precisely the 
research objective of this dissertation.  
Another scenario is some interactions between social groups factors, for example some 𝑊1𝑦 
and 𝑊2𝑦. This may happen when the effect of one social group changes with the effect of another 
social group. To account for such interactions, one might include 𝑊1𝑦 × 𝑊2𝑦 terms in the estimated 
model. But this raises substantial and nontrivial econometrics issues. Another variation of interaction 
may be captured by means of double operators 𝑊1𝑊2𝑦, which account for changes in one social 
effect among the members of other social group. Econometrically, this presents no new issues as 
𝑊1𝑊2 constitutes merely a different spatial weighting matrix. While there is an option for such 
scenarios, the particular population patterns must be the main criteria for adding these interaction 
variables to the model. Any complicated terms that are added to the model must be clearly justified 
by social interaction theory. This is another direction for a possible thought on social interaction 
models. 
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VII. Estimation Results 
The model specifications A, B, and C are tested in various modifications for dependent 
variable income and for dependent variable natural logarithm of income. The results are presented 
below.  
 
Dependent Variable Income 
Model A 
I start with a model A of type SARAR(1,0). Having 17 different social structure 
representations falling into four large categories, I start with infusing into the model each of the wide 
categories separately. Table 4 reports the results obtained for the dependent variable income and 
various reasonable combinations of spatial lags regarding geographic neighbors (regressions 1-3), 
ancestry groups (regressions 4-10), employment peers (regressions 11-25), and age group members 
(regressions 26-29). For these one-factor models15, only the spatial lags coefficients 𝜆s are reported. 
The results are reported for both models with and without occupation fixed effects 𝜇𝑜. The set of 𝑋 
variables contains age, gender, race, education, and health characteristics.16 For the reference, I 
report the R-squared of the conventional OLS model on top of Table 4 (regression 0) – a model that 
does not account for social interactions.  
The first thing to notice is that all of the social effects are greatly statistically significant. 
Some of the robust z-statistics exceed 100. Second, one can immediately see that models with 
occupation fixed effects for each specification have considerably larger R-squared. Another strong 
                                                           
15 Some of the matrices represent pure separate factors – neighborhood group, age group, occupation group, 
etc.; while some other matrices are technically interactions of two spaces – occupation within the 
neighborhood, occupation the neighborhood, occupation and industry, etc. For simplicity, I consider matrices 
from each of the four described wide categories as representing separate factors. 
16 The full list is presented in Table 2. 
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tendency is that in the models with occupational fixed effects, most of the endogenous social effects 
are consistently smaller in magnitude than in the models without the fixed effects. This implies that 
occupational group effects indeed belong in the population model. Further, in terms of marginal 
contribution to the R-squared, employment group lags are the strongest, close to doubling the OLS 
measure of fit. Among 29 tested specifications, the regressions 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25 explain the 
highest portion of the remaining income variation.  
Both the neighborhood spatial lags PUM and SP show strong significant effects; when 
combined (regression 3), SP is dominated by PUM. This makes the within neighborhood social 
group the strongest in this category. Ancestry spatial lags are relatively smaller in magnitude 
particularly in specifications with occupation fixed effects. The largest coefficients are achieved for 
the ancestry groups within and beyond the neighborhood (regressions 8 and 9); when combined 
(regression 10), ANC_WI spatial lag completely negates ANC_BE spatial lag. Overall, ancestry 
effects are found to be important, although they do not contribute as greatly to the fit. A similar 
situation happens with the age category. Age group, age group within the neighborhood, and age 
group beyond the neighborhood show pretty large and strong effects on income (regressions 26, 27 
and 28); the spatial lag AGE_WI turns out to be the strongest both as of the magnitude, and as of the 
extra variation explained (about 3 percentage points more than AGE lag). 
Employment spatial lags deserve special attention due to complications related to the 
presence of occupation fixed effects. Looking closer at regressions (11) – (25), one can notice that 
employment lags yield R-squared values that are significantly higher than OLS for the models 
without occupation fixed effects. Analogous models with occupation fixed effects are only slightly 
better. This may mean high collinearity between employment lags and occupation fixed effects. 
Further, some of the models with occupation fixed effects – regressions (11), (14), (15), (17), (18), 
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Table 4. SARAR(1,0) Models of Income: One Factor 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Rsq Coef Robust S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.2202 0.3442 270402
2SLS
1 PUM 0.6316 (0.0105)*** 0.2570 0.4534 (0.0092)*** 0.3624 270402
2 SP 0.6528 (0.0117)*** 0.2434 0.4633 (0.0101)*** 0.3554 270402
PUM 0.5863 (0.0131)*** 0.4230 (0.0118)***
SP 0.0833 (0.0123)*** 0.0602 (0.0114)***
4 ANC 0.3793 (0.0129)*** 0.2255 0.2469 (0.0118)*** 0.3465 270399
5 ANC_CIT 0.3763 (0.0130)*** 0.2250 0.2418 (0.0119)*** 0.3462 270394
6 ANC_NCIT 0.2427 (0.0100)*** 0.2241 0.1702 (0.0092)*** 0.3461 269991
ANC_CIT 0.2512 (0.0199)*** 0.1355 (0.0183)***
ANC_NCIT 0.1320 (0.0149)*** 0.1138 (0.0137)***
8 ANC_WI 0.5470 (0.0091)*** 0.2599 0.3764 (0.0081)*** 0.3641 269020
9 ANC_BE 0.3376 (0.0127)*** 0.2238 0.2172 (0.0116)*** 0.3457 270397
ANC_WI 0.5808 (0.0102)*** 0.4028 (0.0091)***
ANC_BE -0.0918 (0.0141)*** -0.0663 (0.0130)***
11 OCC 0.7405 (0.0063)*** 0.3376 -2.2529 (0.4773)*** 0.3495 270397
12 IND 0.6562 (0.0070)*** 0.2855 0.4008 (0.0108)*** 0.3547 270398
13 OCCIND 0.7240 (0.0060)*** 0.3481 0.4678 (0.0154)*** 0.3587 264737
OCC 0.6231 (0.0073)*** -2.3619 (0.5026)***
IND 0.2334 (0.0076)*** 0.3994 (0.0108)***
OCC 0.1777 (0.0128)*** -2.6184 (0.4265)***
IND 0.0842 (0.0069)*** 0.2121 (0.0116)***
OCCIND 0.5470 (0.0143)*** 0.3916 (0.0177)***
16 OCC_WI 0.7294 (0.0060)*** 0.3699 0.5353 (0.0135)*** 0.3782 266320
17 OCC_BE 0.7379 (0.0063)*** 0.3331 -10.3928 (0.8402)*** 0.3941 270395
OCC_WI 0.5573 (0.0132)*** 0.2661 (0.0203)***
OCC_BE 0.2217 (0.0127)*** -8.9164 (0.6005)***
19 IND_WI 0.6778 (0.0067)*** 0.3348 0.4667 (0.0089)*** 0.3850 268439
20 IND_BE 0.6484 (0.0069)*** 0.2814 0.3817 (0.0107)*** 0.3528 270398
IND_WI 0.6442 (0.0113)*** 0.4836 (0.0107)***
IND_BE 0.0738 (0.0100)*** 0.0077 (0.0120)
OCC_WI 0.3343 (0.0178)*** 0.0852 (0.0229)***
OCC_BE 0.2660 (0.0161)*** -8.1720 (0.5968)***
IND_WI 0.3366 (0.0149)*** 0.2641 (0.0145)***
IND_BE -0.0524 (0.0128)*** 0.1465 (0.0140)***
OCC_WI 0.5705 (0.0077)*** 0.3087 (0.0185)***
IND_WI 0.2086 (0.0123)*** 0.3178 (0.0150)***
IND_BE 0.0820 (0.0098)*** 0.1133 (0.0144)***
OCC_WI 0.2339 (0.0131)*** 0.3201 (0.0190)***
IND_WI 0.3579 (0.0139)*** 0.2906 (0.0154)***
IND_BE -0.1886 (0.0127)*** -0.0485 (0.0169)***
OCCIND 0.4372 (0.0135)*** 0.3728 (0.0202)***
OCC_WI 0.3625 (0.0115)*** 0.3503 (0.0170)***
IND_WI 0.2114 (0.0086)*** 0.2585 (0.0126)***
OCCIND 0.2955 (0.0105)*** 0.3194 (0.0178)***
26 AGE 0.7793 (0.0253)*** 0.2229 0.3368 (0.0237)*** 0.3447 270402
27 AGE_WI 0.6444 (0.0098)*** 0.2756 0.4475 (0.0086)*** 0.3733 270402
28 AGE_BE 0.7180 (0.0253)*** 0.2209 0.2956 (0.0237)*** 0.3441 270402
AGE_WI 0.6611 (0.0101)*** 0.4784 (0.0089)***
AGE_BE 0.2477 (0.0247)*** -0.0037 (0.0233)
Employment
22 0.3865
0.394224
25 0.3938
23 0.3825
Ancestry
7 0.2254
10 0.2600
AgeGroup
29 0.2761
0.3976
0.3625
0.3602
21 0.3354
14 0.3429
15 0.3539
18 0.3736
Geo
3
0.3671 264737
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
269018
0.2571 270402
0.3465 269986
0.3643
270393
0.3738 270402
266318
0.3853 268439
2646270.3946
0.4105 264625
0.3996 260099
0.3997 260099
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and (22) – become unreliable due to large negative values of OCC and OCC_BE lags. Consider the 
social effects of occupation, industry, and occupation and industry. In the specifications with 
occupation fixed effects, the OCC spatial lag fails (regressions 11, 14, and 15), while IND and 
OCCIND lags perform well (regressions 12 and 13). Occupation and industry group is relatively 
stronger. Regressions (16), (17), and (18) show that OCC_WI is a good predictor of income. 
Regressions (19), (20), and (21) demonstrate that IND_WI is the strongest among the industry-
related lags. Regression (24) combines the best spatial lags in the employment group – OCC_WI, 
IND_WI, IND_BE, and OCCIND. The outcome is that the lag IND_BE is dominated by other lags. 
Finally, regression (25) combines the best of the spatial lags in the employment category. All of 
these effects are reasonable in value, highly statistically significant, and yield a good quality of fit. 
One may conclude that the occupational group within the neighborhood, industry group within the 
neighborhood, and people of the same industry and occupation are the best predictors of income in 
the employment category. 
The next step is to build models that combine two and more factors in an effort to eventually 
construct the desired multiple social effects framework. Table 5 reports the combinations of two of 
the described four factors for the dependent variable income. Out of each category, I take the most 
reasonable and strongest 𝑊 structures: PUM and SP from of geographic lags, ANC_WI from 
ancestry lags, OCC_WI, IND_WI, and OCCIND from employment lags, and AGE_WI from age 
lags. I combine employment and age social effects (regression 1), employment and ancestry (2), 
employment and geographic structure (3-5), age and ancestry (6), age and geographic structure (7-8), 
and ancestry and geographic structure (9).  
As one can see, the regressions in Table 5 perform really well, are highly significant and 
have meaningful values. The R-squared gets larger; and among all combinations, the ones with  
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Table 5. SARAR(1,0) Models of Income: Two Factors 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
 
 
 
 
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Rsq Coef Robust S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.2202 0.3442 270402
2SLS
OCC_WI 0.2032 (0.0126)*** 0.1689 (0.0196)***
IND_WI 0.1160 (0.0086)*** 0.1540 (0.0130)***
OCCIND 0.4659 (0.0122)*** 0.4227 (0.0182)***
AGE_WI 0.2574 (0.0100)*** 0.2369 (0.0118)***
OCC_WI 0.2870 (0.0122)*** 0.2849 (0.0185)***
IND_WI 0.1619 (0.0087)*** 0.2149 (0.0128)***
OCCIND 0.3699 (0.0113)*** 0.3484 (0.0179)***
ANC_WI 0.1800 (0.0089)*** 0.1382 (0.0097)***
OCC_WI 0.3372 (0.0130)*** 0.4253 (0.0206)***
IND_WI 0.1738 (0.0090)*** 0.2458 (0.0136)***
OCCIND 0.3272 (0.0127)*** 0.3093 (0.0183)***
PUM 0.1139 (0.0133)*** -0.0029 (0.0154)
SP 0.0538 (0.0115)*** 0.0502 (0.0114)***
OCC_WI 0.3306 (0.0130)*** 0.4157 (0.0205)***
IND_WI 0.1721 (0.0090)*** 0.2457 (0.0136)***
OCCIND 0.3344 (0.0127)*** 0.3114 (0.0183)***
PUM 0.1471 (0.0106)*** 0.0292 (0.0128)**
OCC_WI 0.3450 (0.0119)*** 0.3596 (0.0177)***
IND_WI 0.1876 (0.0087)*** 0.2372 (0.0128)***
OCCIND 0.3158 (0.0112)*** 0.3274 (0.0179)***
SP 0.1506 (0.0094)*** 0.0875 (0.0097)***
AGE_WI 0.4877 (0.0094)*** 0.3466 (0.0088)***
ANC_WI 0.2106 (0.0096)*** 0.1408 (0.0090)***
AGE_WI 0.8733 (0.0145)*** 0.6358 (0.0137)***
PUM -0.2497 (0.0162)*** -0.1792 (0.0152)***
SP 0.0551 (0.0107)*** 0.0428 (0.0100)***
AGE_WI 0.6367 (0.0080)*** 0.4386 (0.0076)***
SP 0.0411 (0.0104)*** 0.0560 (0.0097)***
ANC_WI 0.3568 (0.0105)*** 0.2439 (0.0099)***
PUM 0.2835 (0.0124)*** 0.2189 (0.0115)***
SP 0.0758 (0.0108)*** 0.0574 (0.0100)***
1
2
5
2690200.37490.2787
0.3941 0.3998 260099
2600990.39980.3954
0.3957 0.4011 258802
Age and 
Ancestry
Ancestry and 
Geo
Age and Geo
Employment 
and Ancestry
Employment 
and Age
Employment 
and Geo
0.2756
0.2777
0.2646
3 0.3942
4 0.3940
6
7
8
9 0.3667
2704020.3733
269020
2704020.3753
0.3997 260099
0.3997 260099
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
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employment lags yield the highest fit. In the combinations of spatial lags with geographic lags, PUM 
and SP become both very weak predictors. This means that the effect of the neighborhood PUM is 
fully captured by interaction lags OCC_WI, IND_WI, and AGE_WI. The effect of adjacent 
neighborhoods SP stays relatively small.  
As factors are combined, the sum of marginal lags ∑ 𝜆 grows and for some specifications 
comes near 1. Models with ∑ 𝜆 above 1 are unstable, in other words, small shocks in exogenous 
variables may induce unexpectedly large feedback in the endogenous variables. Imposition of 
stationarity restrictions could be useful. Overall, potential non-stationarity may arise due to 
misspecification of the model. One can see that ∑ 𝜆 gets lower as one adds to the model occupation 
fixed effects. The model could be potentially improved by modifying the specification further, for 
example, reconsidering the instruments for the 𝑊𝑙𝑦s, or adding contextual effects 𝑍𝑙, or adding 
group unobservable terms 𝜇𝑙 such as ancestry fixed effects. 
Finally, Table 6 presents the ultimate versions of the multiple effects model SARAR(1,0) 
which combine three or four of the social factors. When all the strongest spatial lags are combined, 
geographic effects PUM and SP become unreliable or negligible. Thus, the regression (3) represents 
the best SARAR(1,0) model for dependent variable income. Regression (3) has the most sensible set 
of social effects. The spatial lags are profoundly significant and a relatively high measure of fit is 
achieved – about 40%. Generally, based on the specifications with occupational fixed effects, 
combined employment peer groups still show the largest effect, while age and ancestry groups show 
relatively smaller effect. 
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Table 6. SARAR(1,0) Models of Income: Three and Four Factors 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
 
 
 
Model B 
The next model I consider is of type SARAR(0,1) and presents various versions of spatial 
lags in disturbance. Table 7 show the results of the models with one spatial error. Each of the 17 𝑊𝑙 
matrices is tested for spatial relationships in disturbances. The specifications that account for spatial 
lags in error are estimated for the subsample of size 10,977. This analysis may reveal interesting and 
unexpected patterns, for certain social structures may go through the errors and not through lags in 𝑦 
as in the SARAR(1,0) models. The interpretation of the spatial lags in disturbance deals with 
correlation in unobserved idiosyncratic personal characteristics. For example, people of the same 
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Rsq Coef Robust S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.2202 0.3442 270402
2SLS
OCC_WI 0.2738 (0.0129)*** 0.2826 (0.0206)***
IND_WI 0.1386 (0.0089)*** 0.1780 (0.0134)***
OCCIND 0.3736 (0.0127)*** 0.3579 (0.0182)***
AGE_WI 0.5197 (0.0151)*** 0.5034 (0.0152)***
ANC_WI 0.1834 (0.0109)*** 0.1835 (0.0110)***
PUM -0.4746 (0.0185)*** -0.5060 (0.0192)***
SP 0.0352 (0.0114)*** 0.0372 (0.0114)***
OCC_WI 0.2054 (0.0128)*** 0.1745 (0.0201)***
IND_WI 0.1064 (0.0087)*** 0.1351 (0.0131)***
OCCIND 0.4636 (0.0124)*** 0.4296 (0.0183)***
AGE_WI 0.2222 (0.0122)*** 0.2074 (0.0130)***
ANC_WI 0.0880 (0.0100)*** 0.0887 (0.0103)***
SP -0.0099 (0.0102) -0.0103 (0.0103)
OCC_WI 0.1960 (0.0128)*** 0.1575 (0.0200)***
IND_WI 0.1084 (0.0087)*** 0.1423 (0.0131)***
OCCIND 0.4734 (0.0123)*** 0.4300 (0.0182)***
AGE_WI 0.2090 (0.0115)*** 0.1941 (0.0125)***
ANC_WI 0.0800 (0.0101)*** 0.0808 (0.0103)***
2588020.3998
1
2
3
0.4039 258802
258802
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
0.3962
0.3955
0.4090
0.4004
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ethnicity may share certain genetic or cultural features or abilities that could lead them to achieve 
similar results.  
All of the spatial lags in disturbance are statistically significant at 5% in the models without 
occupation fixed effects. However, merely a half of them becomes insignificant in the models with 
occupation fixed effects (regressions 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, and 14). Spatial errors OCC (3) and OCC_BE 
(7) demonstrate unreliably large negative estimates of autocorrelation, similarly to the SARAR(1,0) 
models. Same ancestry group (10), same ancestry citizens (11), and same ancestry noncitizens (12) 
show essentially no effect. The same applies to ancestry group beyond the neighborhood (14). 
Ancestry group within the neighborhood (13) is significant, but small in value. 
 
 
Table 7. SARAR(0,1) Models of Income 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
Reg No Spatial Error N
rho Robust S.E. z-stat rho Robust S.E. z-stat
1 PUM 0.6485 (0.0319)*** 20.30 0.5762 (0.0393)*** 14.68 10977
2 SP 0.8819 (0.0351)*** 25.12 0.8173 (0.0436)*** 18.73 10977
3 OCC 0.6113 (0.0132)*** 46.44 -2.2956 (1.4451) -1.59 10977
4 IND 0.4974 (0.0141)*** 35.37 0.1808 (0.0287)*** 6.31 10977
5 OCCIND 0.2959 (0.0111)*** 26.73 0.0209 (0.0149) 1.40 10977
6 OCC_WI 0.2034 (0.0093)*** 21.77 0.0750 (0.0098)*** 7.62 10977
7 OCC_BE 0.5905 (0.0128)*** 46.31 -2.4803 (1.3148)* -1.89 10977
8 IND_WI 0.1826 (0.0096)*** 19.04 0.0960 (0.0107)*** 8.94 10977
9 IND_BE 0.4793 (0.0140)*** 34.29 0.1447 (0.0289)*** 5.00 10977
10 ANC 0.0889 (0.0270)*** 3.29 0.0208 (0.0292) 0.71 10977
11 ANC_CIT 0.0650 (0.0264)** 2.46 0.0190 (0.0279) 0.68 10977
12 ANC_NCIT 0.0767 (0.0335)** 2.29 -0.0492 (0.0495) -0.99 10977
13 ANC_WI 0.0770 (0.0122)*** 6.29 0.0555 (0.0128)*** 4.35 10977
14 ANC_BE 0.0679 (0.0256)*** 2.66 0.0027 (0.0278) 0.10 10977
15 AGE 0.7487 (0.1043)*** 7.18 0.7142 (0.1290)*** 5.54 10977
16 AGE_WI 0.3759 (0.0226)*** 16.65 0.2928 (0.0268)*** 10.92 10977
17 AGE_BE 0.6002 (0.0806)*** 7.44 0.5436 (0.1091)*** 4.98 10977
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
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The strongest spatial errors in the models with occupation dummies are geographic effects 
PUM and SP (1 and 2); industry effects IND, IND_WI, and IND_BE (4, 8, and 9); and age group 
effects AGE, AGE_WI, and AGE_BE (15, 16, and 17). These lags in error, and OCC_WI, and 
ANC_WI are used further to build the desirable SARAR(1,1) model. 
Model C 
Further I test models of type SARAR(1,1). A large number of possible combinations of the 
various factors united in a form of spatial lag and spatial error makes a call for a wise selection 
strategy. In this part, I fuse some of the best spatial lags in 𝑦 with some of the best or reasonable 
spatial lags in 𝜀. In some specifications the same 𝑊𝑙 appears in both spatial lags and error lags, in 
other specifications different 𝑊𝑙 matrices appear in the spatial lags of 𝑦 and of 𝜀.  
 
 
Table 8. SARAR(1,0) Models of Income: Large Sample and Subsample 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
 
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Rsq Coef Robust S.E. Rsq
2SLS
OCC_WI 0.1960 (0.0128)*** 0.1575 (0.0200)***
IND_WI 0.1084 (0.0087)*** 0.1423 (0.0131)***
OCCIND 0.4734 (0.0123)*** 0.4300 (0.0182)***
AGE_WI 0.2090 (0.0115)*** 0.1941 (0.0125)***
ANC_WI 0.0800 (0.0101)*** 0.0808 (0.0103)***
OCC_WI 0.3890 (0.0481)*** 0.2610 (0.0662)***
IND_WI 0.1700 (0.0450)*** 0.2379 (0.0626)***
OCCIND 0.2349 (0.0553)*** 0.1282 (0.0756)*
AGE_WI 0.1025 (0.0508)** 0.1089 (0.0521)**
ANC_WI -0.0329 (0.0517) -0.0341 (0.0544)
OCC_WI 0.3875 (0.0478)*** 0.2507 (0.0643)***
IND_WI 0.1593 (0.0449)*** 0.2233 (0.0621)***
OCCIND 0.2411 (0.0553)*** 0.1321 (0.0759)*
AGE_WI 0.0855 (0.0405)** 0.0995 (0.0463)**
258802
109770.41660.3800S1
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
L 0.3955 0.3998
0.4166 109770.3802S2
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Since estimation of models of type SARAR(1,1) is feasible for a subsample, I start with 
comparing the performance of the best SARAR(1,0) model on the large sample and on the 
subsample. Table 8 reports the results of the comparison. 
As one can see, the spatial lag ANC_WI which is smallest in value for the large sample 
disappears in the subsample. After dropping it, the R-squared of regression (S2) remains the same as 
the one for regression (S1). In other words, a model without ancestry within the neighborhood effect 
(S2) is the best, at least on the subsample. Thus, the spatial lags in 𝑦 OCC_WI, IND_WI, OCCIND, 
and AGE_WI are used further to build the SARAR(1,1) model. 
Table 9 demonstrates the results of the combining the best spatial lags in 𝑦 with the best 
spatial lags in 𝜀 in a model SARAR(1,1). Lags in income remain intact as I try various lags in error. 
All of lags in error are insignificant with the exception of AGE_BE in the regression (2). Another 
interesting finding is that in specifications (6) and (7) the age group within the neighborhood lag 
disappears, likely due to certain interactions with IND_WI and OCC_WI in errors. Also, in 
regression (8) ANC_WI appears both as lag of 𝑦 and as lag of 𝜀 and is insignificant in both places. 
Careful consideration of Table 9 reveals that regression (2) is the preferable one.  
 
Summary 
Concluding the presentation of the initial estimation results for dependent variable income, I 
find that the different social effects exist simultaneously and must be considered together. In 
particular, Table 10 reports the estimates of parameters for the best model (regression 2 from Table 
9). 
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Table 9. SARAR(1,1) Models of Income 
  
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
2SLS
OCC_WI 0.3784 (0.0463)*** 0.3102 (0.0627)***
IND_WI 0.1572 (0.0459)*** 0.2308 (0.0632)***
OCCIND 0.2425 (0.0547)*** 0.0641 (0.0716)
AGE_WI 0.1203 (0.0423)*** 0.1021 (0.0530)*
spat error PUM -0.0690 (0.1717) -0.0558 (0.1709)
OCC_WI 0.3794 (0.0473)*** 0.2198 (0.0629)***
IND_WI 0.1452 (0.0443)*** 0.1800 (0.0579)***
OCCIND 0.2542 (0.0549)*** 0.1400 (0.0727)*
AGE_WI 0.1239 (0.0409)*** 0.2047 (0.0491)***
spat error AGE_BE 0.5508 (0.1278)*** 0.6179 (0.1484)***
OCC_WI 0.3781 (0.0469)*** 0.2292 (0.0645)***
IND_WI 0.1517 (0.0445)*** 0.1711 (0.0579)***
OCCIND 0.2513 (0.0549)*** 0.1540 (0.0717)**
AGE_WI 0.1212 (0.0430)*** 0.2094 (0.0488)***
spat error AGE_WI 0.0681 (0.0566) 0.0304 (0.0578)
OCC_WI 0.3752 (0.0470)*** 0.1695 (0.0590)***
IND_WI 0.1667 (0.0455)*** 0.2150 (0.0569)***
OCCIND 0.2617 (0.0541)*** 0.2327 (0.0604)***
AGE_WI 0.0812 (0.0406)** 0.1478 (0.0478)***
spat error IND 0.0170 (0.0336) -0.0052 (0.0310)
OCC_WI 0.3690 (0.0465)*** 0.1947 (0.0567)***
IND_WI 0.1646 (0.0452)*** 0.2743 (0.0628)***
OCCIND 0.2677 (0.0541)*** 0.2038 (0.0578)***
AGE_WI 0.0847 (0.0404)** 0.1044 (0.0465)**
spat error IND_BE 0.0015 (0.0315) -0.0293 (0.0303)
OCC_WI 0.3903 (0.0480)*** 0.2894 (0.0603)***
IND_WI 0.1792 (0.0447)*** 0.3166 (0.0631)***
OCCIND 0.2288 (0.0536)*** 0.1148 (0.0684)*
AGE_WI 0.0887 (0.0408)*** 0.0396 (0.0474)
spat error IND_WI -0.0094 (0.0135) -0.0146 (0.0142)
OCC_WI 0.4116 (0.0539)*** 0.4735 (0.0813)***
IND_WI 0.1678 (0.0475)*** 0.1672 (0.0631)***
OCCIND 0.2277 (0.0588)*** 0.1808 (0.0775)***
AGE_WI 0.0748 (0.0401)* 0.0377 (0.0465)
spat error OCC_WI 0.0112 (0.0193) -0.0102 (0.0230)
OCC_WI 0.3888 (0.0476)*** 0.2966 (0.0655)***
IND_WI 0.1656 (0.0447)*** 0.2350 (0.0601)***
ANC_WI 0.2363 (0.0551)*** 0.0980 (0.0706)
AGE_WI 0.0895 (0.0406)** 0.0948 (0.0459)**
spat error ANC_WI -0.0004 (0.0184) 0.0026 (0.0180)
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
10977
10977
1
spat lag
2
spat lag
10977
3
spat lag
10977
10977
10977
8
spat lag
4
spat lag
5
spat lag
6
spat lag
7
spat lag
10977
10977
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Table 10. Best Model of Income 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices. Average direct and indirect 
effects are reported for the subsample of size 10977. 
Reg No
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
OCC_WI 0.3794 (0.0473)*** 0.2198 (0.0629)***
IND_WI 0.1452 (0.0443)*** 0.1800 (0.0579)***
OCCIND 0.2542 (0.0549)*** 0.1400 (0.0727)***
AGE_WI 0.1239 (0.0409)*** 0.2047 (0.0491)***
spat error AGE_BE 0.5508 (0.1278)*** 0.6179 (0.1484)***
Occupation Fixed Effects
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
Age 2896.06 (146.46)*** 1492.97 (154.61)*** 870.81 (265.83)*** 469.22 (321.41) 487.34 922.48
Age Squared -26.03 (1.69)*** -10.75 (1.77)*** -4.76 (2.99)*** -0.55 (3.61) -0.57 -1.08
Male 14083.65 (1161.73)*** 9784.72 (1236.13)*** 9438.16 (1010.03)*** 9412.85 (1153.7)*** 9776.42 18505.53
Black -11867.82 (1135.24)*** -7060.22 (1042.63)*** -2996.29 (969.73)*** -2441.11 (981.25)* -2535.39 -4799.18
Asian -11983.71 (1751.25)*** -9878.70 (1602.88)*** -7039.82 (1504.65)*** -6926.18 (1490.52)*** -7193.71 -13616.79
Hispanic -8724.36 (1173.55)*** -6095.86 (1057.41)*** -2724.09 (1031.41)*** -2384.93 (999.21)* -2477.04 -4688.73
Education, years 2481.37 (189.15)*** 1134.36 (170.93)*** 985.45 (161.31)*** 973.94 (161.86)*** 1011.55 1914.75
Degree in humanities 13798.61 (3130.57)*** 5111.05 (2974.03)* 1806.51 (2866.57)*** 1126.12 (2793.63) 1169.62 2213.94
Degree in social sciences 26495.30 (4462.78)*** 12158.55 (3957.84)*** 5179.55 (3791.08)*** 4870.90 (3747.04) 5059.04 9576.12
Degree in natural sciences 26343.54 (5898.83)*** 8904.28 (5919.95) 6992.52 (5097.26)*** 4945.11 (5558.17) 5136.12 9722.03
Degree in formal sciences 33581.55 (8608.80)*** 21589.55 (7963.84)*** 13989.17 (7671.23)*** 15983.62 (7304.97)** 16600.99 31423.59
Degree in medical sciences 24140.75 (5279.88)*** 10333.01 (5660.79)* 11519.66 (4607.37)*** 8231.35 (5543.41) 8549.29 16182.73
Degree in business 25972.34 (4193.48)*** 10775.54 (4289.75)** 8961.62 (3756.47)*** 7833.48 (3990.13)** 8136.05 15400.51
Served in military 4778.77 (3838.43) 5621.04 (3504.48) 5002.24 (3280.61)*** 5083.55 (3238.85) 5279.90 9994.19
Has private health insurance 21550.94 (1058.37)*** 14602.95 (998.45)*** 12484.43 (969.13)*** 12263.07 (963.56)*** 12736.74 24109.04
Has public health insurance -4689.89 (1237.67)*** 610.57 (1236.05) -370.72 (1137.56)*** 202.42 (1145.36) 210.24 397.95
Constant -78714.80 (3734.65)*** -50241.47 (3337.20)*** -46977.21 (4918.68)*** -40854.58 (5568.56)*** -42432.60 -80319.58
Size
R-sq
spat lag
OLS OLS GS2SLS GS2SLS
0.2182 0.3721
Avg Direct 
Effect
Avg Indirect 
Effect
4
10977 10977 10977 10977
321
X Vars
N Y N Y
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Regressions (1) and (2) present the parameter estimates for OLS regression without and with 
occupational dummies respectively. Regressions (3) and (4) present the best social interaction model 
without and with occupational dummies respectively. I consider regression (4) the best model for 
dependent variable income. I report results for the subsample of size 10977. The vector of 
coefficients for 484 occupational dummies is omitted. 
The social effects that exist in this model are occupational group within the neighborhood, 
industry group within the neighborhood, people of the same occupation and industry, and age group 
within the neighborhood. The coefficients 𝜆 reflect the strength of social effects; it is important to 
note, however, that the total social effect would be higher than 𝜆, since an exogenous increase in 
(𝑊𝑦)𝑖 leads to change in 𝑦𝑖 which in turn increases the income of individual  𝑖’s neighbors.  Thus, 
endogenous effects 𝜆 are interpreted as the initial reaction of personal income on absolute change in 
average group income in a given group, taking other factors as given. The largest portion of this 
reaction is due to effect of employment-related peers. If average income of people of the same 
occupation in person’s neighborhood goes up by 1 dollar, person’s income would initially increase 
by 22 cents. If average income of person’s industry group within his neighborhood goes up by 1 
dollar, person’s income would initially increase on average by 18 cents. If people that share the same 
occupation and industry on average will have 1 dollar higher income, person’s income would 
initially increase by 14 cents. Finally, if average income of people of the same age in the 
neighborhood rises by 1 dollar, person’s income would initially increase by 20.5 cents. OCC_WI, 
IND_WI, and AGE_WI seem to fully capture the effect of the neighborhood, and OCCIND adds 
certain employment peer group effect. Finally, there is significant spatial autocorrelation in 
disturbances between people of the same age group living in different neighborhoods. The 
coefficient of autocorrelation 0.62 is evidence of rather strong relationship between individual 
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unobservable characteristics. These could be certain expectations of living standards and income 
level achieved by different age points.  
Consider 𝛽 parameter estimates for the regressions in Table 10. Unlike OLS models, 
GS2SLS models 𝛽 coefficients do not present the marginal effects of 𝑋 variables. Following the 
ideas of equations (14), (15), and (17), for each coefficient I derive a matrix 𝐷𝑥𝑘, and calculate the 
average direct effect as the average diagonal element of 𝐷𝑥𝑘 , and the average indirect effect as the 
average row sum of off diagonal elements of 𝐷𝑥𝑘, as proposed by LeSage and Pace (2009). The 
average direct effect represents the reaction of a person’s income on a change in his 𝑥𝑘 variable. The 
average indirect effect represents the reaction of a person’s income on a change in all his neighbors’ 
𝑥𝑘 variable. Thus, the indirect effect is found to have a much larger scale. 
Overall, in the model (4) some 𝑋 variables are not significant. Gender and race differences 
remain large and significant. Having a degree in formal sciences and in business rather than having 
no degree also significantly affects income. Having private health insurance is another variable that 
affects income. An interesting pattern is that the average indirect effect for this particular subsample 
turns out to be about twice as large as the average direct effect. This is a vivid illustration of the 
importance of social effects: if all estimated 𝜆s were close to zero, the indirect effects would vanish; 
instead, they are actually very large. Generally, models with social interactions have smaller 𝛽 
coefficient estimates than OLS models. This can be due to associations between 𝑋 variables and 
social effects, not accounted for in OLS models. Lastly, the results in Table 10 support the idea that 
different social effects must be considered together. 
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Dependent Variable LogIncome 
I do a similar analysis for the dependent variable natural logarithm of income. Such a 
functional form complies with the traditional Mincer equation framework.  
Table A.4 in the Appendix reports the results of one-factor SARAR(1,0) specifications. The 
first thing to notice is that more variation of logincome is explained in both OLS and 2SLS models 
compared to variation in income. The starting R-squared for models without occupational dummies 
is 0.3348, with occupational dummies it is 0.4148. The observations with negative income are 
excluded from this analysis, which brings the sample size to 223323. 
Among geographic factors, both PUM and SP are large significant, while PUM is twice 
larger when considered separately (regressions 1 and 2), and dominates completely when considered 
together with SP (regression 3). Ancestry factors also show patterns similar to those of income 
regressions: ancestry group of citizens and ancestry group of noncitizens are both very small (5 and 
6); ANC_WI and ANC_BE are significant when considered separately (8 and 9); ANC_BE 
disappears when considered together with ANC_WI. Thus, ancestry group within the neighborhood 
is the strongest predictor in the class of ancestry factors. Employment spatial lags also act very 
similar to their analogs in income regressions: OCC and OCC_BE lags become unreliable in 
specifications with occupation fixed effects (11, 14, 15, 18, and 19); IND and OCCIND are both 
relatively strong (12, 13, and 16); OCC_WI, IND_WI, and IND_BE are very good interaction spatial 
lags (20, 21, 22, and 23). Combining the best employment social effects in regression (24) I get 
IND_BE eliminated. Finally, regression (25) combines the best statistically significant and 
reasonable in value employment lags – OCC_WI, IND_WI, and OCCIND. This result is identical to 
income SARAR(1,0) regressions. One distinction though is the behavior of age spatial lags – both 
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AGE_WI and AGE_BE are large and significant (regressions 29), and both contribute to the further 
building of the model. 
Table A.5 in the Appendix combines the best of the described lags. One can see that without 
exception, all the models are very strong and all the social effects are significant and of noticeable 
magnitude. Combination of employment and age yields the highest R-squared – 0.4605, while 
combination of ancestry and geography yields the lowest R-squared – 0.4194. Regression (7) 
combines all the lags, and the neighborhood effect PUM loses its effect, due to being fully reflected 
by interaction spatial lags. Finally, regression (8) presents the best of the SARAR(1,0) models of 
logincome.  
The next step is to explore spatial errors in models of logincome. Table A.6 in the Appendix 
reports 17 spatial lag in disturbance estimates. The subsample of size 9095 represents part of 
subsample of size 10977 that covers respondents with existing logincome (positive income). While 
in models without occupation fixed effects, roughly a half of error lags is significant, only four of the 
lags in models with occupation fixed effects are significant – PUM, SP, IND, and AGE_BE (1, 2, 4, 
and 17). The values of SP and AGE_BE error lags are negative, which may signal unreliable 
estimates as well. Moreover, some lags although significant are negligibly small in value – ANC_WI 
(16). In further analysis I consider 4 spatial lags in error for logincome model – PUM, IND, 
AGE_WI, and IND_BE. 
 Table A.7 in the Appendix reports the performance of the best SARAR(1,0) regression model 
on large sample and the subsample of size 9095. One can see that the results for spatial lags differ 
drastically between regressions (L) and (S1). Regression (S2) drops the insignificant lags, which 
brings the model to only three spatial lags in logincome – IND_WI, AGE_WI, and AGE_BE. This 
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outcome raises doubts in reliability of the subsample. Nevertheless, I consider further several 
versions of SARAR(1,1) model based on these three lags in 𝑦. 
Table A.8 shows 4 specifications of the described model with lags in error PUM, IND, 
AGE_WI, IND_BE. None of the models appear especially good: in regressions (2, 3, and 4) spatial 
errors are not significant, while in regression (1) IND_WI lag disappears. I come to the conclusion 
that spatial errors do not belong in logincome model, and I consider my best model to be 
SARAR(1,0) with 6 spatial lags in 𝑦 – OCC_WI, IND_WI, OCCIND, AGE_WI, AGE_BE, and 
ANC_WI. 
  Table 11 below reports the parameter estimates for the best regression of logincome 
(regression 4). I compare it with models OLS without occupation dummies (1), OLS with occupation 
dummies (2), and GS2SLS without occupation dummies (3). One can notice how R-squared rises 
from 0.3348 in regression (1) to 0.4613 in regression (4). The largest effects are made by occupation 
and industry peers (0.3090) and by age group beyond the neighborhood (0.3224). The smallest effect 
is made by age group within the neighborhood (0.0460). Interestingly, in all the specifications of 
Table 11 all the 𝛽 parameter estimates are significant. Even though the best model is selected to be 
the one estimated on the large sample, I report average direct and indirect effects estimated on the 
subsample of size 9095. Average direct effects are close in magnitude to the 𝛽 estimates, while 
indirect effects are of much larger scale and are 10-20 times greater in value. Similarly to models of 
income, 𝛽 coefficients get smaller in regression with social interactions (3 and 4).  
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Table 11. Best Model of LogIncome 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices. Average direct and indirect 
effects are reported for the subsample of size 9095. 
Reg No
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
OCC_WI 0.1905 (0.0083)*** 0.1124 (0.0130)***
IND_WI 0.1470 (0.0067)*** 0.1063 (0.0090)***
OCCIND 0.3401 (0.0086)*** 0.3090 (0.0114)***
AGE_WI 0.0214 (0.0061)*** 0.0460 (0.0064)***
AGE_BE 0.3268 (0.0071)*** 0.3224 (0.0073)***
ANC_WI 0.0565 (0.0094)*** 0.0735 (0.0094)***
Occupation Fixed Effects
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
Age 0.1059 (0.0010)*** 0.0789 (0.0010)*** -0.0153 (0.0012)*** -0.0208 (0.0013)*** -0.0214 -0.1628
Age Squared -0.0009 (0.0000)*** -0.0006 (0.0000)*** 0.0002 (0.0000)*** 0.0003 (0.0000)*** 0.0003 0.0020
Male 0.2601 (0.0047)*** 0.1747 (0.0051)*** 0.1809 (0.0044)*** 0.1796 (0.0051)*** 0.1848 1.4072
Black -0.1752 (0.0055)*** -0.1096 (0.0054)*** -0.0467 (0.0057)*** -0.0465 (0.0058)*** -0.0479 -0.3644
Asian -0.1772 (0.0072)*** -0.1827 (0.0068)*** -0.1267 (0.0069)*** -0.1523 (0.0070)*** -0.1567 -1.1935
Hispanic -0.0993 (0.0059)*** -0.0376 (0.0056)*** 0.0288 (0.0063)*** 0.0270 (0.0063)*** 0.0278 0.2115
Education, years 0.0597 (0.0008)*** 0.0351 (0.0008)*** 0.0289 (0.0007)*** 0.0292 (0.0008)*** 0.0300 0.2285
Degree in humanities 0.2065 (0.0093)*** 0.1329 (0.0092)*** 0.0270 (0.0089)*** 0.0469 (0.0093)*** 0.0482 0.3672
Degree in social sciences 0.3501 (0.0102)*** 0.1767 (0.0097)*** 0.0773 (0.0094)*** 0.0827 (0.0096)*** 0.0852 0.6485
Degree in natural sciences 0.2976 (0.0154)*** 0.1361 (0.0153)*** 0.0619 (0.0145)*** 0.0753 (0.0154)*** 0.0775 0.5900
Degree in formal sciences 0.3983 (0.0178)*** 0.1936 (0.0175)*** 0.0984 (0.0164)*** 0.1049 (0.0174)*** 0.1080 0.8222
Degree in medical sciences 0.4363 (0.0130)*** 0.1740 (0.0148)*** 0.1560 (0.0119)*** 0.1286 (0.0146)*** 0.1324 1.0082
Degree in business 0.4205 (0.0096)*** 0.1932 (0.0097)*** 0.1194 (0.0089)*** 0.1005 (0.0096)*** 0.1035 0.7879
Served in military 0.1659 (0.0117)*** 0.1510 (0.0114)*** 0.1387 (0.0113)*** 0.1369 (0.0114)*** 0.1409 1.0728
Has private health insurance 0.5536 (0.0060)*** 0.4272 (0.0060)*** 0.3911 (0.0059)*** 0.4017 (0.0060)*** 0.4134 3.1479
Has public health insurance -0.4049 (0.0070)*** -0.2218 (0.0072)*** -0.2610 (0.0069)*** -0.2174 (0.0072)*** -0.2237 -1.7037
Constant 6.3766 (0.0258)*** 6.6723 (0.1269)*** 6.6531 (0.0252)*** 0.2623 (0.1583)* 0.2700 2.0558
Size
R-sq 0.4613
9095
32
spat lag
0.3348 0.4148
223323 223323 211640
0.4545
211640
OLS OLS GS2SLS
X Vars
GS2SLS
Avg Direct 
Effect
Avg Indirect 
Effect
4
N Y N Y
1
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VIII. Self-Selection Correction 
The main issue with identification of group effects is self-selection of people into groups. 
Among 17 social spaces presented in this study, neighborhood selection and occupation selection 
represent the deepest problems in the empirical framework of my research. For example, consider 
residence neighborhood: a person 𝑖 may prefer PUMA 𝑝 because his unobservable characteristics 
drive him to obtain income in 𝑝 higher than in other neighborhoods, or his utility of income is higher 
in  𝑝 , or the cost of obtaining income is lower in 𝑝. That means that PUMA 𝑝 is not exogenously 
given, it is correlated with his unobservable 𝜀𝑖. It follows that people in the PUMA 𝑝 are determined 
to be his neighbors. Formally, that means that the row element of the weighting matrix PUM - 𝑊𝑖𝑗 
equals 1 for 𝑗 ∈ PUMA𝑝 and 0 for 𝑗 ∉ PUMA𝑝. Thus, elements of the 𝑖-th row of 𝑊 matrix are 
correlated with 𝜀𝑖, which means that (𝑊𝑦)𝑖 is correlated with 𝜀𝑖. This correlation appears not 
because of relationship between 𝑦 and 𝜀 (which is account for using IV method), but because of 
correlation between spatial weighting matrix 𝑊 and individual unobservables 𝜀. Thus, I employ a 
sample selection correction strategy that aims to identify the pure social effects without bias. 
Furthermore, I compare the initial models outcomes with the corrected ones. 
 
Neighborhood Choice Modeling 
Neighborhood choice is modeled for every agent as a personal optimization problem. Each 
individual has a utility associated with every neighborhood he could reside in. The utility depends on 
various characteristics of the person, of the neighborhood, and unique person-neighborhood specific 
characteristics. The final choice of the neighborhood is determined by the alternative with the 
highest utility. In this context, a frequently used discrete choice model is Multinomial Logit MNL 
which considers utility as a function of individual characteristics only. Unlike MNL, Alternative 
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Specific Conditional Logit ASCL accounts for all the three types of effects. The estimation of the 
choice model for ASCL is more technically involved and complicated, and it yields predictions 
based on a richer choice framework.  
First, a person chooses a neighborhood to live in considering the living standards of the 
neighborhoods, crime levels, infrastructure, etc. These variables are PUMA-specific. Second, his 
choice inevitably depends on his demographic characteristics and personal preferences. Third, there 
could be features that affect his choice that are unique for a combination of his characteristics and 
each neighborhood. The ASCL model implicitly accounts for the first type of variables, 
neighborhood-specific ones; thus one should not explicitly include them in the model. This means 
that all the neighborhood aggregate characteristics such as housing, utilities, facilities, crime rates, 
living standards, are accounted for by ASCL. So, one should add a set of personal characteristics, 
and a set of person-neighborhood specific characteristics. Using only the 𝑋 variables of SARAR 
outcome equations in the selection model is not sufficient as the selection procedure must yield extra 
variation: the selection model must contain variables excluded from the main equation. 
Conveniently, person-neighborhood specific variables do that. I include three variable of this kind: 
the share of people of the individual’s own ancestry in each PUMA, the share of people in the 
individual’s own age group in each PUMA, and the share of people with the individual’s own 
educational attainment in each PUMA (highest grade or degree completed).  Plausibly, people make 
community choices relying on the information on the type of people with close characteristics and 
interests in these communities.  
Table A.9 in the Appendix describes the PUMA selection model results. Technically, 
estimation of ASCL requires creating a record for each alternative for each observation in the 
dataset; i.e., for my data set the number of records would reach 270,402 × 55 ≈ 14.9 million. Such a 
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large database proved to be infeasible on the computer used for the statistical analysis reported here. 
Thus, instead, I run the ASCL choice model on a random 15% subsample of the data set. The choice 
between 55 PUMAs then is a function of different variables. I predict the choice between 55 PUMAs 
directly, without applying any kind of tree structure (for example, choosing first the borough, and 
then the neighborhood within it), because neighborhoods in different areas may be close substitutes. 
Table A.9 in the Appendix reports the ASCL coefficients for all variables and 55 neighborhoods. I 
predict the probabilities for each person to choose each neighborhood, and later use it to build self-
selection corrected spatial weighting matrices 𝑊𝑙. 
As can be seen in Table A.9, all three case-alternative specific variables are highly significant 
which is a clear indication that people are attached to similar types. This tendency of people 
independently joining groups with the high share of similar people leads to a certain level of 
segregation. This might be a kind of Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game framework. 
The coefficients of ASCL regressions for each PUMA outcome represent the log odds of 
each outcome against the base outcome PUMA1. The PUMA identificators coincide with the ones 
listed in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Thus, outcomes 1-10 are for the Bronx neighborhoods, 11-20 
for Manhattan, 21-23 for Staten Island, 24-41 for Brooklyn, and 42-55 for Queens. The coefficients 
confirm racial segregation: for example, one can see that Black people have significantly higher 
chance to live in the neighborhoods of Bronx, in certain neighborhoods of Manhattan (Harlem, 
PUMAs 12, 13, and 14), and Queens (Queens Village, Cambria Heights & Rosedale, PUMA 46). 
Likewise, Asian people prefer some communities in the Bronx (PUMAs 4, 6, and 9), Chinatown and 
East Harlem in Manhattan (PUMAs 19 and 14), Sunset Park in Brooklyn (PUMA 35), and certain 
Queens neighborhoods (PUMAs 43, 44, and 45). Hispanic people also tend to live in some areas of 
the Bronx (PUMAs 6-10), are much less likely to live in Manhattan, and have significant enclaves in 
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Brooklyn (Bushwick, Brownsville, and East New York, PUMAs 25, 30, and 31). Younger people 
are on average more likely to live in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. People with degrees in 
Humanities, Social Sciences, and Natural Sciences are unlikely to live in the Bronx, and are very 
likely to live in Manhattan. Interestingly, people with degrees in Medical Sciences, on the contrary, 
tend to live in the neighborhoods of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. People with public health 
insurance have lower chance of living in Manhattan. Finally, people with degree in Business have 
high likelihood of living in most of the neighborhoods of Manhattan (PUMAs 13-20), Pelham Bay, 
Belmont, and Morris Heights in the Bronx (PUMAs 3, 5, and 7), and Canarsie, Flatbush, Crown 
Heights, and Bay Ridge in Brooklyn (PUMAs 32, 33, 34, and 36).  
  
Occupation Choice Modeling 
For the choice of occupation, I apply a different approach. The 484 different occupations that 
are represented in my sample are not directly comparable, and the estimation is built on a tree 
structure. I assume that people first choose a general occupational group, such as Management, or 
Clerical occupations, or Science; and that they subsequently choose a narrow occupation within the 
general group. Table A.10 in the Appendix describes the occupation choice model that I use. First, I 
predict the probabilities of every person to choose one of the 13 general groups; then, I model the 
choice within each of the general groups, and, for some large occupational groups (such as Service 
Workers) I apply even further branching. On the one hand, this is a reasonable approach; on the 
other hand, the estimation of an ASCL model on such a large number of groups (96 for Production 
occupations) is technically infeasible. Finally, when I combine predictions for all upper and lower 
branches, I get probabilities for each person to choose each of the 484 occupations. Splitting the 
groups also helps dealing with very large sample sizes.  
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In Table A.10 in the Appendix I report the results of the upper branch estimation. Lower 
branches estimation results are not reported, because their number is large, and the methodology I 
use is identical.  
To implement the ASCL model, in addition to all the usual 𝑋 variables, I add person’s family 
size, the presence of kids and seniors in family, and proficiency with English language. The latter is 
a set of dummy variables representing the level of speaking English with categories “native speaker” 
(omitted), “very well”, “well”, “not well”, “not speaking English”. I also add two person-occupation 
specific variables: interaction of average weekly hours worked with the presence of kids in family, 
and a share of people with the same proficiency in English in each occupation. The aggregate 
characteristics of each occupation, such as work conditions, job features, and benefits are not 
included explicitly, but are accounted for implicitly in the ASCL model. 
Some of the patterns in the upper branch occupational choice estimates are as follows. People 
with a degree in Business have a 84% higher odds of working in Business and Finance occupations 
rather than in Management occupations. On the other hand, a degree in Business reduces almost by 
90% the odds of working in Education, Social Sciences, and in Healthcare versus Management. Not 
surprisingly, a degree in Formal Sciences increases the odds of working in Engineering and Science 
occupations. Female and Black individuals are about twice more likely to be working in Healthcare 
versus Management. A degree in Natural Sciences and Medical Studies also increases the chances of 
working in Healthcare. Black people have almost three times larger odds of working in service 
occupations rather than in Management. For Hispanic people these odds are twice larger. Any 
completed degree reduces on average by 90% the odds of working in Mining and Construction, and 
in Production and Transportation occupations. For men the odds of working in Mining and 
Construction are almost 30 times greater than for women. Another interesting finding is that Black 
 72 
 
people have almost three times higher odds of serving in the Military than White people. For 
Hispanic people these odds are two times as high. Also, people in the Military tend to have public 
support. People with private health insurance have 3 times lower odds of Serving in the Military 
rather than working in Management, while people with Public Health Insurance have these odds 3 
times greater. Finally, people with completed degrees are on average less likely to be not employed.  
 
Self-Selection Correction Methodology 
 After predicting neighborhood choice and occupation choice probabilities, I build the 
selection-corrected spatial weighting matrices. There are various approaches to this correction. First 
is to assign the individuals to the outcome (PUMA or occupation) with the highest predicted 
probability. This outcome may or may not be the outcome that the individual actually selected. The 
second approach is to replace prior to the row normalization of the matrix all zeros and ones on each 
row of a self-selection corrected 𝑊?̂? matrix with the relevant predicted probability. While the first 
approach has intuitive appeal and simplifies the multiple further calculations, it may lead to 
unrealistic predictions, such as no people predicted to choose some alternatives. Overall, such 
approach is rather simplistic, and the second approach which fully exploits the probability 
distribution between the options, would yield deeper insights into the self-selection process. 
Another consideration is the assumptions on the selection process. One way to correct 𝑊𝑙 
matrices is to assume the actual group compositions as given, and each person then has a probability 
of ending up in each of the groups as determined by means of the ASCL model. If people make their 
choices independently, this approach is in line with a noncooperative Nash game framework. A 
second way is to assume the actual group the person is a member of as given, while his social 
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neighbors would belong to that group according to the ASCL-determined probability for each of 
them. Yet another way of modeling may combine both of these ways.  
In this study, I assume that each person makes his choice independently and takes the actual 
group compositions as given; i.e., I adopt the second way of correcting the 𝑊𝑙 matrices. 
Accordingly, I correct 12 of 17 initial matrices that use occupation or neighborhood in some way: 
the neighborhood space PUM, the adjacent neighborhoods space SP, the occupation space OCC, the 
occupation and industry space OCCIND, and the groupings for ancestry, industry, and age that are 
split into within and beyond neighborhood groupings: OCC_WI, OCC_BE, IND_WI, IND_BE, 
ANC_WI, ANC_BE, AGE_WI and AGE_BE. I modify the notation of corrected matrices by adding 
“COR” at the end of the matrix name (for example, PUMCOR is the corrected PUM spatial 
weighting matrix).  
For example, to build the matrix PUMCOR, for each person 𝑖 I calculate each row element 
𝑊𝑖?̂? as the probability that individual 𝑖 selects the PUMA where individual 𝑗 actually resides. Thus, 
in this framework each person 𝑗 is partially a neighbor of individual 𝑖. The diagonal elements of each 
𝑊?̂? are set to be zero, since a person cannot be his own social neighbor. Finally, 𝑊?̂? are row-
normalized just like the initial matrices 𝑊𝑙. The rest of the corrected matrices is built in the same 
manner, with the necessary complications. For example, the corrected matrix OCC_WICOR has to 
account for both the predicted probabilities of choosing one of 55 PUMAs and the predicted 
probabilities of choosing one of the 484 occupations. For the analysis of the large sample, instead of 
building the corrected matrices, I built the corrected spatial lags 𝑊?̂?𝑦, 𝑊?̂?𝑋. For the subsamples I 
construct the actual corrected spatial weighting matrices 𝑊?̂?, and employ them in the analysis of 
SARAR(0,1) and SARAR(1,1) models. 
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IX. Estimation of Self-Selection Corrected Models 
 
Dependent Variable Income 
 The same specifications A, B, and C are tested now with the self-selection corrected spatial 
weighting matrices. Since the robust standard errors are not reliable anymore for the case of 
corrected spatial lags, to estimate standard errors for the models SARAR(1,0) and SARAR(1,1) I use 
the bootstrapping method.17 All the models considered below include occupation fixed effects. 
 Table 12 below presents the results of SARAR(1,0) models for each of the four wide 
categories, identically to the initial analysis. Immediately, one can see that all the corrected 
geographic lags have unreliably large estimates (regressions 1-3). Thus, they are not used in the 
further model building. Ancestry spatial lags have rather good and strong estimates, with 
ANC_WICOR being clearly the best predictor. ANC_BECOR is strong as well, but is negated by 
ANC_WICOR (regression 10). Employment lags, as previously, have relatively the largest 
contribution to R-squared. All of the OCCOR, IND, and OCCINDCOR lags are of reasonable value 
and strongly significant (regressions 11-13). When combined, the IND lag loses its strength (15). 
OCC_WICOR and IND_WICOR seem to be strong separately and stronger than their beyond the 
neighborhood analogs (17-19, 20-22). Thus, the regression (23) combines 4 of the strongest 
employment lags: OCC_WICOR, IND_WICOR, OCCOR, and OCCINDCOR. The result is that 
OCCOR is fully captured by the other lags, so that the regression (24) consists of the best 
employment lags: OCC_WICOR, IND_WICOR, and OCCINDCOR. This finding is exactly the 
same as for the uncorrected estimates. For age spatial lags, however, the results are different. The  
                                                           
17 I take 50 samples with replacement of size N (the actual sample size, large or small). In order to perform 
random resampling and preserve all the variables, I drop a part of occupational dummies that have relatively 
small absolute frequency (<100 for the sample of size 270402, and <20 for the sample of size 10977). 
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Table 12. SARAR(1,0) Self-Selection Corrected Models of Income: One Factor 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
Reg No N
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.3379 270402
2SLS
1 PUMCOR 1.0554 (0.0305)*** 0.3416 270402
2 SPCOR 1.1828 (0.0507)*** 0.3395 270402
PUMCOR 2.6963 (0.0582)***
SPCOR -2.9078 (0.0945)***
4 ANC 0.2562 (0.0124)*** 0.3404 270399
5 ANC_CIT 0.2518 (0.0115)*** 0.3401 270394
6 ANC_NCIT 0.1744 (0.0088)*** 0.3399 269991
ANC_CIT 0.1460 (0.0197)***
ANC_NCIT 0.1132 (0.0129)***
8 ANC_WICOR 0.3514 (0.0124)*** 0.3427 270402
9 ANC_BECOR 0.2531 (0.0097)*** 0.3407 270402
ANC_WICOR 0.3618 (0.0247)***
ANC_BECOR -0.0056 (0.0191)
11 OCCCOR 0.8380 (0.0238)*** 0.3456 270402
12 IND 0.4512 (0.0089)*** 0.3526 270398
13 OCCINDCOR 0.6006 (0.0114)*** 0.3608 270402
OCCCOR 0.7363 (0.0269)***
IND 0.4285 (0.0090)***
OCCCOR 0.4221 (0.0302)***
IND -0.2481 (0.0315)***
OCCINDCOR 0.8630 (0.0369)***
16 OCCCOR 0.5307 (0.0245)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5540 (0.0119)***
17 OCC_WICOR 0.8938 (0.0220)*** 0.3480 270402
18 OCC_BECOR 0.8405 (0.0239)*** 0.3455 270402
OCC_WICOR 0.9540 (0.0634)***
OCC_BECOR -0.0659 (0.0685)
20 IND_WICOR 0.6120 (0.0117)*** 0.3625 270402
21 IND_BECOR 0.4507 (0.0109)*** 0.3530 270402
IND_WICOR 0.7554 (0.0301)***
IND_BECOR -0.1239 (0.0267)***
OCC_WICOR 0.7021 (0.0768)***
IND_WICOR 0.1337 (0.0334)***
OCCCOR -0.1287 (0.0797)
OCCINDCOR 0.4610 (0.0299)***
OCC_WICOR 0.5864 (0.0206)***
IND_WICOR 0.1281 (0.0309)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4659 (0.0293)***
25 AGE 0.3702 (0.0236)*** 0.3385 270402
26 AGE_WICOR 0.9805 (0.0201)*** 0.3510 270402
27 AGE_BECOR 0.3583 (0.0235)*** 0.3385 270402
AGE_WICOR 1.6291 (0.0270)***
AGE_BECOR -1.0533 (0.0281)***
AgeGroup
28 0.3559 270402
Employment
23 0.3668 270402
24 0.3666 270402
0.3636 270402
19 0.3481 270402
22 0.3636 270402
0.3428 270402
14 0.3586 270398
15 0.3649 270398
Geo
3 0.3431 270402
Ancestry
7 0.3404 269986
10
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social effects AGE_WICOR and AGE_BECOR seem to show unreasonable values of effects: 
negative, or near or greater than 1. Among these lags, I choose the pure AGE social effect as the 
best. To summarize, the best spatial lags in one-factor models are ANC_WI, OCC_WI, IND_WI, 
OCCIND, and AGE. 
 
 
Table 13. SARAR(1,0) Self-Selection Corrected Models of Income: Two, Three, 
and Four Factors 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
 
 
Reg No N
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.3379 270402
2SLS
OCC_WICOR 0.5611 (0.0207)***
IND_WICOR 0.1096 (0.0307)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4831 (0.0291)***
AGE 0.2471 (0.0218)***
OCC_WICOR 0.4888 (0.0212)***
IND_WICOR 0.0451 (0.0302)
OCCINDCOR 0.5424 (0.0283)***
ANC_WICOR 0.2185 (0.0150)***
OCC_WICOR 0.4945 (0.0217)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5536 (0.0099)***
ANC_WICOR 0.2233 (0.0156)***
AGE 0.3250 (0.0233)***
ANC_WICOR 0.3354 (0.0152)***
OCC_WICOR 0.4642 (0.0214)***
IND_WICOR 0.0281 (0.0300)
OCCINDCOR 0.5583 (0.0282)***
AGE 0.2352 (0.0219)***
ANC_WICOR 0.2178 (0.0151)***
OCC_WICOR 0.4713 (0.0219)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5541 (0.0099)***
AGE 0.2396 (0.0223)***
ANC_WICOR 0.2197 (0.0156)***
1 0.3666 270402
Employment 
and Age
Employment 
and Ancestry
2 0.3674 270402
3 0.3669 270402
270402
Age and 
Ancestry
4 0.3431 270402
5 0.3675 270402
6 0.3671
All Factors
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 Table 13 combines these spatial lags. As one can see, most of them perform really well. The 
values do not get much smaller, except for the IND_WICOR conflict with ANC_WICOR 
(regression 2). The combination of all of the lags in regression (5) confirms this finding, and the best 
regression (6) combines 4 spatial lags: OCC_WICOR, OCCINDCOR, AGE, and ANC_WICOR. 
Interestingly, most of the lags are relatively stable in various specifications. 
The next step is to examine corrected spatial lags in error. Table 14 presents all 12 corrected 
matrices tested for spatial autocorrelation in disturbances, in the model of type SARAR(0,1). The 
specifications that were troublesome in Table 7 (OCC, OCC_BE) now yield completely unreliable 
estimates (regressions 3 and 6). The AGE_BECOR specification (12) is added to this list. Moreover, 
the regressions (1, 2, 5, and 11) for the lags PUMCOR, SPCOR, OCC_WICOR, and AGE_WICOR 
yield estimates of 𝜌 that are close to are larger than 1. Two other lags ANC_WICOR and 
ANC_BECOR (regressions 9 and 10) have estimates of 𝜌 that are essentially 0. This leaves three 
spatial lags OCCINCOR, IND_WICOR, and IND_BECOR as the best spatial lags in error. They are 
used in the further building of the SARAR(1,1) model. Besides, 5 of 17 matrices were not subject to 
correction: IND, AGE, ANC, ANC_CIT, and ANC_NCIT. The results of Table 7 reveal that two of 
them: IND and AGE could be used as spatial errors too. Thus, in further analysis I test the spatial 
errors for OCCINCOR, IND_WICOR, IND_BECOR, IND, and AGE. 
Table 15 shows the results of comparison of the best SARAR(1,0) model for the large 
sample and the subsample. These results are very favorable, as they show similar values of 
spatial lags estimates. I proceed to SARAR(1,1) models. 
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Table 14. SARAR(0,1) Self-Selection Corrected Models of Income 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
 
 
 
Table 15. SARAR(1,0) Self-Selection Corrected Models of Income: Large Sample 
and Subsample 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
  
Reg No Spatial Error N
rho Robust S.E. z-stat
1 PUMCOR 1.1162 (0.1366)*** 8.17 10977
2 SPCOR 0.9849 (0.2866)*** 3.44 10977
3 OCCCOR -689.4327 - - 10977
4 OCCINDCOR 0.1436 (0.0243)*** 5.90 10977
5 OCC_WICOR 1.7588 (0.2402)*** 7.32 10977
6 OCC_BECOR 53.4399 (6.9546)*** 7.68 10977
7 IND_WICOR 0.3232 (0.0261)*** 12.37 10977
8 IND_BECOR 0.1737 (0.0287)*** 6.05 10977
9 ANC_WICOR 0.0496 (0.0274)** 1.81 10977
10 ANC_BECOR 0.0195 (0.0292) 0.67 10977
11 AGE_WICOR 1.1162 (0.1366)*** 8.17 10977
12 AGE_BECOR -200.1127 (6933.5250) -0.03 10977
Reg No N
2SLS
OCC_WICOR 0.4713 (0.0219)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5541 (0.0099)***
AGE 0.2396 (0.0223)***
ANC_WICOR 0.2197 (0.0156)***
OCC_WICOR 0.5409 (0.1225)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4709 (0.0607)***
AGE 0.1954 (0.1038)*
ANC_WICOR 0.1554 (0.0717)**
270402
S 0.3977 10977
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Rsq
L 0.3671
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Table 16. SARAR(1,1) Self-Selection Corrected Models of Income 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
 
 
 
 Table 16 reports the four SARAR(1,1) models where the best spatial lags in 𝑦 are tested with 
the best spatial lags in 𝜀. Estimation with the error lag AGE fails and therefor is not reported in 
Table 16. Thus, only four models are presented. Evidently, the lags OCCINDCOR, IND_BECOR 
and IND in the errors are not statistically significant, while the lag in error IND_WICOR is very 
strong and good in value. One important pattern is that all of the spatial lags in 𝑦 are significant in all 
specifications and their values are very stable. Finally, the best model for the dependent variable 
income appears to be the regression (2) in Table 16. It combines the spatial lags OCC_WICOR, 
Reg No N
Coef Bootstrap S.E.
2SLS
OCC_WICOR 0.5638 (0.1245)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5798 (0.0710)***
AGE 0.1816 (0.1047)*
ANC_WICOR 0.1508 (0.0715)**
spat error OCCINDCOR 0.0240 (0.0416)
OCC_WICOR 0.4987 (0.1246)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5819 (0.0770)***
AGE 0.1747 (0.1043)*
ANC_WICOR 0.1656 (0.0725)**
spat error IND_WICOR 0.1562 (0.0577)***
OCC_WICOR 0.5222 (0.1238)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5606 (0.0685)***
AGE 0.1825 (0.1042)*
ANC_WICOR 0.1482 (0.0723)**
spat error IND_BECOR 0.0076 (0.0383)
OCC_WICOR 0.5578 (0.1234)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4807 (0.0620)***
AGE 0.1916 (0.1039)*
ANC_WICOR 0.1588 (0.0716)**
spat error IND -0.0206 (0.0449)
3
spat lag
10977
4
spat lag
10977
2
spat lag
10977
1
spat lag
10977
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OCCINDCOR, AGE, and ANC_WICOR with the spatial relationship in error modeled with 
IND_WICOR. 
 If one compares the best model before and after self-selection correction, one can see that 
OCC_WI and OCCIND lags are preserved; AGE_WI is substituted by AGE; and IND_WI 
moves from the lag in dependent variable to the lag in disturbance. Also, ANC_WICOR acquires 
an important effect. The pure geographic variables PUM and SP are dominated in the process of 
building the model.  
Table 17 describes the results of the best model for dependent variable income after self-
selection correction. Many of the estimated 𝛽 parameters become statistically insignificant. This may 
be due to social interactions capturing a large part of variation previously explained by the 𝑋 
variables. There is a stationarity problem since ∑ 𝜆𝑙 > 1. Imposition of restrictive assumptions on  
∑ 𝜆𝑙 could be a useful development of this model. Due to stationarity concerns the average direct and 
indirect effects are unreliable and are not reported. 
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Table 17. Best Self-Selection Corrected Model of Income 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices. 
Reg No
Coef Bootstrap S.E.
OCC_WICOR 0.4987 (0.1246)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5819 (0.0770)***
AGE 0.1747 (0.1043)***
ANC_WICOR 0.1656 (0.0725)***
spat error IND_WICOR 0.1562 (0.0577)***
Occupation Fixed Effects
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E. Coef Bootstrap S.E.
Age 2896.06 (146.46)*** 1492.97 (154.61)*** 83.49 (479.49)
Age Squared -26.03 (1.69)*** -10.75 (1.77)*** 3.71 (4.81)
Male 14083.65 (1161.73)*** 9784.72 (1236.13)*** 6539.25 (1276.43)***
Black -11867.82 (1135.24)*** -7060.22 (1042.63)*** 1916.48 (1409.97)
Asian -11983.71 (1751.25)*** -9878.70 (1602.88)*** -3717.93 (1652.32)**
Hispanic -8724.36 (1173.55)*** -6095.86 (1057.41)*** 2617.83 (1452.99)*
Education, years 2481.37 (189.15)*** 1134.36 (170.93)*** 203.04 (170.49)
Degree in humanities 13798.61 (3130.57)*** 5111.05 (2974.03)* -5923.93 (3293.48)*
Degree in social sciences 26495.30 (4462.78)*** 12158.55 (3957.84)*** -3800.77 (4025.31)
Degree in natural sciences 26343.54 (5898.83)*** 8904.28 (5919.95) -10505.65 (6161.78)*
Degree in formal sciences 33581.55 (8608.80)*** 21589.55 (7963.84)*** 5416.63 (7923.43)
Degree in medical sciences 24140.75 (5279.88)*** 10333.01 (5660.79)* -4171.46 (5581.00)
Degree in business 25972.34 (4193.48)*** 10775.54 (4289.75)** -7619.38 (4660.08)
Served in military 4778.77 (3838.43) 5621.04 (3504.48) 5138.68 (3431.48)
Has private health insurance 21550.94 (1058.37)*** 14602.95 (998.45)*** 7867.74 (1239.13)***
Has public health insurance -4689.89 (1237.67)*** 610.57 (1236.05) 3830.85 (1395.16)***
Constant -78714.80 (3734.65)*** -50241.47 (3337.20)*** -45041.12 (7466.91)***
Size
R-sq
OLS OLS
3
GS2SLS
0.2182 0.3721
10977 10977
21
10977
X Vars
N Y Y
spat lag
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Dependent Variable LogIncome 
 Table A.11 in the Appendix explores SARAR(1,0) one-factor models for dependent variable 
natural logarithm of income after self-selection correction. Following the same logic as before, none 
of the geographic lags appear good. Among the ancestry lags the best one is ANC_WICOR. Clearly, 
the best employment lags are OCC_WICOR, IND_WICOR, and OCCINDCOR, as before. Finally 
the AGE lag is the best in the age category. 
 Table A.12 in the Appendix combines the described best lags. All of the lags remain strong 
and statistically significant. IND_WICOR is reduced in the specifications with AGE lag. Both 
regressions (5 and 6) appear to be rather good. 
 Table A.13 in the Appendix explores the spatial lags in error for the dependent variable 
logincome. Similar to the corrected models of income, OCCOR, OCC_BECOR, and AGE_BECOR 
yield unreliable estimates.  The lags PUMCOR, SPCOR, and AGE_WICOR show estimates above 
1. Finally, the most reasonable lags in error appear to be for OCCINDCOR, OCC_WICOR, 
IND_WICOR, IND_BECOR, ANC_WICOR, and ANC_BECOR (regressions 4, 5, 7-10). 
 Table A.14 in the Appendix shows the transfer from the large sample to subsample. In the 
subsample, IND_WICOR and ANC_WICOR are not significant anymore. For the SARAR(1,1) 
analysis I consider spatial lags from regressions (S2 and S3): OCC_WICOR, OCCINDCOR, AGE, 
and, in some specifications, ANC_WICOR. 
 Table A.15 in the Appendix presents 10 SARAR(1,1) regressions of logincome. None of the 
spatial lags in error are significant, except IND_WICOR. This result is the same as for corrected 
models of income. Choosing between the regressions (2) and (7), one can see that ANC_WICOR is 
small and insignificant and can be dropped from the model. Lastly, regression (2) in Table A.15 
represents the best corrected model of logincome. It has spatial lags in dependent variable 
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OCC_WICOR, OCCINDCOR, and AGE, and an autoregressive process in disturbances that follows 
the pattern IND_WICOR. 
 Table 18 below reports the parameter estimates of the best logincome model. The average 
direct and indirect effects are not reported due to the stationarity concern. Unlike the uncorrected 
model of logincome, many of the 𝛽 parameters become insignificant. The social effects are 
interpreted as follows: keeping other factors constant, if average income of people of the same 
occupation and neighborhood increases by 1%, person’s income will initially increase by 0.45%; if 
average income of people of the same occupation and industry increases by 1%, person’s income 
will initially increase by 0.32%; and if average income of people of the same occupation and 
neighborhood age group increases by 1%, person’s income will initially increase by 0.40%. Also, 
there is a slight correlation between the unobservable characteristics of people that work in the same 
industry within the same neighborhood. Compared to the logincome model before correction, 
OCC_WI and OCCIND lags are preserved; AGE_WI is substituted by AGE; and a spatial process in 
error IND_WICOR is added. These results are similar to the ones for dependent variable income. 
 
Comparison of the Uncorrected and Selectivity-Corrected Models 
 Tables 10, 11, 17, and 18 report the estimation results for the models found to be the best 
for both dependent variables before and after self-selection correction. In order to reveal how the 
results changed after the correction and what the initial models failed to account for, it is useful 
to directly compare the best models in their uncorrected and corrected versions. 
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Table 18. Best Self-Selection Corrected Model of LogIncome  
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices.
Reg No
Coef Bootstrap S.E.
OCC_WICOR 0.4542 (0.0936)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3204 (0.0376)***
AGE 0.3977 (0.0223)***
spat error IND_WICOR 0.1011 (0.0434)**
Occupation Fixed Effects
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E. Coef Bootstrap S.E.
Age 0.1056 (0.0049)*** 0.0769 (0.0049)*** -0.0421 (0.0070)***
Age Squared -0.0009 (0.0001)*** -0.0006 (0.0001)*** 0.0005 (0.0001)***
Male 0.2615 (0.0233)*** 0.1772 (0.0260)*** 0.1265 (0.0265)***
Black -0.1525 (0.0268)*** -0.0918 (0.0267)*** -0.0165 (0.0290)
Asian -0.1914 (0.0370)*** -0.2044 (0.0363)*** -0.1763 (0.0343)***
Hispanic -0.0837 (0.0296)*** -0.0424 (0.0295) 0.0491 (0.0320)
Education, years 0.0560 (0.0037)*** 0.0311 (0.0039)*** 0.0125 (0.0045)***
Degree in humanities 0.2151 (0.0490)*** 0.1280 (0.0491)*** -0.0274 (0.0477)
Degree in social sciences 0.3537 (0.0516)*** 0.2074 (0.0518)*** -0.0063 (0.0544)
Degree in natural sciences 0.3485 (0.0681)*** 0.1872 (0.0656)*** -0.0769 (0.0703)
Degree in formal sciences 0.5258 (0.0842)*** 0.3881 (0.0843)*** 0.0909 (0.0851)
Degree in medical sciences 0.5003 (0.0570)*** 0.2145 (0.0635)*** -0.0622 (0.0738)
Degree in business 0.4246 (0.0465)*** 0.2275 (0.0479)*** -0.0455 (0.0546)
Served in military 0.1834 (0.0562)*** 0.1739 (0.0569)*** 0.1164 (0.0541)**
Has private health insurance 0.5698 (0.0287)*** 0.4389 (0.0294)*** 0.3358 (0.0329)***
Has public health insurance -0.4057 (0.0344)*** -0.2025 (0.0376)*** -0.1268 (0.0403)***
Constant 6.3865 (0.1262)*** 6.6723 (0.1269)*** -1.1137 (0.8201)
Size
R-sq
X Vars
spat lag
2
0.3343 0.4370
9095 9095
N Y Y
9095
1
OLS OLS GS2SLS
3
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Table 19a. Comparison of Best Models of Income 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3  
for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices. 
 
 
Table 19b. Comparison of Best Models of Income 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3  
for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19a  compares  the best uncorrected model of income with an identical model  where 
all the spatial weighting matrices are replaced with the corrected versions of them. As can be seen, 
the corrected model fails and yields completely unreliable estimates for the spatial lag in error 
AGE_BECOR. Moreover, the model fails to yield standard errors and there is a stationarity problem. 
Reg No
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Bootstrap S.E.
OCC_WI(COR) 0.2198 (0.0629)*** 0.2752 -
IND_WI(COR) 0.1800 (0.0579)*** 0.1016 -
OCCIND(COR) 0.1400 (0.0727)* 0.4542 -
AGE_WI(COR) 0.2047 (0.0491)*** 0.2203 (0.0092)***
spat error AGE_BE(COR) 0.6179 (0.1484)*** -183.2667 (451.9810)
Occupation Fixed Effects
Size
spat lag
Y Y
10977 10977
GS2SLS GS2SLS
Best Uncorrected Same Corrected
Reg No
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
OCC_WI(COR) 0.5819 (0.0770)*** 0.2786 (0.0639)***
OCCIND(COR) 0.4987 (0.1246)*** 0.4912 (0.0638)***
AGE 0.1747 (0.1043)* 0.2475 (0.1038)**
ANC_WI(COR) 0.1656 (0.0725)** 0.0901 (0.0450)*
spat error IND_WI(COR) 0.1562 (0.0577)*** 0.0068 (0.0136)
Occupation Fixed Effects
Size
Best Corrected
10977
Same Uncorrected
GS2SLS
spat lag
10977
Y Y
GS2SLS
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Thus, empirical evidence implies that the uncorrected model is not reflecting the true population 
process, and the selectivity correction is an essential procedure.   
Table 19b, on the other hand, compares the best corrected model of income with an 
uncorrected version of itself. Interestingly, all spatial lags in the dependent variable remain 
statistically significant, while the IND_WI lag in the error is not present in the uncorrected model. It 
turns out, that the uncorrected framework fails to account for this correlation in unobservables that 
indeed exists. Regarding the values of coefficients of the social effects, OCCIND effect remains 
practically the same; AGE and ANC_WI effects change slightly; and the OCC_WI effect is twice 
lower for the uncorrected regression. Thus, before the correction, the strength of the occupation 
within the neighborhood effect is underestimated. 
Table 20a compares the best uncorrected model of logincome with the corrected version of 
itself. Similar to the case of dependent variable income, the corrected version of the best uncorrected 
model fails. Each of the reported 𝜆 coefficients is unreliable. This happens even though the model 
does not contain a spatial lag in error.  
Table 20b compares the best corrected model of logincome with the uncorrected version of 
itself. One can see the same situation as with the dependent variable income: the uncorrected model 
fails to account for spatial autocorrelation in disturbances based on IND_WI social space. Also, the 
uncorrected model strongly underestimates the very important occupational group effects OCC_WI 
and OCCIND. It only preserves the age group effect: the AGE coefficient remains about the same.  
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Table 20a. Comparison of Best Models of LogIncome 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3  
for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices. 
 
 
Table 20b. Comparison of Best Models of LogIncome 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3  
for the explanation of notation of weighting matrices. 
Reg No
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Bootstrap S.E.
spat lag OCC_WI(COR) 0.1124 (0.0130)*** -0.4623 (0.0960)***
IND_WI(COR) 0.1063 (0.0090)*** -0.4637 (0.0711)***
OCCIND(COR) 0.3090 (0.0114)*** 1.0230 (0.0805)***
AGE_WI(COR) 0.0460 (0.0064)*** 2.0442 (0.1257)***
AGE_BE(COR) 0.3224 (0.0073)*** -0.7674 (0.1179)***
ANC_WI(COR) 0.0735 (0.0094)*** -0.0008 (0.0260)
Occupation Fixed Effects
Size
R-sq
GS2SLS GS2SLS
Best Uncorrected Same Corrected
Y Y
211640 212369
0.4613 0.4493
Reg No
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
spat lag OCC_WI(COR) 0.4542 (0.0936)*** 0.0010 (0.0028)
OCCIND(COR) 0.3204 (0.0376)*** 0.0050 (0.0028)*
AGE 0.3977 (0.0223)*** 0.4192 (0.0225)***
spat error IND_WI(COR) 0.1011 (0.0434)** -0.0022 (0.0166)
Occupation Fixed Effects
Size 9095 9095
GS2SLS GS2SLS
Best Corrected Same Uncorrected
Y Y
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X. Conclusion 
 
The contribution of this work is the introduction, deep examination, and empirical 
application of the multiple social networks model. First, the study contributes to a growing 
theoretical and empirical literature on group effects and to social networks theory. I combine 
different channels of social influence in one model and elaborate on the implications of such a blend. 
Second, the study addresses the income determinants and contributes to a wide inequality discussion 
in the literature. Third, the paper contributes to a body of spatial econometric research. On the one 
hand, it is an interesting application to the specific New York City context, and it complements the 
empirical findings about this city. On the other hand, this application gives rise to many conceptual 
questions and issues. The study addresses many identification problems, but clearly the discussion 
has not ended, for some questions need further investigation. 
The study includes a unique way of measuring cross-cultural effects; I use micro-level urban 
data rather than macro-level aggregate factors. This helps to obtain a richer and more detailed 
understanding of cultural differences.  
The core finding of my dissertation is that people’s total personal income is affected by the 
group of people of the same occupation within their neighborhood, by the group people of the same 
occupation and industry, by the group of people of the same age group, and by their ethnic group 
within their neighborhood. Additionally, people have correlations in individual unobservable 
characteristics with those working in their industry within their neighborhood. The crucial 
hypothesis gained empirical support – all these social effects exist simultaneously and must be 
considered together. 
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Some of the directions for future analysis are the stationarity concerns and development of 
the necessary stability restrictions; the relationships across social structures and various ways of 
interactions between channels of social influence; and potential heterogeneity of effects. Another 
question to investigate is the applicability of micro-level data sampling weights in spatial 
econometric analysis in general, and to a group effects model in particular.  
One final thought relates to the dispute on the concept of utility. As mentioned earlier, 
rational choice is a questionable notion, and many times imitative behaviors happen unconsciously, 
so I treat the concept of utility with caution. Neuroeconomic findings on the way individuals make 
economic choices could suggest new ways of extending the social effects model. 
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Figure A.1. Dominant Ethnicities Map of New York City 
 
Source: Census American Community Survey.  
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2 
Figure A.2. PUMAs and Community Districts Map of New York City 
 
Source: Census, 2010. 
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Table A.1. Nativity of the Population for the 10 Largest U.S. Cities: 1870 to 2010 
 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1 New York city, NY 2,996,580 35.7 1 New York city, NY 2,871,032 35.9 1 New York city, NY 2,082,931 28.4
2 Los Angeles city, CA 1,521,119 39.7 2 Los Angeles city, CA 1,512,720 40.9 2 Los Angeles city, CA 1,336,665 38.4
3 Houston city, TX 644,167 28.5 3 Chicago city, IL 628,906 21.7 3 Chicago city, IL 469,187 16.9
4 Chicago city, IL 588,480 20.6 4 Houston city, TX 516,105 26.4 4 Houston city, TX 290,374 17.8
5 San Jose city, CA 367,711 38.1 5 San Jose city, CA 329,757 36.9 5 San Francisco city, CA 246,034 34.0
6 Phoenix city, AZ 346,430 21.7 6 San Diego city, CA 314,227 25.7 6 San Diego city, CA 232,138 20.9
7 San Diego city, CA 325,819 24.9 7 Dallas city, TX 290,436 24.4 7 Miami city, FL 214,128 59.7
8 Dallas city, TX 322,072 24.8 8 San Francisco city, CA 285,541 36.8 8 San Jose city, CA 207,041 26.5
9 San Francisco city, CA 278,369 34.1 9 Phoenix city, AZ 257,325 19.5 9 Dallas city, TX 125,862 12.5
10 Miami city, FL 244,352 56.4 10 Miami city, FL 215,739 59.5 10 El Paso city, TX 120,432 23.4
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1 New York city, NY 1,670,199 23.6 1 New York city, NY 1,437,058 18.2 1 New York city, NY 1,558,690 20.0
2 Los Angeles city, CA 804,818 27.1 2 Los Angeles city, CA 410,870 14.6 2 Chicago city, IL 438,392 12.3
3 Chicago city, IL 435,232 14.5 3 Chicago city, IL 373,919 11.1 3 Los Angeles city, CA 311,677 12.6
4 San Francisco city, CA 192,204 28.3 4 San Francisco city, CA 154,507 21.6 4 Detroit city, MI 201,713 12.1
5 Miami city, FL 186,280 53.7 5 Miami city, FL 140,207 41.8 5 Philadelphia city, PA 178,427 8.9
6 Houston city, TX 155,577 9.8 6 Philadelphia city, PA 126,896 6.5 6 San Francisco city, CA 142,531 19.3
7 San Diego city, CA 130,906 15.0 7 Detroit city, MI 119,347 7.9 7 Boston city, MA 109,964 15.8
8 Philadelphia city, PA 107,951 6.4 8 Boston city, MA 83,988 13.1 8 Cleveland city, OH 96,584 11.0
9 San Jose city, CA 90,914 14.4 9 Cleveland city, OH 56,400 7.5 9 Seattle city, WA 59,720 10.7
10 El Paso city, TX 90,907 21.4 10 San Diego city, CA 52,977 7.6 10 Milwaukee city, WI 57,014 7.7
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1 New York city, NY 1,860,930 23.6 1 New York city, NY 2,138,657 28.7 1 New York city, NY 2,358,686 34.0
2 Chicago city, IL 532,970 14.8 2 Chicago city, IL 675,147 19.9 2 Chicago city, IL 859,409 25.5
3 Detroit city, MI 278,260 15.1 3 Detroit city, MI 322,688 19.9 3 Detroit city, MI 405,882 25.9
4 Los Angeles city, CA 262,940 13.4 4 Philadelphia city, PA 292,546 15.1 4 Philadelphia city, PA 372,078 19.1
5 Philadelphia city, PA 237,795 11.5 5 Los Angeles city, CA 227,037 15.1 5 Los Angeles city, CA 247,135 20.0
6 Boston city, MA 149,000 18.6 6 Boston city, MA 184,080 23.9 6 Boston city, MA 233,687 29.9
7 San Francisco city, CA 137,010 17.7 7 Cleveland city, OH 179,784 20.5 7 Cleveland city, OH 230,946 25.6
8 Cleveland city, OH 132,880 14.6 8 San Francisco city, CA 140,023 22.1 8 San Francisco city, CA 171,641 27.1
9 Newark city, NJ 71,810 16.4 9 Buffalo city, NY 92,401 16.0 9 Buffalo city, NY 118,941 20.8
10 Buffalo city, NY 70,505 12.2 10 Newark city, NJ 90,871 21.1 10 Newark city, NJ 116,135 26.3
Place
Foreign born
2010
Rank Place
Foreign born
1960
1950
Foreign born
Rank RankPlace
1980
Foreign born
Rank
1970
1990
Foreign born
Rank Place
Foreign born
Rank Place
Place
2000
Rank Place
Foreign born
Rank Place
1940 1930
Foreign born
Rank Place
Foreign born
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Table A.1. Nativity of the Population for the 10 Largest U.S. Cities: 1870 to 2010 (continued) 
 
 
Source: Census Historical Statistics 
 
 
  
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1 New York city, NY 2,028,160 36.1 1 New York city, NY 1,944,357 40.8 1 New York city, NY 1,270,080 37.0
2 Chicago city, IL 808,558 29.9 2 Chicago city, IL 783,428 35.9 2 Chicago city, IL 587,112 34.6
3 Philadelphia city, PA 400,744 22.0 3 Philadelphia city, PA 384,707 24.8 3 Philadelphia city, PA 295,340 22.8
4 Detroit city, MI 290,884 29.3 4 Boston city, MA 243,365 36.3 4 Boston city, MA 197,129 35.1
5 Boston city, MA 242,619 32.4 5 Cleveland city, OH 196,170 35.0 5 Cleveland city, OH 124,631 32.6
6 Cleveland city, OH 240,173 30.1 6 Detroit city, MI 157,534 33.8 6 San Francisco city, CA 116,885 34.1
7 San Francisco city, CA 149,195 29.4 7 San Francisco city, CA 142,298 34.1 7 St. Louis city, MO 111,356 19.4
8 Los Angeles city, CA 122,131 21.2 8 Pittsburgh city, PA 140,924 26.4 8 Buffalo city, NY 104,252 29.6
9 Buffalo city, NY 121,824 24.0 9 St. Louis city, MO 126,223 18.4 9 Detroit city, MI 96,503 33.8
10 Pittsburgh city, PA 120,792 20.5 10 Buffalo city, NY 118,689 28.0 10 Milwaukee city, WI 88,991 31.2
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1 New York city, NY 639,943 42.2 1 New York city, NY 478,670 39.7 1 New York city, NY 419,094 44.5
2 Chicago city, IL 450,666 41.0 2 Chicago city, IL 204,859 40.7 2 Philadelphia city, PA 183,624 27.2
3 Philadelphia city, PA 269,480 25.7 3 Philadelphia city, PA 204,335 24.1 3 Brooklyn city, NY 144,718 36.5
4 Brooklyn city, NY 261,700 32.5 4 Brooklyn city, NY 177,694 31.4 4 Chicago city, IL 144,557 48.4
5 Boston city, MA 158,172 35.3 5 Boston city, MA 114,796 31.6 5 St. Louis city, MO 112,249 36.1
6 San Francisco city, CA 126,811 42.4 6 St. Louis city, MO 105,013 30.0 6 Boston city, MA 87,986 35.1
7 St. Louis city, MO 114,876 25.4 7 San Francisco city, CA 104,244 44.6 7 Cincinnati city, OH 79,612 36.8
8 Cleveland city, OH 97,095 37.2 8 Cincinnati city, OH 71,659 28.1 8 San Francisco city, CA 73,719 49.3
9 Buffalo city, NY 89,485 35.0 9 Cleveland city, OH 59,409 37.1 9 Baltimore city, MD 56,484 21.1
10 Detroit city, MI 81,709 39.7 10 Baltimore city, MD 56,136 16.9 10 New Orleans city, LA 48,475 25.3
Rank Place
Foreign born
Rank Place
Foreign bornForeign born
Rank Place
1920 1910
Foreign born
Rank Place
Foreign born
Rank Place
1900
1890
Foreign born
Rank Place
1880 1870
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Table A.2. Ethnicities Frequency Distribution 
 
 
1 001 Alsatian 7 0 41 124 Rom 10 0 81 225 Panamanian 709 0.26
2 003 Austrian 497 0.18 42 125 Hungarian 1,340 0.5 82 226 Salvadoran 1,052 0.39
3 005 Basque 25 0.01 43 128 Latvian 88 0.03 83 227 Central American 44 0.02
4 008 Belgian 107 0.04 44 129 Lithuanian 300 0.11 84 231 Argentinean 303 0.11
5 009 Flemish 3 0 45 130 Macedonian 103 0.04 85 232 Bolivian 114 0.04
6 011 British 637 0.24 46 131 Montenegrin 51 0.02 86 233 Chilean 199 0.07
7 012 British Isles 21 0.01 47 142 Polish 5,642 2.09 87 234 Colombian 2,474 0.91
8 020 Danish 192 0.07 48 144 Romanian 762 0.28 88 235 Ecuadorian 4,391 1.62
9 021 Dutch 432 0.16 49 146 Moldavian 29 0.01 89 236 Paraguayan 54 0.02
10 022 English 3,255 1.2 50 148 Russian 6,206 2.3 90 237 Peruvian 933 0.35
11 024 Finnish 92 0.03 51 152 Serbian 160 0.06 91 238 Uruguayan 61 0.02
12 026 French 1,315 0.49 52 153 Slovak 194 0.07 92 239 Venezuelan 217 0.08
13 032 German 5,563 2.06 53 154 Slovene 37 0.01 93 249 South American 138 0.05
14 040 Prussian 3 0 54 168 Turkestani 17 0.01 94 250 Latin American 73 0.03
15 046 Greek 2,451 0.91 55 169 Uzbeg 193 0.07 95 251 Latin 113 0.04
16 049 Icelander 10 0 56 170 Georgia CIS 141 0.05 96 252 Latino 442 0.16
17 050 Irish 10,447 3.86 57 171 Ukrainian 1,907 0.71 97 261 Puerto Rican 15,830 5.85
18 051 Italian 19,413 7.18 58 176 Yugoslavian 211 0.08 98 271 Cuban 868 0.32
19 068 Sicilian 89 0.03 59 177 Herzegovinian 115 0.04 99 275 Dominican 14,287 5.28
20 077 Luxemburger 5 0 60 178 Slavic 55 0.02 100 290 Hispanic 2,617 0.97
21 078 Maltese 79 0.03 61 179 Slavonian 1 0 101 291 Spanish 1,742 0.64
22 082 Norwegian 566 0.21 62 181 Central European 7 0 102 295 Spanish American 23 0.01
23 084 Portuguese 318 0.12 63 183 Northern European 103 0.04 103 300 Bahamian 38 0.01
24 087 Scotch Irish 381 0.14 64 185 Southern European 14 0.01 104 301 Barbadian 834 0.31
25 088 Scottish 819 0.3 65 187 Western European 151 0.06 105 302 Belizean 223 0.08
26 089 Swedish 488 0.18 66 190 Eastern European 1,423 0.53 106 308 Jamaican 7,171 2.65
27 091 Swiss 186 0.07 67 194 Germanic 9 0 107 310 Dutch West Indian 36 0.01
28 094 Irish Scotch 361 0.13 68 195 European 1,821 0.67 108 314 Trinidadian Tobagonian 2,462 0.91
29 097 Welsh 205 0.08 69 200 Spaniard 574 0.21 109 322 British West Indian 146 0.05
30 098 Scandinavian 73 0.03 70 210 Mexican 5,144 1.9 110 325 Antigua and Barbuda 163 0.06
31 099 Celtic 23 0.01 71 211 Mexican American 133 0.05 111 329 Grenadian 604 0.22
32 100 Albanian 1,048 0.39 72 212 Mexicano 329 0.12 112 330 Vincent-Grenadine Islander 328 0.12
33 102 Belorussian 186 0.07 73 213 Chicano 2 0 113 331 St Lucia Islander 216 0.08
34 103 Bulgarian 200 0.07 74 215 Mexican American Indian 18 0.01 114 335 West Indian 2,499 0.92
35 109 Croatian 350 0.13 75 218 Mexican State 570 0.21 115 336 Haitian 4,049 1.5
36 111 Czech 254 0.09 76 219 Mexican Indian 5 0 116 359 Other West Indian 83 0.03
37 112 Bohemian 4 0 77 221 Costa Rican 185 0.07 117 360 Brazilian 427 0.16
38 114 Czechoslovakian 85 0.03 78 222 Guatemalan 770 0.28 118 370 Guyanese 3,973 1.47
39 115 Estonian 29 0.01 79 223 Honduran 1,021 0.38 119 400 Algerian 64 0.02
40 122 German Russian 3 0 80 224 Nicaraguan 236 0.09 120 402 Egyptian 701 0.26
Ancestry Count Percent
Census 
Code
Ancestry Count Percent Count
Census 
Code
CountCount
Census 
Code
Ancestry Count Percent
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Table A.2. Ethnicities Frequency Distribution (continued) 
 
Note: ACS data contain primary and secondary ancestries for respondents. Only the primary ancestry is recorded in this table. 
121 406 Moroccan 213 0.08 161 607 Bhutanese 13 0 201 901 Afro 93 0.03
122 411 North African 10 0 162 609 Nepali 182 0.07 202 902 African American 21,838 8.08
123 416 Iranian 362 0.13 163 615 Asian Indian 5,300 1.96 203 903 Black 4,047 1.5
124 417 Iraqi 29 0.01 164 618 Bengali 587 0.22 204 904 Negro 62 0.02
125 419 Israeli 535 0.2 165 620 East Indian 482 0.18 205 907 Creole 24 0.01
126 421 Jordanian 47 0.02 166 650 Punjab 117 0.04 206 913 Central American Indian 70 0.03
127 425 Lebanese 376 0.14 167 680 Pakistani 1,392 0.51 207 914 South American Indian 32 0.01
128 427 Saudi Arabian 5 0 168 690 Sri Lankan 160 0.06 208 917 Native American 232 0.09
129 429 Syrian 297 0.11 169 700 Burmese 122 0.05 209 918 Indian 303 0.11
130 431 Armenian 292 0.11 170 703 Cambodian 110 0.04 210 919 Cherokee 82 0.03
131 434 Turkish 467 0.17 171 706 Chinese 16,254 6.01 211 920 American Indian 358 0.13
132 435 Yemeni 234 0.09 172 707 Cantonese 89 0.03 212 921 Aleut 1 0
133 442 Kurdish 7 0 173 712 Mongolian 20 0.01 213 922 Eskimo 3 0
134 465 Palestinian 111 0.04 174 714 Tibetan 117 0.04 214 924 White 2,041 0.75
135 483 Assyrian 4 0 175 720 Filipino 2,625 0.97 215 925 Anglo 152 0.06
136 484 Chaldean 2 0 176 730 Indonesian 140 0.05 216 927 Appalachian 2 0
137 490 Mideast 141 0.05 177 740 Japanese 929 0.34 217 929 Pennsylvania German 13 0
138 495 Arab 160 0.06 178 750 Korean 2,925 1.08 218 931 Canadian 241 0.09
139 496 Arabic 248 0.09 179 765 Laotian 13 0 219 935 French Canadian 296 0.11
140 499 Other Arab 65 0.02 180 770 Malaysian 144 0.05 220 937 Cajun 7 0
141 508 Cameroonian 19 0.01 181 776 Thai 229 0.08 221 939 American 6,208 2.3
142 510 Cape Verdean 21 0.01 182 782 Taiwanese 823 0.3 222 940 United States 329 0.12
143 515 Congolese 13 0 183 785 Vietnamese 493 0.18 223 983 Texas 5 0
144 522 Ethiopian 77 0.03 184 793 Eurasian 5 0 224 994 North American 2 0
145 523 Eritrean 17 0.01 185 794 Amerasian 2 0 225 995 Mixture 323 0.12
146 529 Ghanaian 523 0.19 186 795 Asian 1,451 0.54 226 996 Uncodable entries 699 0.26
147 534 Kenyan 28 0.01 187 799 Other Asian 190 0.07 227 997 Other groups 355 0.13
148 541 Liberian 45 0.02 188 800 Australian 116 0.04 228 998 Other responses 7,799 2.88
149 553 Nigerian 654 0.24 189 803 New Zealander 21 0.01 229 999 Not reported 26,598 9.84
150 564 Senegalese 97 0.04 190 808 Polynesian 4 0 Total 270,402 100
151 566 Sierra Leonean 37 0.01 191 811 Hawaiian 29 0.01
152 568 Somalian 7 0 192 814 Samoan 7 0
153 570 South African 49 0.02 193 820 Micronesian 5 0
154 576 Sudanese 19 0.01 194 821 Guamanian 4 0
155 587 Other Subsaharan African 323 0.12 195 822 Chamorro 2 0
156 588 Ugandan 2 0 196 825 Marshallese 1 0
157 598 Western African 108 0.04 197 841 Fijian 3 0
158 599 African 2,760 1.02 198 850 Pacific Islander 9 0
159 600 Afghan 158 0.06 199 899 Other Pacific 9 0
160 603 Bangladeshi 1,828 0.68 200 900 Afro American 1,673 0.62
Count PercentAncestry Count Percent Count
Census 
Code
AncestryCount
Census 
Code
Ancestry Count Percent Count
Census 
Code
 97 
 
Table A.3. PUMAs Frequency Distribution 
 
 
3701 1 Riverdale, Fieldston & Kingsbridge 3,371 1.25
3702 2 Wakefield, Williamsbridge & Woodlawn 4,485 1.66
3703 3 Co-op City, Pelham Bay & Schuylerville 2,990 1.11
3704 4 Pelham Parkway, Morris Park & Laconia 4,421 1.63
3705 5 Belmont, Crotona Park East & East Tremont 4,862 1.8
3706 6 Bedford Park, Fordham North & Norwood 2,944 1.09
3707 7 Morris Heights, Fordham South & Mount Hope 3,790 1.4
3708 8 Concourse, Highbridge & Mount Eden 3,364 1.24
3709 9 Castle Hill, Clason Point & Parkchester 5,003 1.85
3710 10 Hunts Point, Longwood & Melrose 4,799 1.77
3801 11 Washington Heights, Inwood & Marble Hill 5,122 1.89
3802 12 Hamilton Hts, Manhattanville & West Harlem 3,588 1.33
3803 13 Central Harlem 3,485 1.29
3804 14 East Harlem 3,250 1.2
3805 15 Upper East Side 4,959 1.83
3806 16 Upper West Side & West Side 4,120 1.52
3807 17 Chelsea, Clinton & Midtown Business District 4,431 1.64
3808 18 Murray Hill, Gramercy & Stuyvesant Town 3,461 1.28
3809 19 Chinatown & Lower East Side 4,602 1.7
3810 20 Battery Park City, Greenwich Village & Soho 4,486 1.66
3901 21 Tottenville, Great Kills & Annadale 5,318 1.97
3902 22 New Springville & South Beach 4,652 1.72
3903 23 Port Richmond, Stapleton & Mariner's Harbor 5,951 2.2
4001 24 Greenpoint & Williamsburg 5,175 1.91
4002 25 Bushwick 4,273 1.58
4003 26 Bedford-Stuyvesant 4,259 1.58
4004 27 Brooklyn Heights & Fort Greene 5,240 1.94
4005 28 Park Slope, Carroll Gardens & Red Hook 4,279 1.58
4006 29 Crown Heights North & Prospect Heights 4,051 1.5
4007 30 Brownsville & Ocean Hill 3,681 1.36
4008 31 East New York & Starrett City 4,966 1.84
4009 32 Canarsie & Flatlands 8,647 3.2
4010 33 East Flatbush, Farragut & Rugby 4,850 1.79
4011 34 Crown Heights So., Prospect Lefferts & Wingate 3,330 1.23
4012 35 Sunset Park & Windsor Terrace 5,137 1.9
4013 36 Bay Ridge & Dyker Heights 5,546 2.05
4014 37 Borough Park, Kensington & Ocean Parkway 5,672 2.1
4015 38 Flatbush & Midwood 5,463 2.02
4016 39 Sheepshead Bay, Gerritsen Beach & Homecrest 5,972 2.21
4017 40 Bensonhurst & Bath Beach 7,250 2.68
4018 41 Brighton Beach & Coney Island 3,415 1.26
4101 42 Astoria & Long Island City 7,054 2.61
4102 43 Jackson Heights & North Corona 5,090 1.88
4103 44 Flushing, Murray Hill & Whitestone 8,550 3.16
4104 45 Bayside, Douglaston & Little Neck 5,023 1.86
4105 46 Queens Village, Cambria Heights & Rosedale 8,011 2.96
4106 47 Briarwood, Fresh Meadows & Hillcrest 5,097 1.88
4107 48 Elmhurst & South Corona 3,894 1.44
4108 49 Forest Hills & Rego Park 3,864 1.43
4109 50 Sunnyside & Woodside 4,524 1.67
4110 51 Ridgewood, Glendale & Middle Village 7,100 2.63
4111 52 Richmond Hill & Woodhaven 6,554 2.42
4112 53 Jamaica, Hollis & St. Albans 8,777 3.25
4113 54 Howard Beach & Ozone Park 4,959 1.83
4114 55 Far Rockaway, Breezy Point & Broad Channel 3,245 1.2
Total 270,402 100
District 
Code
Borough Neighborhoods
Absolute 
Sample Size
Relative 
Sample Size
PUMA 
ID
The Bronx
Manhattan
Staten Island
Brooklyn
Queens
 98 
 
Table A.4. SARAR(1,0) Models of LogIncome: One Factor 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Rsq Coef Robust S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.3348 0.4148 223323
2SLS
1 PUM 0.3637 (0.0084)*** 0.3420 0.2432 (0.0080)*** 0.4179 223323
2 SP 0.1922 (0.0058)*** 0.3384 0.1276 (0.0055)*** 0.4163 223323
PUM 0.3402 (0.0107)*** 0.2292 (0.0101)***
SP 0.0307 (0.0073)*** 0.0207 (0.0069)***
4 ANC 0.2088 (0.0113)*** 0.3362 0.1312 (0.0106)*** 0.4154 223318
5 ANC_CIT 0.0563 (0.0039)*** 0.3355 0.0323 (0.0036)*** 0.4151 223315
6 ANC_NCIT 0.0575 (0.0033)*** 0.3352 0.0453 (0.0031)*** 0.4151 222945
ANC_CIT 0.0399 (0.0044)*** 0.0171 (0.0042)***
ANC_NCIT 0.0356 (0.0036)*** 0.0345 (0.0034)***
8 ANC_WI 0.2953 (0.0076)*** 0.3431 0.1946 (0.0073)*** 0.4189 221846
9 ANC_BE 0.1922 (0.0113)*** 0.3359 0.1190 (0.0106)*** 0.4153 223318
ANC_WI 0.3170 (0.0088)*** 0.2128 (0.0084)***
ANC_BE -0.0496 (0.0131)*** -0.0381 (0.0123)***
11 OCC 0.6304 (0.0046)*** 0.4081 -0.5320 (0.2123)** 0.4160 223318
12 IND 0.5656 (0.0052)*** 0.3836 0.3311 (0.0069)*** 0.4219 223319
13 OCCIND 0.6135 (0.0046)*** 0.4167 0.4010 (0.0097)*** 0.4261 217725
OCC 0.5045 (0.0051)*** -0.6675 (0.1997)***
IND 0.2354 (0.0056)*** 0.3307 (0.0069)**
OCC 0.2335 (0.0097)*** -0.9364 (0.4220)***
IND 0.1274 (0.0065)*** 0.1527 (0.0096)***
OCCIND 0.3507 (0.0106)*** 0.3454 (0.0119)***
IND 0.1205 (0.0065)*** 0.1526 (0.0096)***
OCCIND 0.5456 (0.0057)*** 0.3460 (0.0119)***
17 OCC_WI 0.5776 (0.0047)*** 0.4036 0.2342 (0.0110)*** 0.4200 219154
18 OCC_BE 0.6288 (0.0046)*** 0.4072 -3.8043 (0.3901)*** 0.4259 223316
OCC_WI 0.2572 (0.0107)*** 0.1392 (0.0162)***
OCC_BE 0.3890 (0.0112)*** -4.6730 (0.4856)***
20 IND_WI 0.5188 (0.0050)*** 0.3855 0.2718 (0.0063)*** 0.4257 221336
21 IND_BE 0.5627 (0.0052)*** 0.3828 0.3258 (0.0069)*** 0.4215 223319
IND_WI 0.3257 (0.0093)*** 0.2369 (0.0091)***
IND_BE 0.2655 (0.0100)*** 0.1216 (0.0106)***
OCC_WI 0.4361 (0.0056)*** 0.1414 (0.0128)***
IND_WI 0.0781 (0.0098)*** 0.1827 (0.0109)***
IND_BE 0.2195 (0.0098)*** 0.1686 (0.0117)***
OCC_WI 0.1997 (0.0086)*** 0.1512 (0.0131)***
IND_WI 0.1481 (0.0101)*** 0.1576 (0.0112)***
IND_BE -0.0059 (0.0112) 0.0113 (0.0134)
OCCIND 0.3800 (0.0093)*** 0.3428 (0.0127)***
OCC_WI 0.2043 (0.0080)*** 0.1510 (0.0122)***
IND_WI 0.1399 (0.0063)*** 0.1520 (0.0084)***
OCCIND 0.3735 (0.0083)*** 0.3271 (0.0115)***
26 AGE 0.4323 (0.0043)*** 0.3732 0.3911 (0.0043)*** 0.4447 223323
27 AGE_WI 0.3279 (0.0034)*** 0.3732 0.2712 (0.0034)*** 0.4409 223323
28 AGE_BE 0.4287 (0.0043)*** 0.3726 0.3883 (0.0043)*** 0.4443 223323
AGE_WI 0.2021 (0.0045)*** 0.1422 (0.0043)***
AGE_BE 0.2348 (0.0061)*** 0.2548 (0.0059)***
0.4186 0.4275 217725
AgeGroup
Employment
24
25
0.4292
0.4291
0.4343 213009
2130090.4343
223314
0.4293 217725
0.4477 223323
219152
0.4264 221336
0.4291 217442
223323
0.4152 222940
0.4189
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
221846
29 0.3795
0.4286
0.4180
0.4233
22 0.3906
14 0.4142
15 0.4220
0.4166
16
23
19 0.4139
Geo
3 0.3420
Ancestry
7 0.3357
10 0.3431
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Table A.5. SARAR(1,0) Models of LogIncome: Two, Three, and Four Factors 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
 
  
  
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Rsq Coef Robust S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.3348 0.4148 223323
2SLS
OCC_WI 0.1928 (0.0083)*** 0.1189 (0.0129)***
IND_WI 0.1495 (0.0066)*** 0.1133 (0.0089)***
OCCIND 0.3383 (0.0086)*** 0.3050 (0.0114)***
AGE_WI 0.0414 (0.0051)*** 0.0697 (0.0058)***
AGE_BE 0.3084 (0.0065)*** 0.3005 (0.0068)***
OCC_WI 0.1895 (0.0084)*** 0.1245 (0.0130)***
IND_WI 0.1244 (0.0066)*** 0.1244 (0.0088)***
OCCIND 0.3901 (0.0087)*** 0.3453 (0.0116)***
ANC_WI 0.0853 (0.0081)*** 0.1003 (0.0087)***
OCC_WI 0.2029 (0.0087)*** 0.1481 (0.0136)***
IND_WI 0.1316 (0.0070)*** 0.1320 (0.0095)***
OCCIND 0.3775 (0.0091)*** 0.3406 (0.0119)***
PUM 0.0633 (0.0100)*** 0.0755 (0.0114)***
AGE_WI 0.1415 (0.0056)*** 0.1010 (0.0053)***
AGE_BE 0.2900 (0.0064)*** 0.2926 (0.0061)***
ANC_WI 0.1547 (0.0092)*** 0.1084 (0.0087)***
AGE_WI 0.1455 (0.0086)*** 0.1073 (0.0082)***
AGE_BE 0.2890 (0.0090)*** 0.2881 (0.0086)***
PUM 0.1268 (0.0156)*** 0.0822 (0.0148)***
ANC_WI 0.1911 (0.0101)*** 0.1306 (0.0096)***
PUM 0.2121 (0.0111)*** 0.1416 (0.0105)***
OCC_WI 0.2091 (0.0085)*** 0.1518 (0.0132)***
IND_WI 0.1604 (0.0068)*** 0.1229 (0.0092)***
OCCIND 0.3173 (0.0088)*** 0.2961 (0.0115)***
AGE_WI 0.0661 (0.0088)*** 0.0796 (0.0089)***
AGE_BE 0.2835 (0.0093)*** 0.2890 (0.0094)***
ANC_WI 0.0822 (0.0099)*** 0.0920 (0.0099)***
PUM -0.1233 (0.0183)*** -0.1070 (0.0186)***
OCC_WI 0.1905 (0.0083)*** 0.1124 (0.0130)***
IND_WI 0.1470 (0.0067)*** 0.1063 (0.0090)***
OCCIND 0.3401 (0.0086)*** 0.3090 (0.0114)***
AGE_WI 0.0214 (0.0061)*** 0.0460 (0.0064)***
AGE_BE 0.3268 (0.0071)*** 0.3224 (0.0073)***
ANC_WI 0.0565 (0.0094)*** 0.0735 (0.0094)***
Ancestry and 
Geo
6
0.4480 223323
0.4194 221846
0.3802
0.3445
0.4614 2116407
8
All Factors
0.4613 2116400.4545
0.4546
Age and Geo 5
0.4538
0.4302
213009
Age and 
Ancestry
1
2
3
4 0.4491 221846
0.4293
0.3821
Employment 
and Ancestry
0.4353
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
0.4605 213009
Employment 
and Geo
Employment 
and Age
211640
0.4344
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Table A.6. SARAR(0,1) Models of LogIncome 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reg No Spatial Error N
rho Robust S.E. z-stat rho Robust S.E. z-stat
1 PUM 0.1505 (0.0816)* 1.84 0.1737 (0.0811)** 2.14 9095
2 SP -0.2648 (0.1620) -1.63 -0.4748 (0.1220)*** -3.89 9095
3 OCC 0.2057 (0.0304)*** 6.76 0.0338 (0.0417) 0.81 9095
4 IND 0.4147 (0.0313)*** 13.26 0.0905 (0.0543)* 1.67 9095
5 OCCIND 0.0899 (0.0192)*** 4.67 -0.0288 (0.0235) -1.23 9095
6 OCC_WI 0.0162 (0.0144) 1.13 -0.0068 (0.0151) -0.45 9095
7 OCC_BE 0.2152 (0.0310)*** 6.95 0.0406 (0.0420) 0.97 9095
8 IND_WI 0.0542 (0.0147)*** 3.67 0.0045 (0.0164) 0.27 9095
9 IND_BE 0.3938 (0.0302)*** 13.05 0.0694 (0.0524) 1.32 9095
10 ANC -0.0045 (0.0484) -0.09 -0.0130 (0.0494) -0.26 9095
11 ANC_CIT 0.0216 (0.0442) 0.49 -0.0157 (0.0470) -0.33 9095
12 ANC_NCIT -0.0037 (0.0338) -0.11 0.0201 (0.0332) 0.60 9095
13 ANC_WI 0.0321 (0.0173)* 1.85 0.0182 (0.0176) 1.03 9095
14 ANC_BE -0.0006 (0.0487) -0.01 -0.0016 (0.0489) -0.03 9095
15 AGE 0.3825 (0.1562)** 2.45 -0.3391 (0.2634) -1.29 9095
16 AGE_WI 0.0714 (0.0354)** 2.02 0.0474 (0.0370) 1.28 9095
17 AGE_BE 0.3533 (0.1517)** 2.33 -0.4311 (0.2568)* -1.68 9095
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
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Table A.7. SARAR(1,0) Models of LogIncome: Large Sample and Subsample 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
  
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Rsq Coef Robust S.E. Rsq
2SLS
OCC_WI 0.1905 (0.0083)*** 0.1124 (0.0130)***
IND_WI 0.1470 (0.0067)*** 0.1063 (0.0090)***
OCCIND 0.3401 (0.0086)*** 0.3090 (0.0114)***
AGE_WI 0.0214 (0.0061)*** 0.0460 (0.0064)***
AGE_BE 0.3268 (0.0071)*** 0.3224 (0.0073)***
ANC_WI 0.0565 (0.0094)*** 0.0735 (0.0094)***
OCC_WI 0.0530 (0.0082)*** 0.0013 (0.0084)
IND_WI 0.0753 (0.0129)*** 0.0342 (0.0104)***
OCCIND 0.0336 (0.0069)*** 0.0020 (0.0061)
AGE_WI 0.1445 (0.0222)*** 0.1313 (0.0221)***
AGE_BE 0.2904 (0.0297)*** 0.2676 (0.0298)***
ANC_WI -0.0047 (0.0109) -0.0098 (0.0108)
IND_WI 0.0952 (0.0131)*** 0.0336 (0.0102)***
AGE_WI 0.1543 (0.0220)*** 0.1296 (0.0218)***
AGE_BE 0.2911 (0.0298)*** 0.2695 (0.0296)***
211640
9095
9095
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
0.4545 0.4613
0.4693
0.4693
0.3962
0.3879
L
S1
S2
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Table A.8. SARAR(1,1) Models of LogIncome  
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. 
  
Reg No N
Coef Robust S.E. Coef Robust S.E.
2SLS
IND_WI 0.0321 (0.0101)*** -0.0288 (0.0268)
AGE_WI 0.1311 (0.0216)*** 0.1858 (0.0815)**
AGE_BE 0.2682 (0.0294)*** 0.1895 (0.1136)*
spat error PUM 0.1927 (0.0793)** 0.1898 (0.0796)**
IND_WI 0.0744 (0.0126)*** 0.0364 (0.0102)***
AGE_WI 0.1500 (0.0219)*** 0.1298 (0.0216)***
AGE_BE 0.2944 (0.0296)*** 0.2690 (0.0294)***
spat error IND 0.3675 (0.0352)*** 0.0546 (0.0514)
IND_WI 0.0948 (0.0131)*** 0.0355 (0.0102)***
AGE_WI 0.1540 (0.0219)*** 0.1283 (0.0216)***
AGE_BE 0.2916 (0.0297)*** 0.2709 (0.0294)***
spat error AGE_WI 0.0607 (0.0378) 0.0455 (0.0388)
IND_WI 0.0749 (0.0126)*** 0.0364 (0.0102)***
AGE_WI 0.1509 (0.0219)*** 0.1316 (0.0215)***
AGE_BE 0.2938 (0.0296)*** 0.2673 (0.0294)***
spat error IND_BE 0.3565 (0.0349)*** 0.0230 (0.0494)
1
2
3
4
spat lag
spat lag
spat lag
spat lag
Without Occup FE With Occup FE
9095
9095
9095
9095
  
1
0
3 
Table A.9. Neighborhood Selection Model 
Alternative-Specific Conditional Logit 
Summary
Number of cases = 40568 (15% Sample)
Number of records = 2231240
Alternative variable = PUMA
Alternatives per case = 55
Wald chi2(867)  =   30362.45
Log likelihood =  -140925.2
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Case-Alternative Specific Variables
Coef z-stat
Share of people of person's ancestry in the PUMA 8.5270 79.23
Share of people of person's age group in the PUMA 4.1394 20.10
Share of people of person's educational level in the PUMA 3.3637 21.06
  
 
1
0
4 
Table A.9. Neighborhood Selection Model (continued) 
 
Alternative Specific Variables (Base outcome is PUMA 1)
Outcomes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age 0.0136 0.68 0.0037 0.16 0.0181 0.90 0.0747 3.84 0.0518 2.34 0.0690 3.34 0.0611 2.91 0.0490 2.50 0.0757 3.84 0.0194 0.97
AgeSquared -0.0002 -1.03 0.0000 -0.03 -0.0002 -1.08 -0.0010 -4.47 -0.0006 -2.54 -0.0009 -3.79 -0.0008 -3.25 -0.0006 -2.80 -0.0010 -4.32 -0.0002 -0.82
Male -0.0028 -0.02 -0.0557 -0.41 -0.0402 -0.33 -0.0189 -0.16 -0.1197 -0.88 -0.2382 -1.85 0.0686 0.53 -0.0551 -0.46 0.1563 1.29 0.0845 0.71
Black 1.4442 9.24 0.2858 1.72 0.2719 1.73 1.1619 7.58 0.8008 4.60 1.3340 8.31 1.3640 8.29 1.2737 8.29 1.2463 7.94 0.0497 0.31
Asian 0.1208 0.41 0.0662 0.23 0.7267 3.08 -0.2389 -0.73 1.2554 4.72 -0.4870 -1.17 0.4912 1.52 1.5071 6.23 -0.4311 -1.13 -0.2466 -0.86
Hispanic -0.0105 -0.07 -0.1896 -1.22 0.0016 0.01 0.4266 2.98 0.4308 2.64 0.3679 2.39 0.6345 4.03 0.6467 4.49 0.6410 4.33 0.0274 0.19
Education -0.0439 -1.95 -0.0512 -2.14 -0.0549 -2.56 -0.1062 -5.22 -0.0796 -3.51 -0.0884 -4.12 -0.0877 -4.00 -0.0913 -4.46 -0.1085 -5.31 -0.0453 -2.20
Degree in Humanities -0.3370 -1.15 -1.1129 -3.07 -0.4713 -1.68 -0.3774 -1.01 0.0810 0.25 0.1060 0.30 -0.4052 -0.94 -0.6106 -1.76 -0.5565 -1.30 1.0514 4.76
Degree in Social Sciences -0.2622 -0.98 -0.1260 -0.45 -0.2748 -1.04 -0.5505 -1.54 -0.3651 -1.04 -0.3136 -0.89 0.0269 0.08 -0.2546 -0.89 -1.0039 -2.22 0.3514 1.50
Degree in Natural Sciences -1.4676 -2.27 -0.6127 -1.22 -0.2438 -0.60 -0.3714 -0.64 -0.0105 -0.02 -0.1626 -0.28 -0.8606 -1.12 -0.0474 -0.11 -1.5451 -1.48 0.2175 0.57
Degree in Formal Sciences 0.3981 0.74 0.5676 1.06 -0.4602 -0.72 -0.9909 -0.92 0.0418 0.06 0.2655 0.37 0.3121 0.44 -0.7189 -0.89 -0.7741 -0.72 0.1947 0.36
Degree in Medical Studies 0.1823 0.55 -0.2579 -0.64 0.5563 1.75 -0.5070 -0.98 -0.0022 0.00 -0.1892 -0.39 -0.0525 -0.11 -0.1308 -0.33 -0.0875 -0.18 -0.3771 -0.94
Degree in Business -0.0355 -0.12 0.2952 1.01 -0.0890 -0.30 0.2543 0.78 -0.0137 -0.04 0.3100 0.93 0.0833 0.23 -0.0341 -0.11 0.1363 0.39 0.0376 0.13
Served in Military 0.1344 0.43 0.1111 0.34 0.2196 0.71 -0.2638 -0.75 0.5898 1.72 -0.0152 -0.04 0.1388 0.39 -0.0184 -0.06 -0.2380 -0.68 -0.6568 -1.69
Has Private Health Insurance -0.0161 -0.11 0.2631 1.55 -0.0056 -0.04 -0.2391 -1.58 -0.4606 -2.76 -0.6006 -3.68 -0.4300 -2.62 -0.1734 -1.17 -0.8001 -5.20 -0.2373 -1.59
Has Public Health Insurance 0.0433 0.26 -0.3332 -1.73 -0.0125 -0.07 0.5176 3.20 0.0100 0.06 0.3659 2.15 0.3219 1.86 0.0534 0.33 0.1447 0.91 -0.1065 -0.65
Constant 0.0485 0.09 0.3119 0.55 0.6183 1.22 -0.3030 -0.61 -0.4686 -0.83 -0.6425 -1.22 -0.8888 -1.65 -0.2033 -0.41 -0.2799 -0.56 0.1703 0.34
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age -0.0136 -0.62 0.0489 2.22 0.0355 1.64 -0.0299 -1.35 -0.0248 -1.08 -0.0225 -1.00 -0.0633 -2.64 0.0102 0.51 -0.0436 -1.92 0.0401 1.94
AgeSquared 0.0001 0.62 -0.0007 -2.69 -0.0004 -1.74 0.0004 1.60 0.0003 1.18 0.0003 1.13 0.0007 2.77 -0.0001 -0.59 0.0005 1.89 -0.0006 -2.43
Male -0.2126 -1.66 -0.0071 -0.05 0.1084 0.83 -0.2988 -2.47 0.0560 0.45 0.1796 1.47 -0.0259 -0.20 -0.0827 -0.68 0.0333 0.27 -0.0794 -0.65
Black 0.4547 2.83 1.2195 7.45 0.6449 3.91 -1.6613 -7.25 -0.7468 -3.98 -0.8031 -4.21 -1.1562 -5.16 -0.3487 -2.00 -2.4338 -7.40 -2.0513 -6.47
Asian 0.6097 2.51 0.3990 1.38 0.7548 2.97 -0.0061 -0.03 -0.0102 -0.04 0.6569 2.99 0.3458 1.48 1.0208 4.71 0.3093 1.38 0.5440 2.23
Hispanic -0.0058 -0.04 0.0938 0.56 0.2373 1.52 -1.1892 -6.68 -0.8566 -4.97 -0.6905 -4.25 -1.1497 -5.78 -0.3410 -2.29 -1.2986 -6.95 -1.2511 -6.70
Education -0.0165 -0.69 -0.0509 -2.15 -0.0429 -1.86 0.0818 3.43 0.0523 2.14 0.0648 2.64 0.0675 2.53 -0.0710 -3.46 0.0547 2.21 -0.0190 -0.84
Degree in Humanities 0.7968 3.52 0.7148 2.94 0.3044 1.15 -0.0147 -0.07 0.3104 1.49 0.0456 0.22 -0.0012 -0.01 0.6079 2.78 0.0707 0.34 -1.8741 -6.12
Degree in Social Sciences -0.0289 -0.12 0.3311 1.35 -0.2616 -0.90 0.1709 0.83 0.1405 0.66 0.0088 0.04 -0.0655 -0.30 -0.2725 -1.10 -0.1062 -0.50 -0.7753 -3.01
Degree in Natural Sciences 0.4503 1.27 -0.1816 -0.41 0.6497 1.76 -0.0552 -0.17 -0.2796 -0.82 -0.3753 -1.12 -0.4258 -1.20 -0.2576 -0.68 -0.0013 0.00 -0.6000 -1.59
Degree in Formal Sciences 0.2947 0.55 0.2651 0.46 0.5581 1.05 0.2534 0.57 -0.0511 -0.11 0.0680 0.15 0.2248 0.49 0.4179 0.89 0.0185 0.04 0.0342 0.07
Degree in Medical Studies -0.9840 -2.13 -0.6110 -1.37 -0.7541 -1.55 -0.8273 -2.48 -1.0465 -2.74 -1.3946 -3.49 -0.6298 -1.80 -1.5872 -3.06 -1.3356 -3.42 -0.3303 -0.95
Degree in Business -0.3336 -1.04 0.2496 0.86 0.3961 1.36 0.3757 1.57 0.1933 0.77 0.3330 1.39 0.3464 1.39 0.3299 1.27 0.2189 0.90 -0.2646 -0.99
Served in Military -0.5013 -1.21 -0.3877 -1.06 -0.0122 -0.04 0.0598 0.20 -0.0236 -0.08 -0.3366 -0.97 -0.1683 -0.49 -0.4488 -1.21 -1.1107 -2.56 -0.0328 -0.11
Has Private Health Insurance 0.0157 0.10 -0.1024 -0.63 -0.4436 -2.73 0.4542 2.78 0.5076 2.99 0.2540 1.56 0.8335 4.37 -0.0994 -0.66 0.6619 3.78 0.4734 2.91
Has Public Health Insurance -0.2845 -1.56 0.3129 1.76 0.1559 0.88 -0.2783 -1.47 -0.1628 -0.84 -0.3759 -1.94 -0.4135 -1.89 0.0541 0.32 -0.3171 -1.56 0.0862 0.48
Constant 0.3300 0.61 -0.8998 -1.60 -0.3896 -0.70 -0.4391 -0.78 -0.4033 -0.69 -0.5168 -0.91 -0.3115 -0.52 1.0203 2.02 0.0228 0.04 -0.4639 -0.88
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Table A.9. Neighborhood Selection Model (continued) 
 
 
  
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age 0.0243 1.19 0.0217 1.14 0.0622 2.97 0.0451 2.18 0.0565 2.72 0.0006 0.03 0.0163 0.71 0.0434 2.06 0.0587 2.76 0.0415 2.13
AgeSquared -0.0003 -1.46 -0.0003 -1.47 -0.0008 -3.34 -0.0006 -2.63 -0.0008 -3.33 0.0000 -0.22 -0.0002 -0.64 -0.0006 -2.49 -0.0007 -3.09 -0.0005 -2.53
Male 0.0094 0.08 -0.0439 -0.38 0.1072 0.91 -0.0337 -0.27 -0.1302 -1.04 -0.0109 -0.09 0.0821 0.67 -0.0552 -0.44 -0.2171 -1.67 -0.0133 -0.11
Black -1.5102 -6.66 -0.1022 -0.69 -1.8960 -8.64 0.7588 4.77 0.6134 3.88 0.2240 1.49 -0.7940 -4.15 0.9847 6.38 2.1370 11.96 1.5781 10.26
Asian 0.7768 3.48 0.4307 1.91 -0.3182 -1.36 0.4940 1.90 -0.3262 -1.05 0.3431 1.51 -0.0276 -0.11 0.2024 0.77 0.2022 0.54 1.1213 4.46
Hispanic -1.2147 -7.05 -0.4941 -3.61 -1.0413 -7.24 0.4325 2.97 -0.4219 -2.54 -0.5682 -3.81 -0.5001 -3.25 -0.8633 -4.81 0.4868 2.91 0.5553 3.84
Education -0.0350 -1.60 -0.0391 -1.88 -0.0640 -3.02 -0.1288 -6.30 -0.0859 -3.86 -0.0164 -0.74 0.0115 0.48 -0.0916 -4.18 -0.1028 -4.65 -0.1028 -5.01
Degree in Humanities -1.0495 -3.99 -0.7976 -3.21 0.3701 1.79 1.2261 5.33 0.6843 2.79 0.6653 3.27 0.5460 2.67 0.7512 3.30 -0.3483 -0.89 -1.0001 -2.35
Degree in Social Sciences -0.6481 -2.55 -0.5192 -2.17 -0.6070 -2.57 -0.1065 -0.38 -0.5248 -1.76 0.0999 0.47 -0.0960 -0.44 0.2140 0.90 -0.7529 -1.93 -0.2190 -0.74
Degree in Natural Sciences -0.1975 -0.56 -0.5911 -1.58 -0.6582 -1.75 -0.9626 -1.50 -0.5058 -1.01 -0.1398 -0.42 -0.2737 -0.80 -0.1927 -0.46 -0.6234 -0.96 -0.5339 -1.01
Degree in Formal Sciences -0.1597 -0.31 -0.3095 -0.60 -0.1830 -0.38 0.8687 1.67 0.7008 1.31 0.3038 0.68 -0.0986 -0.21 0.3127 0.59 0.8738 1.44 0.3400 0.57
Degree in Medical Studies -0.1365 -0.41 -0.2095 -0.65 -0.8400 -2.20 -0.6926 -1.33 -0.6492 -1.40 -1.4883 -3.52 -2.0129 -3.89 -0.3770 -0.98 -0.3499 -0.75 -0.1298 -0.32
Degree in Business -0.2565 -0.94 -0.0062 -0.02 -0.1348 -0.52 -0.2698 -0.78 -0.0931 -0.29 -0.3499 -1.32 -0.6016 -2.18 -0.5430 -1.65 -0.4524 -1.12 -0.1562 -0.47
Served in Military 0.4230 1.48 0.5946 2.18 -1.3658 -2.87 -0.4522 -1.09 0.0958 0.30 -0.0010 0.00 -0.7969 -1.99 -0.2363 -0.69 -0.3518 -0.96 0.0466 0.15
Has Private Health Insurance 0.2241 1.42 0.2316 1.59 -0.3989 -2.68 -0.4899 -3.23 -0.2927 -1.88 0.2200 1.44 0.2241 1.36 0.0224 0.14 -0.4092 -2.58 -0.0452 -0.31
Has Public Health Insurance -0.0008 0.00 0.0355 0.22 0.1302 0.79 -0.2622 -1.59 0.2624 1.55 -0.0632 -0.36 -0.3827 -1.98 0.1205 0.69 -0.1195 -0.69 0.0682 0.42
Constant 0.4591 0.88 0.8907 1.84 0.8054 1.55 0.9506 1.86 0.1538 0.29 0.5135 0.99 -0.3503 -0.61 0.3465 0.65 -0.6530 -1.19 0.0545 0.11
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age 0.0079 0.43 0.0100 0.49 0.0101 0.46 0.0505 2.54 0.0308 1.56 0.0403 2.09 0.0291 1.50 0.0243 1.26 0.0320 1.72 0.0286 1.33
AgeSquared -0.0001 -0.67 -0.0001 -0.59 -0.0002 -0.63 -0.0007 -3.04 -0.0004 -1.74 -0.0005 -2.53 -0.0004 -1.79 -0.0003 -1.30 -0.0004 -2.04 -0.0003 -1.30
Male 0.0000 0.00 0.0083 0.07 -0.0947 -0.72 0.0894 0.75 -0.1221 -1.04 0.1022 0.88 -0.0825 -0.70 -0.0119 -0.10 -0.0698 -0.62 -0.0186 -0.14
Black 1.1207 8.25 3.0865 15.26 1.5717 9.52 -1.0883 -5.21 -2.2578 -9.06 -2.5873 -10.22 0.0524 0.36 -2.3791 -10.17 -3.0818 -9.76 -1.0155 -5.31
Asian 0.1013 0.44 0.6738 2.00 -0.6753 -1.77 0.8516 3.94 0.4527 2.13 0.1864 0.86 0.0196 0.09 0.1950 0.91 0.4904 2.38 0.5749 2.53
Hispanic -1.1703 -7.74 -0.6463 -3.07 -0.9912 -4.81 -0.1519 -1.05 -1.3815 -8.78 -1.9120 -11.77 -1.4468 -9.06 -2.2364 -12.19 -1.5422 -10.08 -1.3610 -7.70
Education -0.0539 -2.70 -0.0521 -2.31 -0.0613 -2.58 -0.1106 -5.67 -0.0535 -2.62 -0.0871 -4.36 -0.0714 -3.49 -0.0649 -3.23 -0.0671 -3.50 -0.0140 -0.63
Degree in Humanities -0.8019 -3.25 -0.5443 -1.59 0.4345 1.62 0.5672 2.52 -0.4502 -2.01 -0.4697 -1.99 -0.0195 -0.09 -0.9233 -3.92 -0.8641 -3.58 -1.3162 -4.23
Degree in Social Sciences -0.4489 -1.98 -0.1961 -0.72 -0.1532 -0.53 -0.1104 -0.44 -0.3691 -1.61 -0.6233 -2.49 -0.2323 -1.00 -0.8323 -3.47 -0.6600 -2.77 -1.2265 -3.87
Degree in Natural Sciences -0.7952 -2.09 -0.0834 -0.19 0.1582 0.37 -0.1040 -0.27 -0.1425 -0.42 -0.1219 -0.35 -0.2513 -0.70 -0.4574 -1.33 -1.1873 -2.95 -0.9516 -2.17
Degree in Formal Sciences 0.6853 1.56 0.4155 0.75 0.0756 0.12 -0.7148 -1.19 -0.5506 -1.06 0.3424 0.74 0.7113 1.58 0.5106 1.17 0.2949 0.66 -0.4448 -0.78
Degree in Medical Studies 0.1346 0.46 -0.0539 -0.16 0.2245 0.63 -0.7120 -1.67 -0.7578 -2.13 -0.4352 -1.20 -0.1006 -0.31 -0.6909 -2.02 -0.7506 -2.13 -0.4702 -1.27
Degree in Business 0.2701 1.12 0.2262 0.79 0.2085 0.67 -0.0010 0.00 0.3621 1.49 -0.1039 -0.38 0.0852 0.33 0.0817 0.33 -0.0717 -0.29 -0.2375 -0.81
Served in Military 0.1821 0.66 -0.3893 -1.16 -0.1949 -0.54 0.2075 0.62 -0.0047 -0.02 -0.7080 -1.99 -0.4047 -1.21 0.0659 0.23 -0.0426 -0.14 -0.2844 -0.82
Has Private Health Insurance 0.2657 1.92 -0.1342 -0.90 -0.3983 -2.48 -0.4481 -3.02 -0.1685 -1.14 -0.4678 -3.18 -0.2648 -1.81 -0.1167 -0.80 -0.3739 -2.65 -0.4845 -3.02
Has Public Health Insurance -0.2500 -1.62 -0.3222 -1.92 -0.2241 -1.25 -0.0306 -0.19 0.0254 0.15 0.1765 1.09 0.0345 0.21 -0.1346 -0.82 -0.0097 -0.06 0.0963 0.54
Constant 1.3256 2.87 -0.9830 -1.83 0.4179 0.75 1.1949 2.41 1.3201 2.64 1.9127 3.95 1.5594 3.18 1.7712 3.63 1.8199 3.87 0.4457 0.81
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Table A.9. Neighborhood Selection Model (continued) 
 
 
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age 0.0197 1.03 0.0281 1.43 0.0040 0.22 -0.0052 -0.26 -0.0044 -0.24 -0.0126 -0.64 0.0363 1.70 -0.0052 -0.23 0.0252 1.22 0.0358 1.90
AgeSquared -0.0002 -1.02 -0.0003 -1.32 0.0000 0.05 0.0001 0.59 0.0000 0.24 0.0002 0.77 -0.0004 -1.56 0.0001 0.62 -0.0003 -1.11 -0.0004 -2.02
Male -0.0008 -0.01 0.0871 0.73 -0.0694 -0.63 -0.1636 -1.36 -0.0190 -0.17 -0.0046 -0.04 0.1631 1.30 -0.1280 -1.01 0.0298 0.24 -0.0324 -0.29
Black -1.0842 -6.49 -0.0604 -0.34 -1.6624 -8.20 -2.1388 -7.75 1.3887 9.79 -0.5863 -3.35 -0.2556 -1.21 -2.2238 -7.22 -1.4609 -6.12 -2.2925 -10.19
Asian 0.4422 2.07 1.7756 7.87 1.3002 6.35 1.0678 5.07 1.7065 7.97 1.5121 7.16 2.2664 9.85 1.0148 4.70 1.6896 7.87 0.0614 0.28
Hispanic -0.5915 -4.45 0.9713 6.64 -0.6759 -4.82 -0.9790 -5.88 -0.6518 -4.27 -0.4598 -3.04 0.8468 5.17 -0.9123 -5.23 -0.1160 -0.77 -0.7755 -5.93
Education -0.0700 -3.56 -0.0627 -3.12 -0.0336 -1.77 -0.0076 -0.36 -0.0427 -2.13 0.0043 0.20 -0.0509 -2.45 0.0214 0.94 -0.0302 -1.43 -0.0776 -3.93
Degree in Humanities 0.2608 1.29 0.1483 0.59 -0.6024 -2.72 -0.7659 -3.27 -0.7226 -2.87 -0.5567 -2.41 -0.5341 -1.77 -0.4716 -2.04 -0.5341 -2.17 -0.6735 -2.89
Degree in Social Sciences -0.3168 -1.46 -0.1901 -0.71 -0.6367 -2.81 -0.5854 -2.51 -0.6187 -2.60 -0.5704 -2.44 -0.6377 -2.08 -0.4596 -1.95 -0.2655 -1.12 -0.8420 -3.35
Degree in Natural Sciences -0.4990 -1.44 -0.2697 -0.65 -1.0081 -2.83 -0.9401 -2.55 -0.2836 -0.83 -0.2830 -0.86 -0.7988 -1.75 -0.4460 -1.27 -1.0316 -2.49 -1.0519 -2.56
Degree in Formal Sciences 0.1510 0.34 0.1251 0.23 0.1608 0.37 0.4545 1.05 0.3757 0.83 0.0699 0.15 0.0992 0.19 0.4555 1.03 -0.0647 -0.13 0.0498 0.10
Degree in Medical Studies -0.6582 -1.95 -0.3565 -0.89 -0.9513 -2.84 -0.5379 -1.67 -0.2455 -0.81 -0.5977 -1.84 -0.5121 -1.26 -0.9884 -2.67 -0.6223 -1.75 -0.7413 -2.03
Degree in Business -0.0177 -0.07 0.3351 1.22 0.0622 0.26 -0.1747 -0.69 0.0690 0.28 -0.1234 -0.49 -0.1651 -0.55 0.2597 1.04 0.1735 0.69 0.0155 0.06
Served in Military -0.0079 -0.03 0.2242 0.68 -0.0504 -0.17 -0.0287 -0.09 0.2482 0.90 -0.2397 -0.73 -0.4705 -1.04 0.1343 0.43 0.3833 1.20 0.0265 0.09
Has Private Health Insurance -0.2685 -1.93 -0.6389 -4.39 -0.2878 -2.10 0.2212 1.45 0.2098 1.52 0.2893 1.91 -0.7234 -4.70 0.1407 0.87 -0.5566 -3.72 -0.1442 -1.03
Has Public Health Insurance -0.3618 -2.28 -0.3656 -2.29 -0.3799 -2.47 -0.2946 -1.69 -0.3096 -1.99 -0.1447 -0.85 -0.5103 -3.02 -0.1617 -0.87 -0.3871 -2.31 -0.4615 -2.91
Constant 1.8530 3.89 0.3103 0.62 1.5421 3.32 0.6619 1.28 0.8622 1.85 0.4850 0.96 -0.2854 -0.53 -0.0621 -0.11 0.5034 0.97 1.8651 3.93
52 53 54 55
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age 0.0287 1.53 0.0234 1.30 0.0333 1.71 0.0250 1.17
AgeSquared -0.0003 -1.57 -0.0003 -1.47 -0.0004 -1.97 -0.0003 -1.37
Male 0.0295 0.26 -0.0241 -0.22 -0.0010 -0.01 -0.0396 -0.30
Black -0.4267 -2.62 1.6011 11.04 -0.0267 -0.17 0.1965 1.25
Asian 1.5648 7.41 1.6668 7.53 1.1520 5.32 -0.4391 -1.50
Hispanic 0.1054 0.79 0.0238 0.17 -0.6718 -4.52 -0.9035 -5.30
Education -0.0570 -2.91 -0.0751 -3.85 -0.0830 -4.09 -0.0534 -2.31
Degree in Humanities -0.3735 -1.56 -0.9802 -3.30 -0.9521 -3.14 -0.3189 -1.14
Degree in Social Sciences -0.7245 -2.80 -0.4186 -1.73 -0.8784 -2.90 -0.4762 -1.62
Degree in Natural Sciences -0.3912 -1.09 -0.4209 -1.10 -0.9234 -2.04 -0.7244 -1.45
Degree in Formal Sciences 0.0832 0.17 0.0356 0.07 -0.3049 -0.54 0.0041 0.01
Degree in Medical Studies -1.2687 -3.00 -0.6343 -1.82 -0.3874 -1.05 0.1390 0.39
Degree in Business 0.1237 0.49 -0.1196 -0.45 -0.3254 -1.08 0.1647 0.55
Served in Military 0.2949 1.00 0.5018 1.87 0.1806 0.58 0.1112 0.35
Has Private Health Insurance -0.3221 -2.30 -0.1903 -1.40 -0.0919 -0.62 0.0204 0.12
Has Public Health Insurance -0.2644 -1.70 -0.3446 -2.28 -0.0466 -0.28 0.2369 1.31
Constant 0.9857 2.08 0.7636 1.66 1.1651 2.37 0.4274 0.78
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Table A.10. Occupation Selection Model 
 
 
 
Occupational 
Group
2010 Census 
Occupation Code Description
Number of distinct 
ocupations Comments
1 0010-0430 Management Occupations 27
2 0500-0950 Business and Financial Operations Occupations 28
3 1000-1965 Computer, Engineering, and Science Occupations 50
4 2000-2060, 2200-2550 Education, Community, and Social Service Occupations 19
5 2100-2160 Legal Occupations 4
6 2600-2960 Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations 18
7 3000-3540 Healthcare Practitioners 31
8 3600-4650 Service Occupations 65 4 sub-branches
9 4700-5940 Sales and Office Occupations 68 2 sub-branches
10 6000-7630 Natural Resources and Construction Occupations 72 2 sub-branches
11 7700-9750 Production and Transportation Occupations 96 3 sub-branches
12 9800-9920 Military Occupations 5
13 NA Not Employed 1
Upper Branch Selection Model Characteristics
Alternative-Specific Conditional Logit
Summary
Number of cases = 270402
Number of records = 3515226
Alternative variable = occupational groups
Alternatives per case = 13
Log likelihood = -468402.83
Case-Alternative Specific Variables
Coef z-stat
Kids in family * Weekly working hours in the occupation 0.0023 3.60
Share of people of person's English level in the occupation -1.2538 -
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Table A.10.  Occupation Selection Model (continued) 
Outcomes 2 3 4 5 6 7
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age 0.0644 9.96 0.0635 8.89 0.0161 3.06 0.0339 3.24 0.0857 12.53 0.1028 14.52
AgeSquared -0.0009 -12.17 -0.0010 -11.38 -0.0003 -4.70 -0.0007 -5.68 -0.0012 -15.18 -0.0012 -14.31
Male -0.2281 -8.70 0.5221 17.45 -0.8766 -36.98 -0.1655 -4.28 -0.0414 -1.49 -0.7792 -25.34
Black 0.2301 6.20 0.0938 2.14 0.7165 23.77 0.1466 2.51 -0.4640 -10.12 0.8480 22.86
Asian 0.4409 11.48 0.4441 10.84 -0.2572 -6.68 -0.1446 -2.18 0.0838 1.88 0.4892 11.51
Hispanic 0.0889 2.00 -0.0865 -1.72 0.4663 12.93 0.3404 5.06 -0.1688 -3.45 0.0580 1.20
Education 0.1561 21.86 0.3183 45.18 0.3966 70.76 0.5250 55.13 0.1340 18.18 0.2134 29.83
Degree in Humanities -0.3014 -6.87 -1.1641 -24.11 -0.6885 -19.59 -0.1457 -2.84 0.7150 18.09 -1.2240 -21.70
Degree in Social Sciences -0.0523 -1.25 -1.1589 -24.19 -1.0374 -28.35 -0.0249 -0.49 -1.0335 -20.61 -1.1889 -21.84
Degree in Natural Sciences -0.6248 -7.62 -0.3958 -6.03 -1.0617 -17.00 -1.2115 -11.53 -1.1393 -11.85 0.9579 15.78
Degree in Formal Sciences -0.1634 -2.31 0.5013 8.76 -1.1237 -16.50 -1.2310 -9.53 -1.1656 -11.49 -1.4513 -13.15
Degree in Medical Studies -0.9828 -8.53 -1.3574 -11.76 -1.4626 -18.12 -1.6801 -9.23 -1.5430 -10.16 2.1015 33.00
Degree in Business 0.6136 16.70 -1.6362 -32.43 -2.1510 -48.41 -1.1835 -17.53 -1.6739 -27.61 -2.1038 -30.83
Served in Military 0.1173 1.55 0.1295 1.61 -0.2833 -3.94 0.2751 2.55 -0.2797 -3.01 0.1154 1.34
Has Private Health Insurance 0.3407 8.25 0.3604 7.88 0.0137 0.41 0.3250 4.74 -0.3460 -8.91 0.2673 6.07
Has Public Health Insurance 0.4047 8.01 0.2489 4.35 0.8223 20.63 0.4612 5.59 0.3519 6.95 0.3715 7.16
Family Size -0.0193 -1.67 -0.0468 -3.60 0.1664 17.91 -0.0329 -1.72 -0.2373 -16.54 0.0786 6.70
People under 18 in Family -0.1600 -4.18 -0.1419 -3.35 -0.2157 -7.29 0.1163 1.92 0.0520 1.20 -0.0533 -1.35
Seniors over 65 in Family 0.2418 7.72 0.2441 7.04 0.0067 0.25 0.2174 4.30 0.2256 6.14 0.2368 7.43
Speaking English Very Well 0.0419 1.25 0.3401 9.33 0.0354 1.20 -0.5618 -10.92 -0.3981 -10.56 0.4675 12.69
Speaking English Well -0.0012 -0.02 0.5806 10.76 0.0906 1.95 -0.9616 -8.58 -0.3553 -5.76 0.5170 9.54
Speaking English Not Well -0.3639 -3.78 0.0763 0.76 -0.2125 -2.82 -1.3929 -5.68 -0.3511 -3.72 -0.0353 -0.37
Not Speaking English -0.2539 -1.15 0.0977 0.38 -0.1928 -1.16 -0.8375 -1.63 0.0203 0.11 -0.1273 -0.58
Constant -4.1815 -25.99 -6.7903 -39.07 -5.9281 -44.99 -9.8555 -38.87 -2.7459 -16.50 -6.4481 -36.28
Outcomes 8 9 10 11 12 13
Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat Coef z-stat
Age 0.1063 24.57 0.0444 10.63 0.1872 31.11 0.1760 32.66 -0.0369 -4.86 -0.2550 -62.51
AgeSquared -0.0013 -26.24 -0.0007 -14.65 -0.0021 -29.88 -0.0019 -30.54 -0.0002 -1.63 0.0029 60.22
Male -0.2774 -14.07 -0.5111 -27.02 3.3471 61.95 1.3059 50.84 -0.1157 -3.09 -0.5455 -27.79
Black 1.0766 41.28 0.5073 19.86 0.4670 13.65 0.8565 27.33 1.1181 23.88 0.4794 18.38
Asian 0.1599 5.09 0.3066 10.42 -0.4567 -10.26 0.3682 9.91 0.3708 6.06 0.1422 4.62
Hispanic 0.6345 20.96 0.4219 14.26 0.3618 9.44 0.6988 19.79 0.6694 12.68 0.2802 9.27
Education -0.1075 -23.34 -0.0177 -3.80 -0.1037 -19.22 -0.1092 -21.83 -0.0630 -7.89 -0.1378 -30.19
Degree in Humanities -0.9036 -22.82 -0.7508 -22.34 -1.5785 -21.40 -1.0316 -18.08 -1.0880 -9.43 -0.7043 -18.42
Degree in Social Sciences -1.2890 -29.80 -0.9154 -26.57 -2.1887 -22.33 -1.4934 -22.11 -1.0964 -9.83 -0.8805 -21.83
Degree in Natural Sciences -0.8113 -11.51 -0.9369 -15.16 -1.4115 -11.06 -1.1724 -11.01 -0.3655 -2.39 -0.4090 -6.23
Degree in Formal Sciences -1.6963 -19.11 -0.9517 -15.62 -1.2474 -11.55 -1.4228 -13.23 -0.7061 -4.12 -0.7072 -9.59
Degree in Medical Studies -0.5286 -6.99 -1.1523 -15.18 -1.7571 -7.34 -1.4153 -8.95 -0.5348 -2.85 -0.3121 -4.20
Degree in Business -1.7026 -40.85 -0.8143 -25.96 -2.0810 -28.44 -1.6875 -29.24 -1.4528 -13.62 -1.2758 -31.70
Served in Military 0.0589 1.07 -0.1321 -2.41 0.1094 1.72 -0.0363 -0.59 0.8409 8.81 -0.0761 -1.46
Has Private Health Insurance -0.4633 -17.35 -0.2845 -10.81 -0.5951 -17.85 -0.4513 -14.62 -1.1567 -23.87 -0.7897 -29.98
Has Public Health Insurance 0.6325 19.36 0.6673 20.50 0.0813 2.01 0.5893 16.14 1.1357 23.05 1.4158 44.14
Family Size 0.0952 12.07 0.1011 13.10 0.1204 12.27 0.1294 14.39 0.2170 18.49 0.1073 13.71
People under 18 in Family -0.1505 -6.36 -0.2379 -10.27 -0.0191 -0.56 -0.1316 -4.26 -0.3613 -7.25 -0.0266 -
Seniors over 65 in Family 0.1344 5.89 0.1812 8.16 0.1190 4.07 0.1619 6.22 0.1295 3.26 -0.0968 -4.30
Speaking English Very Well 0.1828 6.95 0.1034 4.22 0.0292 0.80 0.2646 8.00 0.1454 2.91 0.0284 1.10
Speaking English Well 1.0150 27.20 0.3199 8.66 1.0120 21.83 1.2701 29.90 0.3522 4.92 0.5707 15.19
Speaking English Not Well 1.6068 30.60 0.3077 5.71 1.6237 26.65 1.7962 31.49 0.7878 9.15 1.0355 19.65
Not Speaking English 1.6602 15.57 0.1422 1.27 1.5183 12.82 1.8584 16.72 1.3702 9.90 1.2609 11.84
Constant 0.1253 1.18 0.9277 9.02 -5.4819 -35.95 -3.8957 -29.42 0.4226 2.37 7.6490 75.57
Alternative Specific Variables (Base outcome is Occupational Group 1)
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Table A.11. SARAR(1,0) Self-Selection Corrected Models of LogIncome: One 
Factor 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
Reg No N
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.4028 223323
2SLS
1 PUMCOR 1.5945 (0.0385)*** 0.4074 223323
2 SPCOR 2.0503 (0.0589)*** 0.4061 223323
PUMCOR 1.9690 (0.0882)***
SPCOR -0.6356 (0.1368)***
4 ANC 0.1396 (0.0105)*** 0.4035 223318
5 ANC_CIT 0.0347 (0.0034)*** 0.4031 223315
6 ANC_NCIT 0.0460 (0.0029)*** 0.4030 222945
ANC_CIT 0.0203 (0.0037)***
ANC_NCIT 0.0330 (0.0033)***
8 ANC_WICOR 0.2317 (0.0105)*** 0.4047 223323
9 ANC_BECOR 0.1373 (0.0090)*** 0.4037 223323
ANC_WICOR 0.6673 (0.0296)***
ANC_BECOR -0.3902 (0.0256)***
Employment 11 OCCCOR 0.7151 (0.0227)*** 0.4076 223323
12 IND 0.4382 (0.0055)*** 0.4172 223319
13 OCCINDCOR 0.5432 (0.0071)*** 0.4218 223323
OCCCOR 0.6226 (0.0173)***
IND 0.4262 (0.0056)***
OCCCOR 0.4033 (0.0232)***
IND -0.1394 (0.0279)***
OCCINDCOR 0.6747 (0.0328)***
16 OCCCOR 0.4522 (0.0224)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5178 (0.0075)***
17 OCC_WICOR 0.8325 (0.0222)*** 0.4097 223323
18 OCC_BECOR 0.7133 (0.0228)*** 0.4075 223323
OCC_WICOR 1.7566 (0.0710)***
OCC_BECOR -0.9161 (0.0738)***
20 IND_WICOR 0.5085 (0.0072)*** 0.4220 223323
21 IND_BECOR 0.4379 (0.0066)*** 0.4177 223323
IND_WICOR 0.8929 (0.0209)***
IND_BECOR -0.3623 (0.0193)***
OCC_WICOR 1.7356 (0.0823)***
IND_WICOR 0.1222 (0.0210)***
OCCCOR -1.1324 (0.0861)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4019 (0.0217)***
24 OCC_WICOR 0.6159 (0.0220)***
IND_WICOR 0.2435 (0.0188)*** 0.4266
OCCINDCOR 0.2734 (0.0194)***
IND_WICOR 0.2624 (0.0197)***
OCCCOR 0.5143 (0.0230)***
OCCINDCOR 0.2577 (0.0205)***
26 AGE 0.3883 (0.0041)*** 0.4323 223323
27 AGE_WICOR 1.2197 (0.0121)*** 0.4348 223323
28 AGE_BECOR 1.1861 (0.0124)*** 0.4302 223323
AGE_WICOR 1.0066 (0.0366)***
AGE_BECOR 0.2217 (0.0391)***
Ancestry
7 0.4033 222940
10 0.4056 223323
Geo
3 0.4074 223323
0.4209 223319
23 0.4279 223323
15 0.4241 223319
14
223323
0.4238 223323
19 0.4112 223323
22 0.4234 223323
25 0.4252 223323
AgeGroup
29 0.4346 223323
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Table A.12. SARAR(1,0) Self-Selection Corrected Models of LogIncome: Two, 
Three and Four Factors 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
  
Reg No N
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Rsq
OLS 0 0.4028 223323
2SLS
OCC_WICOR 0.4213 (0.0222)***
IND_WICOR 0.0824 (0.0189)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4259 (0.0198)***
AGE 0.3642 (0.0041)***
OCC_WICOR 0.4096 (0.0220)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5035 (0.0077)***
AGE 0.3658 (0.0041)***
OCC_WICOR 0.5718 (0.0225)***
IND_WICOR 0.2198 (0.0189)***
OCCINDCOR 0.2980 (0.0196)***
ANC_WICOR 0.1047 (0.0102)***
AGE 0.3850 (0.0041)***
ANC_WICOR 0.1733 (0.0096)***
OCC_WICOR 0.3814 (0.0228)***
IND_WICOR 0.0618 (0.0194)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4472 (0.0203)***
AGE 0.3636 (0.0041)***
ANC_WICOR 0.0995 (0.0097)***
OCC_WICOR 0.3705 (0.0225)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5044 (0.0077)***
AGE 0.3648 (0.0041)***
ANC_WICOR 0.1055 (0.0096)***
Employment 
and 
Ancestry
3 0.4270
0.4516
Age and 
Ancestry
4 0.4335
223323
223323
All Factors
5
Employment 
and Age
1 0.4513 223323
2 0.4510 223323
223323
6 0.4514 223323
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Table A.13. SARAR(0,1) Self-Selection Corrected Models of LogIncome 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
  
Reg No Spatial Error N
rho Robust S.E. z-stat
1 PUMCOR 2.2928 (0.3591)*** 6.38 9095
2 SPCOR 1.4445 (0.4562)*** 3.17 9095
3 OCCCOR -2122.1270 (6823.9590) -0.31 9095
4 OCCINDCOR 0.1179 (0.0364)*** 3.24 9095
5 OCC_WICOR 0.4970 (0.2585)* 1.92 9095
6 OCC_BECOR 16.8382 (10.5864) 1.59 9095
7 IND_WICOR 0.2250 (0.0410)*** 5.48 9095
8 IND_BECOR 0.2058 (0.0473)*** 4.35 9095
9 ANC_WICOR 0.1096 (0.0373)*** 2.94 9095
10 ANC_BECOR 0.0945 (0.0473)** 2.00 9095
11 AGE_WICOR 2.2928 (0.3591)*** 6.38 9095
12 AGE_BECOR -292.0338 (377.9202) -0.77 9095
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Table A.14. SARAR(1,0) Self-Selection Corrected Models of LogIncome: Large 
Sample and Subsample 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
  
Reg No N
2SLS
OCC_WICOR 0.3814 (0.0228)***
IND_WICOR 0.0618 (0.0194)***
OCCINDCOR 0.4472 (0.0203)***
AGE 0.3636 (0.0041)***
ANC_WICOR 0.0995 (0.0097)***
OCC_WICOR 0.3705 (0.0225)***
OCCINDCOR 0.5044 (0.0077)***
AGE 0.3648 (0.0041)***
ANC_WICOR 0.1055 (0.0096)***
OCC_WICOR 0.4478 (0.1018)***
IND_WICOR 0.1092 (0.0970)
OCCINDCOR 0.2145 (0.1046)**
AGE 0.3964 (0.0224)***
ANC_WICOR 0.0472 (0.0623)
OCC_WICOR 0.4259 (0.0985)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3149 (0.0372)***
AGE 0.3987 (0.0224)***
ANC_WICOR 0.0589 (0.0613)
OCC_WICOR 0.4433 (0.0939)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3146 (0.0372)***
AGE 0.3995 (0.0223)***
S3 0.4735 9095
S1 0.4740 9095
S2 0.4736 9095
223323
L2 0.4514 223323
Coef Bootstrap S.E. Rsq
L1 0.4516
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Table A.15. SARAR(1,1) Self-Selection Corrected Models of LogIncome 
 
Note: *, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See Table 3 for the explanation of notation of 
weighting matrices. All models include occupation fixed effects. 
Reg No N
Coef Bootstrap S.E.
2SLS
OCC_WICOR 0.4668 (0.0930)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3273 (0.0355)***
AGE 0.3985 (0.0223)***
spat error OCCINDCOR -0.0069 (0.0401)
OCC_WICOR 0.4542 (0.0936)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3204 (0.0376)***
AGE 0.3977 (0.0223)***
spat error IND_WICOR 0.1011 (0.0434)**
OCC_WICOR 0.4530 (0.0935)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3255 (0.0363)***
AGE 0.3983 (0.0223)***
spat error IND_BECOR 0.0510 (0.0538)
OCC_WICOR 0.4330 (0.0942)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3133 (0.0369)***
AGE 0.3989 (0.0223)***
spat error ANC_WICOR 0.0481 (0.0355)
OCC_WICOR 0.4387 (0.0941)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3112 (0.0369)***
AGE 0.3992 (0.0223)***
spat error ANC_BECOR 0.0662 (0.0431)
OCC_WICOR 0.4444 (0.0976)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3281 (0.0356)***
AGE 0.3977 (0.0223)***
ANC_WICOR 0.0645 (0.0613)
spat error OCCINDCOR -0.0062 (0.0400)
OCC_WICOR 0.4396 (0.0980)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3217 (0.0377)***
AGE 0.3969 (0.0224)***
ANC_WICOR 0.0542 (0.0610)
spat error IND_WICOR 0.1003 (0.0434)**
OCC_WICOR 0.4350 (0.0979)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3259 (0.0363)***
AGE 0.3976 (0.0224)***
ANC_WICOR 0.0559 (0.0610)
spat error IND_BECOR 0.0513 (0.0537)
OCC_WICOR 0.3910 (0.0982)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3146 (0.0369)***
AGE 0.3978 (0.0224)***
ANC_WICOR 0.1085 (0.0622)
spat error ANC_WICOR 0.0327 (0.0363)
OCC_WICOR 0.4014 (0.0979)***
OCCINDCOR 0.3116 (0.0369)***
AGE 0.3982 (0.0223)***
ANC_WICOR 0.1068 (0.0624)*
spat error ANC_BECOR 0.0546 (0.0440)
9
spat lag
9095
10
spat lag
9095
7
spat lag
9095
8
spat lag
9095
spat lag
9095
6
spat lag
9095
4
spat lag
9095
5
2
spat lag
9095
3
spat lag
9095
1
spat lag
9095
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